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This thesis makes a connection between the histories of public sector audit and those 
of Parliament and public administration.1 In so doing, it reveals important findings 
that provide a precedent for retaining the independent Auditor General as a 
fundamental requirement of Australia's Westminster-based constitutional 
arrangements, and which are essential for enabling an informed defence against 
potential erosion of effectiveness. As a secondary purpose, this study also 
substantially contributes to filling significant gaps in the specific history of the 
Auditor General’s role in Western Australia between 1829 and 1891, using new data 
identified in archival official correspondence and other original source material.  
 
How and why the principles of independence in public sector audit came to be seen 
as essential for democratic accountability are questions that have received limited 
attention from scholars, even though the field of accounting and auditing history (in 
both the public and private sectors) has many ongoing discussions and a wealth of 
already-published research. Nineteenth-century public sector auditors in Britain and 
in the Australian colonies were understood to provide essential controls in managing 
public finances, but they operated as an arm of Executive government. It is the 
nineteenth-century transition of the Auditor General from an Executive functionary 
to an independent officer of Parliament that is of interest here. Appointing an 
independent Auditor General provided a crucial strengthening of Parliament's 
historically-claimed constitutional power over the Executive. 
 
In providing a new narrative description of the development of audit independence in 
a Westminster jurisdiction, this thesis delivers a foundational understanding to 
inform improvements in policy and legislative development and to substantially add 
to Australian and international discourse around the constitutional framework within 
which the Auditor General works as an independent officer of Parliament.  
                                                 
1 The formatting used throughout this thesis is in accordance with Curtin University requirements and 
APA style. The words "Parliament" and "Executive" and their derivatives are generally capitalised as 
they refer to political entities of significant relevance to the arguments here around democratic 
governance. The non-hyphenated form of "Auditor General" is used (except in a few instances where 
the hyphenated form is specific to a particular jurisdiction or quote) as it is the one used by the Office 
of the Auditor General in Western Australia and was the usual form in nineteenth-century documents. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY2 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
An independent Auditor General is seen as critical to modern day Parliamentary 
sovereignty (Commonwealth Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, 1996; 
Dewar, 1988; Funnell, 2003, 2007; Kiraka, Clark, and De Martinis, 2002; 
Normanton, 1966). This thesis examines the origins and development of that 
independence in Western Australia and Britain by considering the development of 
public sector audit in the nineteenth century.3 
 
The Westminster-based system of democratic government was exported to many 
countries as a bequest of Britain’s imperial past. In each of these jurisdictions, the 
modern system relies on a combination of a written constitution and unwritten 
precedent; that is, a part-written constitution. Further, modern Westminster-based 
democracies have public sector audit functions based on those established in Britain 
during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Baker and Rennie, 2013; 
Colquhoun, 2011; Di Francesco, 1999; Funnell, 1994a, 1994b; Funnell, Cooper, and 
Lee, 2012). 
 
An element of that system recognises the importance of an independent Auditor 
General as assisting in providing an assurance of government (Executive) 
accountability and transparency (Commonwealth Joint Committee of Public 
Accounts and Audit, 2010; Gilchrist and Coulson, 2015; Thomas, 2003). Indeed, 
independent auditing of the expenditure of public funds is an essential part of modern 
constitutional safeguards (Funnell et al., 2012; Normanton, 1966). However, this 
understanding of the Auditor General’s role is relatively new. Auditors (whether 
public sector-focused or private sector) were not a new idea when Australia was first 
                                                 
2 A brief note on formatting and spellings used in this thesis: the formatting used throughout is in 
accordance with Curtin University requirements and APA style. The words "Parliament" and 
"Executive" and their derivatives are generally capitalised throughout as they refer to political entities 
of significant relevance to the arguments here around democratic governance. The non-hyphenated 
form of "Auditor General" is used throughout (except in a few instances where the hyphenated term is 
specific to a particular jurisdiction or quote) as this form is used by the Office of the Auditor General 
in Western Australia and, additionally, was the usual form in most nineteenth-century documents. 
3 The term "public sector audit" is generally used in this thesis, although some other research refers to 
it as "state audit". 
2 
colonised by Britain in 1788 (Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts, 
1785; Di Francesco, 1999; New South Wales Auditor General's Office, 1963) but the 
nature of their role and relationship with the Executive was different. Nineteenth-
century administrators understood public sector auditors in Britain and in the 
Australian colonies as providing an essential control in the management of public 
finances, but they were clearly an arm of Executive government.  
 
Public sector audit in Australia and Britain underwent an almost complete 
transformation during the nineteenth century. The role of the Auditor General 
changed from providing an administrative function for Executive government to that 
of an independent officer of Parliament operating as a check on Executive 
government. The appointment of an independent Auditor General was a significant 
strengthening of Parliament's historically-claimed constitutional power to control 
Executive expenditure. The transfer of this power did not happen easily. 
Notwithstanding the modern prominence of an independent Auditor General, 
research on this transition is limited, perhaps because of the difficulty in undertaking 
the interdisciplinary crossover necessary to connect the histories of public sector 
audit with those of Parliaments and public administrations.  
 
This thesis does make that connection and reveals important findings that increase 
the understanding of the Auditor General's constitutional role in modern democratic 
governance. These findings provide a precedent for retaining the independent 
Auditor General as a fundamental requirement of Australia's Westminster-based 
constitutional arrangements, and are essential for enabling an informed defence 
against potential erosion of effectiveness. Without a full understanding of the 
precedents by which government functions, and how these precedents were obtained, 
the risk of losing them is increased (Bunn, Pilcher, and Gilchrist, in press; Finn, 
1987; Pilcher, Gilchrist, Singh, and Singh, 2013). 
 
1.2 RESEARCH SCOPE 
 
The intent of this thesis is to examine the origins of the concept of an independent 
Auditor General in the nineteenth-century Western Australian and British Imperial 
contexts. The work is, therefore, not intrinsically concerned with audit theory but, 
3 
rather, the precedent of independence in the modern office of the Auditor General as 
it pertains to the Westminster system of government. This thesis explores the 
development of public sector audit independence in the nineteenth century by means 
of a focus on the Auditor General role in one British colonial jurisdiction—the Swan 
River colony (now Perth) of Western Australia.  
 
There were several reasons for choosing the Swan River colony jurisdiction. Firstly, 
the Western Australian colonial period neatly spans the period of public sector audit 
development that is most pertinent to the questions being asked. The constitutional 
transformations in this colony, particularly to representative then to responsible 
government in 1870 and 1890 respectively, proved to be integral to the 
implementation of an independent Auditor General as a legislative check on 
Executive expenditure. Secondly, the evidence to address this overlooked area of 
research was readily available in rich sources of empirical data. Thirdly, this was 
only the third British colony to be established in Australia but, notably, it was the 
first non-penal settlement in Australia and was not an Imperially promoted scheme of 
settlement. Combined with its relative isolation from the colonies in Eastern 
Australia, the effect was that the government's administrative and constitutional 
frameworks in Western Australia were less subject to the sometimes volatile events 
of the earlier penal colonies in Australia.  
 
The time frame is primarily restricted to the beginnings of the colony in 1829 
through to the passage of the Audit Act 1891 (WA). This mid-nineteenth century 
period was a formative time for the development of many administrative processes in 
democratic governance, especially in Britain and its many colonies, and some of 
these processes have been well studied (as is discussed in Chapter 2). Public sector 
audit has not been so favoured, although it also underwent considerable changes in 
this same period.  
 
By providing an understanding of the development of audit independence, the 
contextual analysis of this thesis significantly adds to understanding of an issue of 
central importance to modern Australian and international public sector audit. As a 
secondary purpose, this study also substantially contributes to filling major gaps in 
the specific history of the Auditor General’s role in Western Australia between 1829 
4 
and 1891, using new data identified in archival official correspondence and other 
original source material.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
How and why the principles of independence in public sector audit came to be seen 
as essential for democratic accountability are questions that have had limited 
attention from scholars, even though the field of accounting and auditing history (in 
both the public and private sectors) has many ongoing discussions and a wealth of 
already-published research findings.4 In summary, the contextual historical analysis 
of this thesis seeks to respond to two primary research questions:  
 
1. Why did the principles of independent public sector audit come to 
be recognised in the nineteenth century as a key accountability 
mechanism for democratic government?  
 
2. How were those principles implemented in regard to the Auditor 
General’s role in Western Australia between 1829 and 1891?  
 
In addressing these questions it is expected that the results of this research will 
enhance understanding by: (1) identifying major themes in both Western Australian 
public sector audit practice and in Westminster constitutional development; (2) 
synthesising a new chronological and contextual narrative on the topic; and (3) 
generating a conceptual framework describing public sector audit independence. 
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
 
The imperative of having an Auditor General with independence from the Executive 
government is a central proposition of contemporary public sector audit and 
government accountability. This thesis provides an essential platform for 
understanding the foundation of the Auditor General's role as an independent officer 
of Parliament and of the constitutional framework within which that officer works. 
The primary concern is the constitutional significance of Auditor General 
independence to the present state of Executive accountability.  
                                                 
4 These discussions and findings are considered in more detail in Chapter 2. See also Bisman (2012); 
Bunn et al. (in press); Carnegie and Napier (1996); Fleischman and Radcliffe (2005); Funnell (2007); 
Moussalli (2008); Sargiacomo and Gomes (2011).  
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Australian governments at both the national and state levels follow the British model 
of a Westminster-based system of democratic governance, at the heart of which is the 
concept that political authority should be limited by law. The Australian Constitution 
implements the concept of democratic governance by dividing and separating the 
powers to govern amongst three separate bodies—the judiciary, Parliament, and 
Executive government. This arrangement has developed over centuries and, as each 
body provides checks and balances on the others, is intended in modern times to 
prevent oppressive government by ensuring that elected legislators and public 
administrators do not abuse their power and remain accountable and responsive to 
the people. Parliament is further enabled to scrutinise Executive government activity 
through the operations of its independent officers, which have various protections 
(usually legislative) to safeguard their actions from Executive influence and which 
ensure their ability to report to Parliament on Executive activities without fear or 
favour (Constitutional Centre of Western Australia, 2006).  
 
The finances of government have long been the cause of constitutional dissatisfaction 
in history and certainly were at the root of the seventeenth century Civil Wars in 
Britain (Maitland, 1911). To ensure sound financial governance, control today is 
balanced between the Executive and Parliament. The Parliament authorises supply in 
the context of the Executive’s request and the Executive uses supply to implement its 
policy program. The Auditor General is the independent officer supporting the 
Parliament in its oversight of the Executive's use of public funds. In providing a 
check on the financial activities of government and an assurance to Parliament, the 
Auditor General's role in examining the effectiveness and efficiency related to public 
sector expenditure is critical to Parliament retaining financial control and power 
(Normanton, 1966). 
 
Public sector audit is, therefore, the essential link in ensuring the constitutional 
Parliamentary "power of the purse" and it is the relationship of the Executive and the 
Parliament that is of interest in this thesis: specifically, the nineteenth-century 
transition of the Auditor General from a non-independent officer of the Executive to 
an independent officer of Parliament. The quest for Auditor General independence 
was about the transfer of the power to control financial expenditure from the 
Executive government to the fully representative and responsible Parliament.  
6 
The answers to the two thesis questions provide the major findings. Firstly, that 
Auditor General independence was largely implemented in the nineteenth century 
because of a growing understanding that it could provide an effective check on 
Executive government expenditure and thereby strengthen Parliament's historical 
constitutional "power of the purse". Secondly, the case study narrative of Western 
Australia answers the thesis question about how the principles of Auditor General 
independence were implemented, demonstrating the long struggle between the 
Parliament and the Executive government for control of public finances. This 
nineteenth-century battle to obtain constitutional control over public finances (via an 
independent Auditor General operating as an officer of Parliament), although largely 
now forgotten, was real and hard-fought. It deserves more recognition, for several 
reasons touched on below.  
 
Perhaps the most important of these reasons is that the permanence and effectiveness 
of the Auditor General’s role in ensuring accountable and open government today 
cannot be taken for granted. Understanding the foundation of the Auditor General’s 
role, and the framework within which that officer works, is essential for its defence 
against any erosion of effectiveness—as is the case with all constitutional 
arrangements based in the Westminster system. Even in an open democracy, there is 
inherent tension in the relationship between Executive government and the 
"watchdog" appointed to scrutinise and report on its expenditure of public money 
(for example, see the attempt in the late 1990s of the then-Victorian Premier, Jeff 
Kennett, to effectively privatise the Office of the Auditor General (English, 2003; 
Nagy, 2002)). 
 
Another important reason is that the process of development provides essential 
precedents informing the part-written constitutions of the Commonwealth (or 
Federal) government and each of the Australian states. The reliance on unwritten 
conventions (which Mann (2014, p. 36) defined as "rules which are generally 
observed but have no legal force") means that the process of judicial review and the 
operation of precedent are integral to constitutional law. Without an appreciation of 
the conditions by which governments function, and their development trajectory 
(including precedents relating to the purpose, powers and functioning of public 
sector auditors), it becomes difficult to protect essential controls in constitutional 
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arrangements which are only partly written (Finn, 1987; Gilchrist and Coulson, 2015; 
Pilcher et al., 2013).  
 
Furthermore, to date there has been no significant or comprehensive research 
regarding the development of the Auditor General’s place in Western Australian 
public governance and its importance in relation to either democratic accountability 
or public sector audit. This history is vital for educators and policy-makers alike in 
terms of current public sector audit practice and government accountability.  
 
Much more than a correction of an oversight in parochial historiography, the focus of 
this thesis provides a new narrative description of the development of audit 
independence in a Westminster jurisdiction—a foundational understanding that will 
inform improvements in policy and legislative development and which will 
substantially add to the Australian and international discourse. 
 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THESIS 
 
A schematic overview of the thesis structure and the chapter connections is included 
as Appendix 1. In summary, Chapter 1 provides an overview of, and the background 
to, the thesis, along with the two key research questions. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 provide evidence demonstrating the rationale for the thesis 
framework. The review of literature relating to public sector audit history, 
predominantly in Britain and Australia, finds the origin of the concept of 
independence in public sector audit is an under-researched area particularly in terms 
of why and how the concept became entrenched in the nineteenth century (Chapter 
2). A justification is provided in Chapter 3 for the adopted research paradigm of a 
qualitative and inductive intellectual history in the tradition of the Sussex School. 
The research methodology and theoretical framework are also examined, and the 




The extensive data identified during the initial phase of the research were analysed in 
the second phase and used to synthesise the findings presented in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis.  
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide a contextual background to answer the thesis question 
about why the concept of Auditor General independence became understood as a 
fundamental accountability mechanism, by demonstrating its increasing use by the 
British Parliament over the centuries as a tool for enabling a check on Executive 
government expenditure both in Britain and in its several colonies. In Chapter 4, the 
association between public sector audit and political power is discussed and a 
contextual overview provided of the British Parliament's increasingly successful 
efforts for direct financial control over Executive government expenditure, 
particularly throughout the nineteenth century. A connection is identified between 
the implementation of public sector audit legislation that strengthened Parliament's 
constitutional control of public finances with other political and social constitutional 
reforms that established a more representative and accountable government—a 
narrative linking the history of public sector audit with Parliamentary and 
constitutional history. Chapter 5 examines the operation of public finances in 
Imperial Britain's many colonies during the first half of the nineteenth century, and 
the various political, administrative and cultural mechanisms used for oversight and 
control. Chapter 6 considers how these financial management instruments were 
applied in the first half-century of the British colony of New South Wales. Early 
problems arising from fluctuating responsibilities between major controlling entities, 
and deficiencies in instructions, audit processes and the personal integrity of core 
personnel, are shown to have resulted in the subsequent preparation and 
implementation of a new system of colonial audit in the 1820s and 1830s. 
 
Chapters 7-9 provide a case study narrative to answer the second thesis question: 
how the principles of Auditor General independence were implemented in the British 
colony of Western Australia. The operation of public sector audit in the Swan River 
colony, and the attempts to implement effective legislative control of government 
finances, are presented in this narrative. It is clearly demonstrated that colonists 
increasingly understood their constitutional right to control Executive government 
expenditure to be fundamentally linked to the constitutional status of the colony as a 
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whole and the role of the Auditor General. This understanding is demonstrated 
repeatedly from the very first year of operation of the colony's Legislative Council 
(1832) and throughout the many decades before obtaining a fully responsible 
government (in 1890). It is most clearly seen in the battle to implement an 
independent Auditor General in 1880. 
 
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes this thesis, summarising the major findings and 
implications: that the nineteenth-century implementation of Auditor General 
independence was understood as fundamentally linked to the historical constitutional 
"power of the purse" held by Parliaments in Westminster-based democracies. 
Moreover, the struggle in the nineteenth century to obtain that control (an 
independent Auditor General operating as an officer of Parliament), although largely 




Independent Auditors General, or Supreme Audit Institutions, are today found 
throughout the world but the scope of this research analysis was restricted to one 
jurisdiction in a critical time frame, namely, the nineteenth century Western 
Australian Colonial Audit Office in the context of contemporaneous developments in 
Imperial government. This limitation was necessary to maintain a tight focus on the 
thesis objectives within the time constraints and amount of potential data. Some brief 
references are, however, made to relevant events in other jurisdictions including the 
United States, Canada and New Zealand. 
 
The historical nature of this thesis limited the available approaches, as other 
qualitative research methods—such as interviews or observation—were simply not 
viable (Merriam, 1998). Further, the data were originally generated not for the 
purposes of this thesis but for administrative and/or political aims, and the creators 
were not representative of the general population but of a small cohort largely 
comprised of literate, British, socially and politically elite men. Nevertheless, these 
aspects of the data did provide the necessary contextual evidence of the daily reality 
being studied (as per the Sussex School approach to intellectual history) and the 
historical records were reasonably complete and readily accessible. The design 
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strategy of entering identified data into a chronological database proved to be an 
effective method for capturing and managing the large amount of data able to be 
collected and also provided built-in cross-checking controls. The risks of observer 
bias, interpretive errors and the difficulty of recreating the social and political milieu 
of the time were minimised by the size of the database, the multiplicities of available 
viewpoints and the careful transcription of original data without amendment. 
 
1.7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The part written, part precedent-based constitutions typical of the Westminster 
system of political organisation developed over an extended period. Because of their 
nature, such constitutional arrangements can be subject to the political and economic 
pressures prevalent from time to time and pragmatic political actors may move to 
avoid or set aside unwritten precedents that are otherwise essential in ensuring 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Such actors may set aside constitutional arrangements intentionally or 
unintentionally, depending on their depth of knowledge as to the existence of these 
precedents, the nature of the problems faced and the extent to which other actors 
recognise the importance of the particular constitutional element. The existence of an 
independent Auditor General is one such precedent-based but well recognised 
protector of Parliamentary sovereignty. This thesis examines the development of this 
independence in the context of the power to control government expenditure and, in 
the next chapter, the literature surrounding these issues is discussed. 
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As described in Chapter 1, this thesis examines evidence in relation to the 
development of the concept of public sector auditor independence. Analysis of the 
extant literature has confirmed the gap in the literature that is rectified by this work. 
It also confirms that this thesis does not simply resolve a parochial oversight in the 
literature but, rather, reinforces the importance of the ideas offered in response to the 
evidence gathered. 
 
This chapter provides commentary following an analysis of the literature relating to 
public sector audit history, predominantly in Britain and Australia, and demonstrates 
that the literature generally follows three themes. These are (1) literature criticizing 
the general under-representation of public sector audit history and debating the 
merits of various methodological approaches; (2) teleological research tracing the 
histories of technical and legislative changes affecting public sector audit practice; 
and (3) modern contextual analysis of tensions in the relationship between public 
sector audit and Executive government, particularly in regard to the effects of the 
general wide-spread changes to public sector administration in the 1990s. These 
three themes are developed further below. 
 
The constitutional place of Auditor General independence that developed in 
nineteenth-century Britain and Australia, and elsewhere in the British Empire, was 
critical to eventually delivering modern day Parliamentary sovereignty. In fact, the 
independent auditing of the expenditure of public funds is an essential constitutional 
safeguard (Funnell et al., 2012; Normanton, 1966).  
 
Yet given that the topic of public sector audit history holds so much precedent for 
today's practice, it is perhaps surprising that it has received significantly less 
attention than the related topic of the development of audit independence in the 
private sector. For example, private sector audit independence was considered by, 
among others, Baker (2014), Chandler, Edwards, and Anderson (1993), Green 
12 
(2006), Lavin (1976), Lee and Md. Ali (2008) and Stevenson (2002). In this group, 
Lee and Md. Ali (2008) were the only authors who also referred to independence in 
public sector audit.  
 
2.2 THEME ONE: IDENTIFYING THE UNDER-REPRESENTATION 
 
The value of studying accounting history is well understood as providing a 
potentially rich resource of learned experience that may assist in preventing any 
repetition of past errors (Carnegie and Napier, 1996; Dean and Clarke, 2012; 
Robertson, 2010). However, there is a paucity of history relating to public sector 
accounting generally and auditing, whether public or private sector, specifically, 
notwithstanding the well-recognised benefits of such scholarship. 
 
The general lack of scholarly attention paid to the history of public sector accounting 
has long been identified by researchers. Funnell (2007) explained this gap by 
identifying that universities predominantly teach private sector-focused accounting 
courses, while Carnegie and Napier (1996) noted that accounting historians had 
traditionally focused on private sector investigations. Returning to the topic more 
than a decade later, Funnell (2007, p. 268) found there was still "little evidence of 
any substantive interest…in the history of accounting and accountability in 
government". In his analysis of that accounting historiography published between 
1995 and 2004, Funnell (2007) found that, of 1,384 papers identified as being 
concerned with some aspect of accounting history, the average proportion of those 
focussing on public sector accounting history was just 3.9%, while Moussalli (2008) 
noted a similar scarcity of scholarly descriptive work in the area of American 
government accounting. More recently, Bisman (2012, pp. 11, 16) analysed almost 
190 articles and found "a continuing shortage of studies of financial accounting and 
auditing set in the public sector" despite "substantial relative growth" in the second 
half of that period (reinforcing similar findings made by Sargiacomo and Gomes 
(2011)). 
 
Incidentally, private sector audit history is also generally under-represented 
(Matthews, 2006). Fleischman and Radcliffe (2005) examined the proliferation of 
accounting history research that occurred in the 1990s and identified that only two 
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out of 70 projects examined referred to audit history. Matthews (2006) also identified 
just two works on audit history: those of Power (1992), who focussed on the history 
of audit sampling; and Chandler et al. (1993), who examined the changing purpose of 
audit. An additional three relatively recent articles have been identified. Baker (2014) 
analysed and compared the development of the auditing profession in the United 
Kingdom and France; Green (2006) traced nineteenth-century development of the 
auditor's role in Canada; and Lee and Md. Ali (2008) studied the technical evolution 
of auditing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
 
Public sector audit history is generally even further overlooked and much of what 
does exist "is limited in focus to professional and technical aspects of audit, with 
discussion tending to treat public sector audit in isolation from the sociopolitical 
context in which it operates" (English and Guthrie, 1991, p. 347). Calls for rectifying 
this under-representation of the history of public sector audit recognise the 
connection to constitutional and political power. For instance, Funnell (2007, p. 266) 
called for more research "because of the consequential importance of government, 
the constitutional imperative that government be financially accountable and the 
wealth of government material that is freely available to accounting historians". 
Sargiacomo and Gomes (2011, p. 253) and Gomes and Sargiacomo (2013, p. 439) 
also called attention to the existence of "vast archives" of public records.  
 
The association of public sector audit and the constitutional imperative for 
government to be financially accountable was previously highlighted in the mid-
twentieth century by Normanton (1966, p. vii), who understood an independent 
Auditor General to function as a fundamental cornerstone of government 
accountability and asked: "Without audit, no accountability; without accountability 
no control; and if there is no control, where is the seat of power?" Funnell (2007, p. 
276) offered a further elaboration of the argument.  
 
Fundamental to the distribution of power within government is the 
location of financial control. Indeed, contests between the executive 
and the legislature over control of, and accountability for, finances 
have been the defining feature of the evolution of the English 
Constitution. The "power of the purse" was parliament's main 
weapon by which it was able, over many centuries, finally to wrest 
power from the Crown. 
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Regardless, it is well-recognised that "public sector audit of the modern era arose, 
and exists…to enhance constitutional safeguards against Executive threats to 
individuals and their liberty in a democratic state" (Funnell et al., 2012, p. 362). 
 
Additionally, while the teleology of the development of constitutional Westminster 
arrangements is laid at the door of the British Imperial Parliament, this narrative is 
somewhat simplistic when it is observed that the final maturation of the Westminster 
Parliamentary system of Imperial Britain—and the elements of maturation relevant 
to Auditor General independence—occurred concomitantly with the development of 
various colonial constitutional arrangements rather than before them (Gilchrist and 
Coulson, 2015). The next section considers this teleology.  
 
2.3 THEME TWO: TELEOLOGICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF AUDITOR 
GENERAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
The operation of precedent is fundamental to the constitutional and practical 
operation of many democratic governments' accountability and transparency 
processes in the post-Imperial world, while developing and maintaining a universal 
understanding of the role of such constitutional arrangements is critical in order to 
protect a democratically organised polity (Finn, 1987). As Justice Spigelman (2007, 
p. 60) warned, "indifference" can result in the context of such infrastructures "being 
undermined and rendered less effective over time", so that making connections 
between constitutional limitations and such things as Auditor General independence 
helps both to recognise the constitutional position of such arrangements as well as 
disseminate its importance. Further, pragmatism particularly drives political thought 
in young countries like Australia, making constitutional protection even more 
significant (Gilchrist and Coulson, 2015; Gilchrist, 2015).  
 
Therefore, it is the connection of public sector audit history with other non-
accounting history fields (including constitutional, political and Parliamentary 
histories) that enables the historical context of key institutional infrastructures to be 
understood and disseminated. Making such connections and increasing 
understanding is essential for the ongoing protection of British and Australian 
constitutional safeguards. Yet, despite these strong arguments reinforcing the 
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necessity of understanding the constitutional history of public sector audit, the 
available research is limited. 
 
By and large, the teleologies examining Parliamentary sovereignty are concerned 
with examining Parliamentary, constitutional and public sector administrative 
developments. These histories reveal how the audit of expenditure decisions and 
records has been used throughout the centuries to establish political power, forcing 
actors to react to maintain and increase their control. In this context, the history of 
public sector audit is also political history—the story of power. Although the 
literature does focus on public sector audit and Auditor General independence prior 
to the mid-twentieth century, it is generally not comprehensive in its coverage of the 
topic and does not usually inquire into the complex socio-political demands driving 
the various reforms affecting Auditor General independence: the reasons "why". 
 
Instead, the literature thematically tends to focus on the historical development of 
audit in the nineteenth century, in the much more general context of legislative 
progress and technical auditing advancements (the "how"). The constitutional place 
of public sector financial management, including the various forms of auditing 
controls, is usually only mentioned in passing despite its acknowledged importance 
for effective governance. The methodological approach is also usually teleological, 
fitting the description of the "traditional" accounting history paradigm as "essentially 
atheoretical and descriptive narratives" (Bisman, 2012, p. 9).  
 
Carnegie and Napier (1996) were able to identify only one article on public sector 
audit. This argued that the nineteenth century implementation of Auditor General 
independence was not truly effective and was even perhaps introduced as a self-
serving mechanism by the Executive itself (Funnell, 1994b). Similarly, Normanton 
(1966, p. 372) identified the system as "audit on behalf of the legislature and the 
executive, under the detailed direction of the latter". Funnell has since published 
further on public sector audit history, chiefly relating to Britain and Australia, and 
validated the constitutional place of public sector audit as well as the need for further 
historical study of the topic (as noted earlier) (Funnell, 1996c, 2007). Funnell also 
examined various nineteenth-century socio-political influences that strongly affected 
public sector audit reforms in Britain, including, in order of publishing, excesses in 
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British military expenditure in the 1830s (Funnell, 1997b), the political demands for 
economy in public expenditure (Funnell, 2004), and the impact of the financial and 
political strains placed upon Britain by the American War of Independence (Funnell, 
2008). 
 
In the Australian colonial context, Di Francesco (1999, p. 43) traced the nineteenth 
century development of public sector audit independence in each of the six British 
colonies, finding that they each followed their "own trajectory of independence, 
rather than emerging as a carbon copy of the British model". This is an especially 
vital aspect given the contemporaneous development of the Westminster Parliament 
with those of the settler colonies (Gilchrist and Coulson, 2015). 
 
Histories of local government accounting and auditing practice in New Zealand, 
including some reference to concepts of auditor independence, were prepared by 
Colquhoun (2004, 2013). Dunn (2004) examined the meaning of government 
accountability in two Canadian jurisdictions via an examination of the political 
administrative history—particularly the evolution of independence in the public 
sector audit function in an era marked by government hostility to such extensions of 
audit powers. Finally, a very brief summary of the difficulties faced by seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century public sector auditors in the young American colonies was 
provided by Dewar (1989). However, the concept of independence from Executive 
government was referred to only in the context of ethical dilemmas regarding the 
collection of public revenue. 
 
More broadly, Parliamentary histories confirm the Westminster tradition of 
establishing Parliamentary public accounts committees and estimates committees as 
the overseers of Executive government expenditure. While the constitutional role of 
these committees as a check on government expenditure is frequently discussed, 
there is usually little discussion on their relationships with Auditors General. 
Exceptions include Butt (1969), Chubb (1952) and Tribe (1954), whose overviews of 
the origins of Parliamentary control over public expenditure clearly demonstrated 
that independent audit and Executive government accountability were fundamental to 
that political control. These three histories, along with the work of Normanton 
(1966), are perhaps the most useful studies to begin with for those seeking to make 
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connections between public sector audit history and its importance in ensuring 
government accountability today.  
 
British constitutional histories (such as Keir, 1966; Maitland, 1911) also discuss 
Parliamentary control of Executive government expenditure. Nevertheless, 
references to the significance of Auditor General independence as part of that 
Parliamentary control are not extensive, although at least acknowledged. The focus 
in these histories is generally on the administrative processes of taxation, 
appropriations, estimates and the overall management of government accounting. 
 
Public sector administrative histories provide central details regarding the operations 
of departments of state but seemingly little related to public sector audit. The most 
comprehensive of such histories are provided by Gladden (1972) and Chester (1981), 
with thorough studies of public administration and financial management in Britain 
from medieval times.  
 
The Imperial Treasury department was arguably the most powerful entity in 
nineteenth-century Britain's public administration and research into its role has been 
substantial (for instance, see Bridges, 1966; Clark, 1960; Heath, 1927; Macpherson, 
2013; Wright, 1969). Although discussion relating to the specific administrative 
relationship of audit and Treasury was published early in the twentieth century 
(Robinson, 1924), the transformation of public sector audit from an administrative 
Treasury function on behalf of Executive government to that of an independent, 
constitutionally fundamental part of Parliamentary control of the public purse is 
generally considered only in terms of the technical issues arising from legislative 
changes.  
 
Developing an understanding of colonial administration is essential for appreciating 
the context of public sector audit throughout the nineteenth century. In Imperial 
Britain, the existence of multiple colonies and varying forms of colonial 
governments contributed considerably to the complexity of public sector audit 
purpose, foci and arrangements. However, while there is much valuable research 
examining the operations of the British Colonial Office (for example: Eddy, 1969; 
Weller and Cutt, 1976; Williams, 1943; Winch, 1965; Young, 1961), the financial 
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management within, and of, Britain's colonies is generally accepted as a relatively 
uncomplicated administrative function of Executive government.  
 
There are few studies specifically examining nineteenth-century aspects of 
government financial management in Australia. Butlin (1953) provided a thorough 
study on the Australian monetary system and financial management development to 
the mid-nineteenth century, but did not refer to the function of public sector audit 
(see also Boot, 1998). Bunn and Gilchrist (2013) studied public sector audit in 
colonial Western Australia, 1828-1835, finding that it matched Di Francesco's (1999, 
p. 44) description of providing "a competent accounting function for the colonial 
administration" rather than "a rigorous check on the propriety of the Governor's 
expenditure". Spann (1960) provided the standard Australian text on public 
administration for decades, and others have studied specific government 
administrative operations in colonial New South Wales, such as the colonial 
Treasury (Lamb, 1962; McMartin, 1958a, 1958b, 1959, 1983, 1987), the economic 
role of the Commissariat (Beckett, 2012) and the operation of the Colonial 
Secretary's Department (Kingsmill, 1972). Eddy and Nethercote (1987) and Eddy 
and Nethercote (1994) provided further studies on various aspects of Australian 
public sector administrative history. Fletcher (1979) provided an overview of 
administrative (including financial) reform implemented in New South Wales under 
Governor Darling and Felton (2004) a history of the Tasmanian Department of 
Treasury and Finance. Each of these works focus on the Executive functions of 
financial management only, perhaps because the Parliamentary institutions were very 
immature. Yule (2002a) analysed the Victorian crisis in public finance 1853-1855, 
making an interesting connection between the role of the Auditor General and the 
events leading to the Eureka Rebellion in 1854. Similarly, Waugh (1998) provided 
some case studies relating attempts by early colonial governments (1860-1870) in 
New South Wales and Victoria to evade Parliamentary control of their expenditure.  
 
There is also a small sub-category of existing literature forming what might be 
labelled official histories of a number of Australian offices of Auditors General. Such 
histories currently exist for five of the nine Australian jurisdictions, namely South 
Australia (Ralph, 1990); Queensland (Longhurst, 1995); the Australian National 
Audit Office (Wanna, Ryan, and Ng, 2001); Victoria (Yule, 2002b); and Tasmania 
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(Scripps, 2006). Smaller, less formal histories exist for the Western Australian office 
(Bowyer, 1966) and New South Wales (New South Wales Auditor General's Office, 
1963). The history of the Canadian equivalent was researched by Sinclair (1979) and 
there is a brief analysis of the origins of public sector audit in colonial America 
(Dewar, 1989). The content of these histories, the larger of which were generally 
commissioned by the relevant office to mark some commemorative milestone, tend 
to be a reasonably straightforward compilation of available historical records with 
particular emphasis on the various Auditors General. Some do refer to the lack of 
independence as part of the accepted context of the times (Longhurst, 1995; Scripps, 
2006; Yule, 2002b), albeit briefly.  
 
Although the research undertaken by the authors recognised above is valuable for 
tracing how nineteenth-century legislative changes over many decades affected 
public sector audit in Britain and Australia, many questions remain about why the 
complex rationales concerning the concept of Auditor General independence were 
introduced in the first place, and extensive examination has confirmed there is very 
little research specifically focussed on this aspect of constitutional history.  
 
2.4 THEME THREE: MODERN CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
 
Public sector audit today extends far beyond the traditional provision of financial 
assurance. This extension has its provenance in the broader, ubiquitous New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms introduced initially in Europe (Hood, 1991, 1995) and 
extended to Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand and other OECD countries 
(Guthrie, 1998; Hood, 1991; Nagy, 2002). When public sector leaders aimed to 
reduce the gap between the public and private sectors' modes of operation, NPM 
required viewing public accountability through a different lens (Pilcher, 2011). John 
J Glynn and Murphy (1996, p. 126) demonstrated that, in the United Kingdom, the 
reform process tended to emphasise "managerial accountability at the expense of 
political accountability". This included in relation to accounting and auditing. 
 
The implementation of these NPM reforms generated a plethora of scholarly research 
and discussion, mainly focusing on contemporaneous commentary and research. It 
was highlighted as early as 1966 that "important new developments" were taking 
20 
place in France, Germany, the United States and "countries beyond the Iron Curtain" 
regarding audits of administrative efficiency and of state enterprises, and the use of 
"State audit as an auxiliary of economic planning" (Normanton, 1966, p. xv). 
Although the limited historical considerations of this aspect of public sector audit 
research rarely extend further back in time than the 1970s, literature reviews 
published in the 1990s and since 2000 on public sector audit indicate there was a 
growing interest not only in the technical implementation and effects of introducing 
accrual accounting, but also on the socio-political context and transformative effects 
of extending the traditional Auditor General mandate of financial audit into areas of 
government efficiency and value for money (for example, see Carnegie and West, 
2005; English and Guthrie, 1991; Funnell, 2003; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Pilcher, 
2011).  
 
In Australia, it took a decade to clarify confusion over the 1979 legislative 
requirement for the Commonwealth Auditor-General to implement efficiency audits 
(Glynn, 1989). Potter (1999, 2002) provided critical analyses of rationales behind the 
formulation of new accounting regulations in the Australian public sector. 
 
In examining Auditor General independence specifically, Funnell (1994a, p. 24) 
noted that "interpretations of audit independence have been the target of capture by 
powerful interest groups….There is no absolutist, apolitical meaning to 
independence. It is a socially constructed belief". Funnell (1996a, p. 109) provided 
examples that described how the independence of the Australian Auditor-General, in 
relation to the Commonwealth government of Australia, was interpreted as 
substantive but proved to be conditional—enabling "very extensive Executive 
intrusions in public sector audit accepted largely as benign and untainted by political 
interests". 
 
During the 1990s, discussions centred on what independence really meant in practice 
(Barrett, 1996; Funnell, 1994a, 1994b; Parker and Guthrie, 1993; Stone, 1993), 
perhaps as a result of the poor governance practices endemic in Australia particularly 
during the 1980s (for instance, see Sykes, 1994; Taylor, 1995) and also the previous 
two decades. Analysis was also conducted by Parliamentary activities such as 
committees of enquiry and included consideration of Executive activities from a 
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probity perspective (for example, see Kennedy, Wilson, and Brinsden, 1992; Nicoll, 
2005; Taylor, 1990). Comparisons of the various public sector audit legislative 
frameworks provided rich sources of data for researchers interested in issues of 
government accountability. These included analyses comparing jurisdictions 
undertaken by de Martinis and Clark (2003) and an examination of the relationship 
between Parliaments by Coghill (2004). More recently, the legislative frameworks 
for Auditors General in each Australian jurisdiction and in New Zealand were 
compared by Pearson (2009) and Robertson (2009, 2013), who found that still more 
could be done to protect Auditors General from undue Executive government 
influence and to safeguard their independence, as did the Western Australian Joint 
Standing Committee on Audit (2016). 
 
Globally, the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) 
(1998, pp. 3-5) issued declarations on audit independence, specifying eight core 
practice-focused principles generally recognised by SAIs as "essential requirements 
of proper public sector auditing".5 Subsequent INTOSAI editorial comment 
supporting these principles was provided by Otbo (2009) and Norgren (2010). 
Comparisons across international jurisdictions were made by Kiraka et al. (2002) and 
Stevenson (2002). Both studies found a considerable diversity of the provisions for 
Auditor General independence and called for their further strengthening. On a 
slightly different tangent, Bemelens-Videc (2003) reviewed the methods and 
standards by which international public sector audit institutions have judged the 
collaborative governmental arrangements in public services introduced as part of 
NPM. 
 
Audit independence is now considered to be vital for all modern audit activities, 
regardless of the economic sector in which the auditee organisation operates (for 
example, see Good, 2007; Wanna, 2006; Waugh, 1998). Indeed, the Auditing 
Standard ASA 200 requires auditors in Australia to "comply with relevant ethical 
                                                 
5 In summary, these 8 principles are as follows: 1. Existence of a constitutional/statutory/legal 
framework. 2. Independence of SAI heads, including security of tenure and legal immunity in the 
discharge of duties. 3. A sufficiently broad mandate and full discretion in the discharge of SAI 
functions. 4. Unrestricted access to information. 5. The right and obligation to report on the SAI's 
work. 6. Freedom to decide the content and timing of audit reports and to publish and disseminate 
them. 7. Existence of effective follow-up mechanisms for SAI recommendations. 8. Financial and 
managerial/administrative autonomy with appropriate resourcing.  
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requirements, including those pertaining to independence" (Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board, 2009, p. 18), and the APES 110 Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants, amended in May 2013 to clarify that its requirements are applicable to 
Auditors General and their senior officers, includes requirements and definitions for 
independence of mind and in appearance (Accounting Professional and Ethical 
Standards Board, 2010).  
 
The endurance of the Auditor General's role in helping to ensure accountable and 
open government and the impact of political actors has also been considered. 
Ramkumar (2009) examined the findings of a survey of government budget 
transparency in 85 countries, and found that 80% did not provide enough information 
to hold the government accountable and 50% provided such minimal information 
they were able to hide unpopular, wasteful, and corrupt spending. Because the public 
sector implements the Executive's policy decisions, thereby operating as its 
administrative arm, the Auditor General inevitably also functions as a de-facto check 
on the activities of the government. McPhee (2008, p. 72) described this function as 
providing an "outcome" of "stakeholder confidence in the integrity and performance 
of an organisation" while Mulgan (2008, p. 355) has written extensively on this 
responsibility. 
 
While a further and rich vein of examination relates to the inevitable tension between 
the Executive and the Auditor General, limited work has been undertaken in this 
area. Where such tension has been examined, the research often focusses on specific 
events with the potential to reduce Auditor General power. One notable example in 
Australia is the (ultimately unsuccessful) 1997 attempt of the then-Victorian Premier, 
Jeff Kennett, to effectively disband the Office of the Auditor General and privatise 
the role (for detailed analysis on this event and for other examples, see English, 
2003; Funnell, 1996a, 1997a; Good, 2007; Nagy, 2002; Wanna, 2006). 
 
In summary, the extension in the late twentieth century of Auditor General 
investigative powers beyond traditional financial accountability, into areas of 
government efficiency and effectiveness, has generated some scholarly debate on the 
constitutional importance of the role and in legislative strengthening of Auditor 
General independence across the globe. While the examination of modern public 
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sector audit is extraneous to this thesis, the considerable work completed here 
reinforces the criticality of Auditor General independence in the present day and 
supports its historical development as a vital topic of study for scholars. 
 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This chapter has assessed and examined the extent of public sector auditing history, 
with a particular emphasis on Auditor General independence, in the available 
scholarly literature. Examination of the evidence found that public sector auditing 
historiography can be located in three essential themes: (1) identifying the under-
representation and the value of public sector audit history (a grouping to which this 
thesis belongs); (2) the teleology of Auditor General independence; and (3) modern 
contextual analysis. 
 
Late twentieth-century tensions between public sector audit independence and 
Executive government accountability (as a result of NPM reforms) have generated 
discussion on the significance of the relationship between independent Auditors 
General and Parliaments in governance systems (Coghill, 2004; Parker and Guthrie, 
1993). However, the analysis undertaken in this chapter demonstrated that 
surprisingly little scholarly research has been conducted exploring the connection 
between increasing Parliamentary demands for stronger controls over government 
expenditure in the nineteenth century and the place of Auditor General 
independence. Such analyses of the topic as do exist tend instead to focus on the 
"evolution" of public sector audit by tracing legislative changes and are useful for 
showing how the transition of the Auditors General role occurred, but not the 
complexity of the socio-political context considering more fully the "why". 
 
However, there is wide-ranging research identifying the need for public sector audit 
history examination, as it is crucial for educators and policy makers to understand the 
history and precedent in order to properly inform and defend current public sector 
audit practice (Gilchrist and Coulson, 2015; Pilcher et al., 2013). Without such an 
appreciation, essential controls in constitutional arrangements in Britain and 
Australia, as well as elsewhere in developed democratic countries, might appear 
instead as merely bureaucratic intrusions generating inefficiencies or ineffectiveness.  
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It is the intent of this thesis to address the origins of Auditor General independence in 
the context of its relationship with Parliamentary sovereignty. In the next chapter, a 




CHAPTER 3  




Prior to examining the evidence itself, it is necessary to establish the framework 
within which the evidence is evaluated. This chapter explains the research paradigm 
adopted for this thesis, including the methodology and theoretical framework, the 
rationale for adoption and the specific assumptions about the nature of the past under 
examination in this contextual intellectual history in the Sussex School tradition.  
 
Figure 3.1 (below) provides a diagrammatical overview of the research paradigm 
discussed in this chapter. 
 























3.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
The adopted ontological position very much takes a subjective approach, 
understanding that the social reality and entities of the mid-nineteenth century have 
been constructed from the perceptions and actions of the people in that time period 
(Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2012). There is also an expectation that social 
reality is subject to change and that there may be multiple interpretations of that 
reality. In consequence, the epistemological approach is that of interpretivism, 
defined by Saunders et al. (2012, p. 137) as crucially requiring the researcher to 
adopt an "empathetic stance.…to enter the social world of our research subjects and 
understand their world from their point of view".  
 
In this vein, to answer the thesis questions regarding nineteenth-century concepts of 
Auditor General independence, it is necessary to enter the social and political world 
of colonial audit (via methods of archival research and document analysis) in order to 
understand the social reality of colonial government administration as it actually 
existed. It is vital that, as far as is possible, the understanding of public sector audit 
practice in the nineteenth century is derived from the point of view of those 
experiencing it at the time, rather than being interpreted via any modern set of 
cultural values or meanings. 
 
The overarching research approach is inductive, in that the rich empirical data 
identified in the archival research (the first phase of the research design) will enable 
the generation, in the second phase of the research design, of a theory or a new 
conceptual framework describing the trajectory and rationale for the development of 
Auditor General independence in the nineteenth century. As noted by Saunders et al. 
(2012, p. 146), the philosophy of inductive research is "particularly concerned with 
the context in which such events were taking place", and certainly the data analysis 
phase could not be completed without recognising that the social reality of the Swan 
River colony consisted of many contextual interpretations.  
 
Obviously, too, the methodological approach in this thesis is qualitative (in keeping 
with the interpretivist epistemology and inductive approach), examining the 
contextual relationships of public sector audit in the nineteenth century. 
27 
3.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Having examined potential theoretical groundings extant in other studies, the 
literature review of accounting history for this thesis was unsuccessful in identifying 
any precedent of methodology or theoretical framework (Jupp, 2006; Lewis-Beck, 
Bryman, and Liao, 2004; Merriam, 1998; Sinclair, 2007). The negotiations of power 
in the relationships between Auditors General, Executive government and 
Parliaments were considered too complex for the effective application of agency 
theory, consistent with the difficulties pointed out by Nagy (2002). Although a 
popular choice for "providing insights into the processes of organisational change" 
(Nagy, 2002, p. 34), the application of institutional theory to the historical 
constitutional role of the Auditor General was considered potentially too inflexible 
for the contextual work of this thesis.  
 
However, the review did reveal consensus for researchers to apply their own choice 
of theory, if they believed it best suited to answer the particular query (Bisman, 
2012; Carmona, Ezzamel, and Gutierrez, 2004; Carnegie and Napier, 1996; Funnell, 
1996b). As such, a contextual intellectual history using a "Sussex School" framework 
was considered to be the most appropriate theoretical approach for addressing the 
research questions here.  
 
The work of an "intellectual history" as per the Sussex School is related to the history 
of ideas and of political thought. Such an approach to history seeks understanding 
through examining the broader historical contexts of the particular idea or concept 
under consideration—in this case, the origins of Auditor General independence. 
These contexts may be literary (the text), social and/or cultural. The appellation 
"Sussex School" of intellectual history has been used to denote the innovative work 
of Sussex University scholars Donald Winch, John Burrow and Stefan Collini 
(Collini, 2013; Moore, 2010; Waterman, 2002; Winch, 2010, 2014). In turn, the 
Sussex School had its antecedents in the work of Dunn (1968) and Skinner (1969) 
(Pocock, 2004; Waterman, 2002). 
 
The Sussex School of intellectual history is ideally suited for the interpretivist 
epistemology, inductive approach and qualitative methodology used in this thesis and 
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represented in Figure 3.1. The contextual aspect of an intellectual history is 
particularly important and useful here. Moore (2010, pp. 78-79) defined 
contextualism as "placing a text, passage or conversation in the context in which it 
was expressed to gain a richer and more nuanced understanding of the idea or ideas 
embedded in that text, passage or conversation". The emphasis on broad, 
interdisciplinary contextual study means the research and analysis are not restricted 
to merely one prism, for example, economic, social, architectural or even political. 
Instead, the research is able to incorporate all of these aspects—and others—where 
relevant and locate data from a disparate range of sources. 
 
The Sussex School approach seeks to position the historical narrative in its own time, 
and this is certainly the approach intended in this thesis (Winch, 1996). The objective 
of intellectual historians has further been described as the attempt to "recover the 
thought of the past in its complexity and…as far as possible in its own terms" 
(Collini, 2013, p. 2). Such a historiography is very different to the traditional realist 
approach that certain texts are "part of a canon that reflected timeless and universal 
truths (that is, the great text tradition)" (Moore, 2010, p. 81). In fact, another strongly 
held characteristic of the Sussex School is a rejection of such a teleological 
interpretation of history, where events are interpreted as inevitably "evolving 
triumphantly towards what dominates in the present" (Moore, 2010, p. 91). These 
types of histories have been described as cutting a "vertical" slice through the past, 
whereas the Sussex School approach tends to take a "horizontal" slice, "exploring the 
idioms and preoccupations of a past period as they manifest themselves in thought 
and discussion about various issues that cannot readily be assigned to current 
academic pigeon-holes" (Collini, 2008, para. 9). 
 
Other Sussex School characteristics include that the necessary accumulation of detail 
required by such an intellectual history tends to manifest as narratives in essay or 
book formats (Moore, 2010). Practitioners tend to avoid excessive criticism or 
praising of an historical text, instead providing "sympathetic readings" that 
understand the context in which they were produced (Moore, 2010, pp. 89-90). There 
is strong support of inter-disciplinary cooperation, partly because it is conducive to 
contextualism and assists in avoiding teleological narratives, and partly because 
"modern disciplinary boundaries do not apply to the boundaries within which the 
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authors of past texts operated" (Moore, 2010, p. 92). All of these defining 
characteristics are readily seen in the thesis format, and in the connections made here 
between public sector audit history, political and Parliamentary history, and public 
sector administrative history. 
 
Sussex School historians understand it to be possible to examine an historical text 
and reconstruct the author's intent, even though "the 'past is another country' and the 
historian is 'inescapably the child' of his or her time" (Moore, 2010, p. 92). Similarly, 
practitioners agree that current historians may have knowledge enabling them to 
consider past ideas in ways that may not have been possible for the historical authors 
themselves. 
 
Adopting a contextual intellectual framework for this thesis, with all the attendant 
Sussex School characteristics described above, will enable reconstruction of the 
historical context (the "horizontal slices" of history) surrounding the concept of 
Auditor General independence in the nineteenth century as evidenced in the Swan 
River colony of Western Australia. The approach allows the exploration, analysis 
and narrative description of key concepts in terms of the multiple contemporary 
cultural contexts of those writing about them at the time, and thus facilitates the 
development of a conceptual theoretical model regarding the Auditor General’s 
operating framework. 
 
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN AND SCOPE 
 
As discussed above, the approach for this research is a qualitative and inductive 
intellectual history in line with the characteristics of the Sussex School. The research 
design consisted of two phases: 
 
 Phase One (data collection). Exploratory, using archival research methods to 
locate data and document analysis to generate data. The term "data" is used in 
the sense described by Bowen (2009, p. 28) as "excerpts, quotations, or entire 
passages". Data identified as being of potential relevance to the thesis were 
then entered into a database, preserving chronological connections to 
facilitate the contextual exploration of the second phase. During Phase One, 
30 
almost 2,000 separate datum items were identified and entered into the thesis 
database. Specific archival sources are listed in the References. 
 
 Phase Two (data analysis). Descriptive and analytical. The collected data 
were analysed using a combination of methods, including content analysis 
and narrative analysis, to verify and triangulate the collected data, and to 
generate the outcomes: a contextual narrative regarding the constitutional 
origins of Auditor General independence in the nineteenth century (presented 
in the subsequent chapters of this thesis). 
 
In brief, Chapters 4-6 provide a contextual background demonstrating the increasing 
use of independent audit by the British Parliament as a mechanism for enabling a 
check on Executive government expenditure. Chapters 7-9 present a case study 
narrative illustrating the struggle to implement the principles of Auditor General 
independence in the British colony in Western Australia. 
 
The scope of this research analysis was restricted to one jurisdiction in a critical time 
frame: the nineteenth-century Western Australian colonial audit office, in the context 
of contemporaneous developments in Imperial government. This limitation was 
necessary to maintain a tight focus on the thesis objectives within the time 
constraints and amount of potential data.  
 
3.4.1 Research phase one: data collection 
 
The initial phase of the research for this thesis was exploratory, searching for suitable 
data contained in nineteenth-century documents. There were two principal research 
methods used, namely, archival research and document analysis. These are discussed 
below. The historical nature of this thesis limited the available approaches, as other 
qualitative research methods—such as interviews or observation—were not viable 
(Merriam, 1998). The effectiveness of such archival research and document analysis 
for identifying and tracing ideological origins and development in the field of 
government administration has been demonstrated by the work of J S Battye (1924), 





This thesis privileges data located using archival research into nineteenth-century 
government correspondence and reports, Parliamentary reports and debates, and 
newspaper editorials and articles regarding the role and work of the Auditor General 
(particularly in colonial Western Australia). Archival research enabled identification 
of multiple sources of empirical data in the original documents, records and 
correspondence of the Audit Office and other government departments of the Swan 
River colony and Britain (see References for details). 
 
An archival research strategy is useful for providing new knowledge and 
interpretations to answer research questions focussing upon the past and changes 
over time (Saunders et al., 2012). The study of historical records contained in 
archives—such as public sector correspondence, government reports (both official 
and non-official), Parliamentary debates, newspaper editorials and public 
arguments—provides evidence of actual administrative process, as the data were 
originally created as part of daily organisational activities (Corti, 2003; Saunders et 
al., 2012). This means, of course, the actual data analysis is secondary. Nevertheless, 
when used in an archival research strategy the historical records are valuable 
precisely because they are "part of the reality being studied" (Saunders et al., 2012, p. 
179). The location, evaluation and systematic analysis of data from archival sources 
enable their use 
 
for purposes other than those for which they were originally 
collected—to ask new questions of old data, provide a comparison 
over time or between geographic areas, verify or challenge existing 
findings, or draw together evidence from disparate sources to 
provide a bigger picture. (Corti, 2003, p. 20) 
 
In fact, understanding the place of these historical documents within their own 
contemporary cultural context is how historians of the Sussex School approach the 
task. It facilitates access to the social and political milieu of the time ("eavesdropping 
on conversations of the past" (Winch, 1996, p. 28)) and enables re-creation of that 
broader cultural context (Moore, 2010).  
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The collection process for archival research is unobtrusive and there are high levels 
of data stability—"the investigator's presence does not alter what is being studied" 
(Bowen, 2009, p. 31). Other significant advantages of using archival research include 
the possibility of longitudinal studies, the permanence of the data and the probability 
of obtaining comparative and contextual data for triangulation and analysis 
(Saunders et al., 2012). The third of these factors was especially useful here, as 
identified data frequently appeared in duplicate sources and could be directly 
compared, for example, to ensure transcription accuracy. In addition, the collection 
process incorporated constant assessment of the overall suitability of data to the 
research objectives. Following the recommendations suggested by Saunders et al. 
(2012) for evaluating secondary data, the collection process included identification of 
source authority and reputation (to assess data reliability and validity), and 
consideration of data coverage and measurement bias.  
 
The use of secondary data may present some potential disadvantages, including that 
they may not suit the intended purpose, access may be difficult, and a limited control 
over quality (Saunders et al., 2012). None of these factors were a hindrance to the 
work of this thesis. The accessibility of relevant historical records was, in fact, a 
distinct advantage. A wealth of material was publically available as scanned 
documents accessible either on microfilm or electronically via library and 
government websites. The presentation of evidence enabled a horizontal, 
chronological data analysis. The original presentation, aggregation and definitions of 
the documents were suitable for data collection. The quality and coverage of 
historical records examined appeared to be reasonably complete and readily available 




Document analysis was the method used to generate the primary data for this thesis 
after the archival research had identified potential data sources, as described above. It 
has been described as "a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating 
documents" within their historical context, enabling the researcher to find, select, 
appraise and synthesise the data they contain (Bowen, 2009, p. 27). The method 
supports archival research by enabling the initial evaluation of the authenticity, 
33 
purpose and intended and actual audience(s) of identified data within its historical 
context. As a research method, document analysis is particularly applicable to 
qualitative research as it has the advantages of being efficient in selecting data for 
analysis, cost-effective, unobtrusive and enabling broad coverage over many events, 
settings and times (Bowen, 2009).  
 
Potential limitations of using document analysis are that the documents themselves 
may be difficult to retrieve, may not contain sufficient detail for the research agenda, 
and the selection process may be biased (Bowen, 2009). As noted above, the 
documents needed for this thesis were readily accessible. To combat the other 
limitations, the process undertaken for this thesis in selecting documents  
incorporated a critical and cautious approach (described below), acting objectively 
and sensitively in order to successfully generate the expected empirical knowledge 
(Bowen, 2009). Document analysis was also used to determine the meaning of the 
document, the original information source (first-hand experience or secondary 
sources), the document's purpose (both overt and covert), author and intended 
audience and its contextual contribution (topic coverage comprehensive or partial; 
balanced or uneven) (Bowen, 2009). 
 
The process included continuous and careful evaluation of the document authenticity, 
validity, credibility and reliability (Colquhoun, 2004; Corti, 2003). The assessment 
of selected documents also included a constant querying of gaps, in order to identify 
absent voices. For example, it was self-evident that well-educated, socially 
respectable and wealthy older males produced most of the available British and 
Australian government records in the nineteenth century and the first-hand views of 
women, aboriginal Australians, servants, children and labourers were rarely exposed. 
Nevertheless, this limitation was not considered a risk as the cultural debates and 
decisions occurring around the role of the Auditor General and the constitutional 
status of government were almost entirely held and made by men.6 Therefore, the 
motivations they had with respect to establishing an independent Auditor General 
were critical. 
                                                 
6 Women and minority groups were not employed as officers of government, were not eligible to vote 
or participate in Parliamentary processes and did not appear to contribute to the pertinent debates via 
personal correspondence to government officials or newspaper editors. 
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Finally, confidence in the selected data was further improved by ensuring the 
document analysis process was broad enough to include a multiplicity of viewpoints 
and sources, albeit within the limitations noted above (Colquhoun, 2004). A large-
scale collection, such as that used in this thesis, assists in ensuring adequate 
representation of sources while also supporting data triangulation and evaluation 
against other sources of information (Bowen, 2009; Colquhoun, 2004). 
 
The actual process of document analysis followed the iterative practice outlined by 
Bowen (2009, p. 32): a preliminary superficial examination, known as "skimming", 
to identify potentially useful data, followed by a more thorough reading to confirm 
the data usefulness, and transcription and entry into a database.  
 
Preliminary skimming  
 
Initial preliminary scanning of documents identified in the archival research enabled 
a bulk capture of those containing potentially relevant data. All data sources were 
searched using specific parameters, such as key words and dates, by visual scanning 
(reading). Documents containing potentially significant data were generally found in 
either microfilm, electronic or paper-based formats. Microfilm records were visually 
scanned on-site and potentially useful documents were converted to PDF files for 
subsequent secondary reading. Electronic and paper-based records were similarly 




This step included cross-referencing to data already captured, identification of 
potentially relevant themes and culling of unsuitable material. The more thorough 
secondary reading of the PDF files and the tagged search results confirmed if the 
data contained in the selected documents were of potential relevance to the thesis. If 






Transcription and entry into database 
 
Formal capture of selected data occurred by transcribing the document text and 
entering it into the thesis database with appropriate indexing, including date of 
creation and source information. This database was a crucial research tool for the 
complex data analysis undertaken in the second phase of the thesis. Microsoft Word 
and Excel were used as the database platform because of their general availability 
and compatibility with computer systems.  
 
The primary index used was the date of the document's original creation, rather than 
the source location, author or thematic content. Connecting the data from disparate 
sources into one common time-line in this manner facilitated the re-creation of 
original chronological connections. Thematic trends could then be detected in the 
correlations revealed between the cause and effects of events—a critical aspect of 
subsequent data analysis work in Phase Two. This approach also facilitated data 
verification and cross-checking, as it created linkages between information from 
different sources.  
 
The transcription process carefully maintained original spelling and punctuation, 
both to minimise the risk of interpretative and transcription errors and to maintain, as 
much as possible, the nuances of the original author's language and terminology. 
This care is the preferred approach of intellectual historians, attempting to recover 
the complexity of the past in its own terms (Collini, 2013). It is essential that any 
development of contextual understanding be firmly grounded within the archive, that 
is, "within an understanding of the specific context in which the object of our 
research emerges and operates" (Carnegie and Napier, 1996, p. 8). Such contextual 
understanding enables a more thorough understanding of the various covert cultural 
contexts in which the document was originally written. For example, routine 
correspondence frequently contained abbreviations, especially in the salutation and 
sign-off, whereas correspondence of a more important nature, such as formal reports 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies from the Lieutenant Governor, were less 
likely to contain abbreviations. Likewise, the use of a recipient's complete formal 
title was more common when the document contained information with a significant 
value to the author (such as a request for an increase in salary), or when there was a 
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large social disparity between the status of the author and the recipient. Careful 
transcription also facilitated interpretation of the meaning and usage of now-obsolete 
terminology, which became clear when the cultural context was broadened by 
finding the same phrase in multiple documents. Appendix 2 provides examples 
illustrating the document analysis process used in this thesis.  
 
3.4.2 Research phase two: data analysis 
 
In the analytical and descriptive second phase of this thesis, the material contained in 
the database (almost 2,000 items) was analysed using a combination of methods 
described below. It was at this point in the research that data could be triangulated, 
key themes identified and a new contextual narrative begin to be developed. Content 
analysis and narrative analysis were the principal methods used in this second phase. 
 
Content analysis is defined as "the process of organising information into categories 
related to the central questions of the research" (Bowen, 2009, p. 32). It is 
particularly useful for recognizing patterns in the data and identifying themes, 
allowing the data to be "examined and interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain 
understanding, and develop empirical knowledge" (Bowen, 2009, p. 27). 
 
Narrative analysis was used to synthesise the archival data into a new narrative 
description and conceptual model regarding the Auditor General’s operating 
framework. In this context, the research method operated precisely as defined by 
Saunders et al. (2012, p. 577) by incorporating the pertinent data, "collected from 
different participants, to create a new narrative that incorporates all of their stories 
into one account" whilst preserving its integrity and value.  
 
Providing far more "than reproduction of historical materials or chronology of 
events", narrative analysis has been recommended as a central method for the 
accounting history discipline (Carnegie and Napier, 1996, p. 14). It is particularly 
useful for producing histories that do not tell just a "simple story of progressive 
improvement", but which instead "emphasise the political roles of accounting 
through its ability to constitute social relations" (Funnell, 1998, p. 156). The political 
context of Auditor General independence is exactly the narrative attempted here. 
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The thesis database was imported into NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software 
package, and the rich text data coded to facilitate the organisation "into major 
themes, categories, and case examples" (Bowen, 2009, p. 29). The data were further 
interrogated for the frequency of relevant terms. Within their historical context, the 
causality between events (or not) was identified and comparisons made with the 
Imperial experience and, to a limited extent, that of other Australian colonies. The 
themes and categories were interpreted and analysed. Using this process, the 
thematic connection was made regarding Western Australian constitutional 
development and the origins of Auditor General independence and the new 
contextual narrative developed. 
 
3.5 ETHICAL CONCERNS 
 
Ethics approval was not required as the research did not require any involvement 
with animals or humans. Publicly and freely accessible archival documents provided 
the necessary data.  
 
3.6 RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
The combination of methods described above guarded against the potential risk of 
compiling a simple historiography of anecdotal evidence, because the scale of the 
qualitative archival research was large and comprehensive and also because the 
database provided cross-checking controls. Data were available from a multiplicity 
of viewpoints from highly informed contemporary participants (such as government 
officers, Parliamentarians and newspaper editors/reporters). Data were also 
continually assessed during the collection process for their validity. 
 
These factors facilitated data triangulation and minimised the potential risk of 
observer bias. Similarly, the extensive reliance on primary documents and the care 
taken to transcribe original spelling and punctuation reduced potential interpretative 





3.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
A review of potential theoretical groundings in other relevant literature identified a 
consensus that researchers of audit history were free to adopt the approach 
considered most suitable for their particular query. In this chapter, justification was 
provided for the adopted research paradigm and theoretical approach: a qualitative 
and inductive intellectual history in the tradition of the Sussex School. Such a 
contextual intellectual framework allows the exploration and analysis of the 
historical contexts around the origins of Auditor General independence. Critically, it 
supports the development of a new narrative description and conceptual model 
regarding the Auditor General’s operating framework. 
 
The two-phase research design was also outlined. The extensive data identified 
during the initial phase of the research and entered into the thesis database were 
analysed in the second phase and used to synthesise the findings presented in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis.  
 
The association between public sector audit and political power is demonstrated in 
the following chapter, via a contextual overview of the British Parliament's 
increasingly successful efforts for direct financial control over Executive government 
expenditure. The narrative links the history of public sector audit with the history of 
Parliament and with other political and social constitutional reforms aimed at 
establishing a more representative and accountable government. 
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CHAPTER 4  




Political power is reliant on possessing control of public expenditure, described in 
1891 by Gladstone as the "power of the purse" (Wehner, n.d.). Ongoing 
disagreements between the British Parliament and the Crown over financial control, 
including the Glorious Revolution of 1688, have had lasting impacts on the 
constitutional principles and separation of powers operating in democratic 
governments today.  
 
Indeed, contests between the executive and the legislature over 
control of, and accountability for, finances have been the defining 
feature of the evolution of the English Constitution. The "power of 
the purse" was parliament's main weapon by which it was able, over 
many centuries, finally to wrest power from the Crown. (Funnell, 
2007, p. 276) 
 
These clashes are well reported elsewhere (see, amongst others, Bagehot, 1872; Butt, 
1969; Chester, 1981; Keir, 1966; Macaulay, 1848; Maitland, 1911). 
 
Yet financial control is only possible when there are effective systems of 
accountability in place, both for issue and expenditure. Further, financial 
accountability is impossible without the existence of independent audit. In providing 
a check on the financial activities of government and an assurance to Parliament, the 
Auditor General's role is critical to Parliament retaining control over public 
expenditure. Mackenzie asked "Without audit, no accountability; without 
accountability no control; and if there is no control, where is the seat of power?" 
(Normanton, 1966, p. vii). Public sector audit, therefore, is the essential link in 
ensuring and in maintaining Parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
The transition to an independent Auditor General occurred in Britain and in each of 
the British colonies in Australia during the same 100-year period. The Canadian 
Audit Act 1878 was also passed in the late nineteenth century (Funnell, 1994a). The 
implementation by Parliaments of an independent Auditor General almost inevitably 
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followed the enlargement of electoral franchises and the formalisation of responsible 
government, with political power being transferred from the Executive to the 
Parliament. Consequently, the history of public sector audit is shown in this chapter 
as fundamentally linked with Parliamentary and constitutional history. 
 
While important, these financial management reforms in Britain did not effect any 
real change in the subordinate status of the public sector auditor to Treasury until 
after 1850 (Chester, 1981; Chubb, 1952; Edwards, 2011; Funnell, 2004, 2008; 
Gladden, 1972; Keir, 1966; Young, 1961). Until the mid-to-late nineteenth century, 
public sector audit continued to be understood as merely a part of the Executive's 
overall financial administrative system, functioning to assist the Imperial Treasury to 
determine financial certainties (Funnell, 1994b, 2004). Evidence of the Imperial 
Treasury's specific and technical control over colonial accounting requirements in 
1847 and 1826 can be found in Appendices 5 and 6; these also provide an overview 
of the complexity of the colonial auditors' daily tasks.  
 
4.2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: BRITAIN 
 
In Britain, as the role of public sector audit shifted, the assurance that public money 
was being spent in accordance with Parliamentary appropriations became the 
responsibility of the Comptroller and Auditor General (Chester, 1981). This officer 
was independent of Executive government and responsible to Parliament, but the role 
was not created until the passage in 1866 of 29 & 30 Vic., c.39—Exchequer and 
Audit Departments Act 1866 (Imp.). Even then, independence was not total (Funnell, 
1994a).  
 
Of course, the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 was far from the only 
legislative reform to the public sector audit function in Britain. Searching for key 
legislative reforms to the public sector audit function in Britain in the five centuries 
between 1200 and 1899 identified a total of 60 acts, more than half of which were 
passed after 1750 (see Appendix 3). To reveal more of the political struggle for 
control of the public purse in Britain, the search for data on public sector audit 
reform history was broadened to non-accounting fields including constitutional law, 
political and Parliamentary histories. This search identified an additional dataset of 
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84 actions (failed bills, Parliamentary debates, official government reports and 
instructions, Treasury minutes, Parliamentary committee reports and 
recommendations, and official government correspondence) that occurred between 
the thirteenth century and the first few decades of the twentieth century. 
 
These additional 84 actions were collated into the original data set of 60 legislative 
actions. Analysis of the total data set confirmed the nineteenth century to be the 
predominant focus of action in Britain. Between 1600 and 1921, the average number 
of Parliamentary actions affecting public sector audit per half-century between was 
just 13. Yet in the half-century 1800-1849 there were 41 actions (16 legislative 
actions and 25 other measures). In the almost 400 years between 1200 and 1599, just 
22 successful Parliamentary actions affecting public sector audit in total were 
identified.  
 
4.2.1 Data analysis: effectiveness of parliamentary actions affecting public 
sector audit 
 
Not all of these actions relative to public sector audit were effective in increasing 
Parliamentary control. To analyse the effectiveness over time, each item in the 
complete data set was categorised, or coded, according to an assessment of how 
successful it had been at strengthening Parliamentary control. Each assessment was 
made following extensive research, including locating the original archival action 
(where possible7) and collating the information with secondary data such as 
comments and analysis from historians and other researchers. The sum total of this 
information on each action was considered before applying the following coding 
query: "In terms of Parliamentary attempts to increase its power over the Executive 
via control of public money, was the action":  
 
 Successful (for example: passage of an empowering piece of legislation; an 
increase of reporting to Parliament; implementation of independent auditing; 
an extension of appropriation and expenditure control) 
                                                 
7 The contents of several archaic pieces of legislation could not be found, apart from their titles. 
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 Partially successful (for example: implementation of a Parliamentary 
committee or inquiry; tabling of a report that recommended increasing 
Parliamentary control)  
 Limited (for example: increased the Treasury control of the financial 
processes in a manner that did improve oversight, but which did not increase 
the power of Parliament) 
 Failed/Unsuccessful (for example: failed bills; passage of legislation that 
decreased Parliamentary control). 
 
The results are shown in Figure 4.1 (and Appendix 3) and demonstrate that the 
number of successful and partially successful actions affecting public sector audit 
increased significantly after 1600, compared to those that had a limited or negative 
(unsuccessful) effect. In the 400-year period from 1200-1599 there were 14 
initiatives that were successful or partially successful in increasing Parliamentary 
power over the Executive via control of public money, an average of about one every 
28 years. In the 200-year period from 1600-1800 there were 51 initiatives that were 
successful or partially successful, equating to about one every four years. In the 
nineteenth century there were 57 such actions, or about one every two years. 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Parliamentary actions affecting public sector audit, 
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In summary, the above analysis provides strong evidence supporting the argument 
that the British Parliament was increasingly successful in obtaining control over 
public finances throughout the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In 
next sections of this chapter, the data are examined more closely and key political 
events connected with the public sector audit reforms are identified. 
 
4.3 PUBLIC FINANCE AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE  
 
This section demonstrates the connection between the implementation of public 
sector audit legislation that strengthened Parliamentary financial control and other 
political and social constitutional reforms concerned with establishing a more 
representative and publicly accountable government. The period has been separated 
into pre- and post-1600 divisions to improve clarity. 
 
4.3.1 Public finance and political struggle: pre-1600 
 
The Imperial British system of managing public finances dates back to the medieval 
era when most land and all finances were the property of the ruling monarch (James, 
2011). In this sense, there was no concept of public finance. All money was literally 
the royal treasure, stored in the physical treasury and used as the monarch personally 
desired. The king's noble barons and lords (wealthy land-owners) travelled about as 
part of the royal court and therefore used sheriffs to perform a type of audit, checking 
the private accounts of their estates, "on the lord's behalf that his steward had not 
been negligent or fraudulent" (Matthews, 2006, p. 6). The sheriffs then delivered the 
accounts to the principal financial officers at the Court of the Exchequer (where the 
king's finances were managed) for final checking/auditing. 
 
Parliamentary control of the Executive is generally agreed to have originated in the 
thirteenth-century Magna Carta agreements, which confirmed the constitutional 
principle that the Crown could not impose taxes without Parliamentary consent. The 
British Parliament has granted financial support to the Crown on a regular basis since 
then (Butt, 1969; Spigelman, 2015). In the fourteenth century, Parliament began to 
insist on revenue being paid directly into the Exchequer, rather than to the royal 
household, and to demand an examination of the royal accounts (Butt, 1969; Chubb, 
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1952; Maitland, 1911). In the very early fifteenth century, the House of Commons 
gained the authority to choose its own auditors and "since 1407, the sole power to 
initiate Bills involving the grant of public money or the imposition of taxation" 
(Warner and Marten, 1913, p. 446).  
 
Personal disincentives for dishonest or corrupt behaviour by public sector auditors 
and collectors of revenue were implemented as far back in time as pre-medieval 
England and gradually increased in severity. English legislation passed in 1266 (soon 
after Magna Carta and the implementation of the first Parliament) required all 
collectors of money to regularly submit their accounts for audit at the Court of 
Exchequer "and if any make default, their bodies shall remain until they have paid or 
made agreement" (51 & 52 Hen. III, stat.5, s.9—Dictum of Kenilworth 1266 (Imp.)). 
Sheriffs who took any reward to do their office, apart from their salary, were forced 
to repay double the amount and punished "at the King's pleasure" (3 Edw. I, c.26—
Extortion by Officers of the Crown 1275 (Imp.)). By the early fifteenth century, 
"accountants" found guilty of concealing money collected on behalf of the Crown 
were liable to repay treble the amount, "and their bodies to prison, till they have 
made fine and ransom" (6 Hen. IV, c.3—First fruits, petitions to the King for lands, 
sheriffs, escheators, etc 1404 (Imp.)). 
 
In the sixteenth century, Henry VIII (1509-1547) implemented a number of actions 
affecting public sector audit. These included establishing his own financial courts, 
separate from the Exchequer, to manage his additional income from the 
appropriation of lands and revenues after disbanding the Roman Catholic 
monasteries in Britain (Thomas, 1848). The effect was to diminish Parliamentary 
control over finances: 
 
There is no doubt that the parliaments of…Henry VIII's reign, were 
extremely submissive, practically Henry could get them to do what 
he wanted.…In the years between 1522-8 he extracted heavy loans 
by a regular process not far removed from compulsion; in 1529 
parliament wiped out all the debts; he had recourse to the same 
expedient in 1542, and the parliament of 1543 whitewashed him 
once more. (Maitland, 1911, p. 251) 
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However, the political turmoil over the inheritance of the British crown after Henry 
VIII's death provided opportunities for Parliament to regain some financial control. 
His financial courts were annexed to the Exchequer by 1 Mary Sess. 2, c.10—
Dissolution of Certain Courts Act 1553 (Imp.) and, in 1560, within two years of 
Elizabeth I's accession, permanent auditors of the imprest were appointed and 
accounts regularly declared before the Treasury (Thomas, 1848; Treasury, 1869).  
 
Figure 4.2 (below) plots the number of Parliamentary actions affecting public sector 
audit between 1200 and 1599, adding in the key political activities discussed briefly 
above. As noted earlier (and shown in more detail in Appendix 3), in this 400-year 
period there were 14 initiatives identified as successful or partially successful in 
increasing Parliamentary power over the Executive via control of public money. 
Eight actions were identified which were unsuccessful or which limited 
Parliamentary control of finances. Piecing together the legislative activity with the 
political actions demonstrates a clear connection of public sector audit with 
constitutional proceedings. 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of Parliamentary actions affecting public sector audit, 
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4.3.2 Public finance and political struggle: post-1600 
 
Maitland (1911, p. 251) noted that it was in the late 1600s that the British Parliament 
began again "to act as an independent check upon the king, to assert a will of its 
own". Many of the public finance management processes taken for granted in 
modern democratic governance—such as regular Parliamentary appropriation, 
annual estimates and voting for supply—are a direct outcome of Parliamentary 
power struggles against the Crown during the British Civil Wars (1642-1646, 1648 
and again in 1650-1651). This turbulent period in British history resulted in the 
passage of several important pieces of legislation strengthening Parliamentary 
control of revenue collection and account keeping. By the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, successful mechanisms for achieving Parliamentary control over 
Executive expenditure had largely been implemented. Examples include appointing 
commissioners to examine the public accounts; providing specific procedures and 
responsibilities for officers receiving public money; establishing an annual civil list; 
stipulating in the annual appropriation acts that the money could only be used for the 
purposes specified; and creating one consolidated fund and requiring the Treasury to 
provide annual accounts to Parliament (Chester, 1981; Chubb, 1952; Maitland, 
1911). Figure 4.3 (below) highlights the connections between reforms to the Imperial 
public sector audit system and the Parliamentary efforts to increase control of public 




















Figure 4.3: Number of Parliamentary actions affecting public sector audit, 
Britain, 1600–1923, by half-centuries. 
 
 
The Civil Wars in Britain during the seventeenth century arose from increasing 
pressures between the House of Commons and the Crown (James I, 1603-1625, and 
then his son, Charles I, 1625-1649), over the King's power to raise revenue by the 
imposition of taxes (Maitland, 1911). In 1629, Charles I's fourth Parliament refused 
to vote supply and was dismissed. For the next 11 years Charles I ruled without a 
Parliament, raising funds through other means such as forced loans. Eventually, in 
1640, the need for funding forced Charles I to recall Parliament. The Parliament 
quickly strengthened its power by passing legislation in 1641 to ensure it must be 
called at least every three years, could not be dissolved without its own consent and 
must approve the officers appointed to raise military troops (Warner and Marten, 
1913). These actions have been identified as "the abolition of the arbitrary power of 
the Crown" (Warner and Marten, 1913, p. 368). 
 
Nevertheless, the conflict between the powers of the Crown and the authority of 
Parliament continued to increase and in August 1642 the first Civil War commenced. 
During this and the subsequent Civil Wars, the Parliament strengthened its financial 
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public revenue (in 1643), another committee to account for all revenue (in 1644), a 
Comptroller of the Excise to keep accounts according to Parliamentary instructions 
(in 1645), and several other ordinances throughout 1647 and 1648 to administer and 
audit military salaries and other accounts (see Appendix 3). The conflict ended in 
early 1649 with the execution of Charles I, the immediate passage of legislation 
preventing the accession of his son (30 January 1649), and the abolition of the office 
of King (13 February 1649). Britain operated as a republic for the next 11 years (the 
Interregnum) and political governance was concerned with redefining and 
implementing a workable constitution. It was also a period with "many experiments 
in parliamentary control of finance", most notably an ordinance passed in August 
1649 for auditing the Navy and Customs' accounts (Chubb, 1952, p. 16). 
 
The monarchy was restored in 1660 but was now funded only via the approval of 
Parliament, which granted the Crown a revenue for life, payable from revenue 
received from customs and excise (Warner and Marten, 1913). The House of 
Commons first asserted its claim that its finance bills could not be amended by the 
House of Lords in 1661—a constitutional precedent still operational today (Maitland, 
1911; Parliament of Australia, 2014). The administrative control of financial matters, 
however, began to pass to the Treasury from the Exchequer, which were formally 
separated. The effect on the Exchequer was to restrict its role from "a central position 
in the state" to that of recording and auditing the receipt and issuing of public money, 
thereby ensuring its "uselessness…as an impartial check on public spending" 
(Chubb, 1952, pp. 12-13).  
 
It merely controlled issue and even this task was performed 
inefficiently. It was the home of many valuable sinecure offices and 
its chief officer, the Auditor of Receipt, might be and often was a 
political leader. (Chubb, 1952, pp. 12-13) 
 
Only a few years later, the Parliament passed 19 & 20 Charles II, c.1—Accounts of 
Public Moneys Act 1667 (Imp.), described as "a great advance" for Parliament, 
because "it secured that additional grants of money to the Crown should be 
appropriated for particular objects, and that a Parliamentary audit should be made to 
ensure that the money was so expended" (Warner and Marten, 1913, p. 411). In 
short, it enshrined in legislation the principle of appropriation, combined with audit 
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(Medley, 1902). Yet the reign of James II (1658-1688) tested this principle almost to 
breaking point. The King's attempts to raise an army without the approval of 
Parliament "exposed the constitutional inadequacy of parliamentary appropriation in 
the absence of the means to verify actual expenditures" (Funnell, 2007, p. 27).  
 
It is generally now accepted that the subsequent 1688 Revolution was both an 
institutional and "a fiscal revolution" (North and Weingast, 1989, p. 815), and that it 
"marked the beginning" of the current management system of public finances 
(Chubb, 1952, p. 8). Accounting (and audit) became integral to constitutional liberty 
(Funnell, 2007). The 1688 Bill of Rights guaranteed Parliament's powers in respect 
to the Crown, initiating an era of Parliamentary supremacy and establishing Britain 
as a constitutional monarchy (Maer and Gay, 2009). Parliament re-established its 
sole authority to instigate new taxes and restricted the Crown's independent revenue 
sources (North and Weingast, 1989, p. 816). Further legislation8 "contained the most 
minute and severe restrictions with respect to the application of the supplies granted 
by Parliament" (UK, HC, March 11, 1862, vol. 165. cc. 1319). The complete transfer 
of financial administration to Parliamentary control occurred with the passage of 2 
Will. and Mary, Sess. 2, c.11—Public Accounts Act 1690 (Imp.), giving Parliament 
the right to both veto and audit government expenditure (North and Weingast, 1989, 
p. 816). 
 
Throughout the ensuing decade, further legislation was enacted to strengthen the 
process of appropriation by detailing specific procedures to be undertaken by 
Exchequer staff, including the Auditor of the Receipt, to ensure compliance, and 
formalising the principle that public money was no longer the King’s personal 
treasure chest to be used at whim (8 & 9 Will. III, c.28—Receipt of Exchequer Act 
1696 (Imp.); 9 Will. III, c.23—Civil List Act 1697 (Imp.)) (Chester, 1981). The 
Crown could now only receive public finance on an annual basis, as granted by 
Parliament and managed by the Executive (via Treasury) (Maitland, 1911). By the 
middle of the eighteenth century, the annual appropriation acts generally stated that 
the grants were not to be applied to any use or purpose other than those specified by 
Parliament (Chester, 1981). This principle became so well established that, as early 
                                                 
8 2 Will. and Mary, c.1—The Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689 (Imp.). 
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as 1734, a suggestion made in Parliament for granting a vote for unspecified 
purposes was met with a formal protest referred to more than 130 years later as 
having established precedent: "Appropriating Clauses were introduced to prevent the 
secret ill use of public money; and every tendency of breaking through them is a just 
foundation for Parliamentary jealousy and inquiry" (UK, HC, March 11, 1862, vol. 
165. cc. 1317). 
 
In 1760, on the accession of George III (1760-1820), Parliament achieved full 
control over the Crown's finances when "the Crown surrendered the management of 
all the royal domains in return for a Civil List of a fixed amount. It [the Crown] thus 
ceased to take any personal interest in, and therefore to exercise any control over, the 
Treasury" (Medley, 1902, p. 545). However, that same lack of interest from the 
Crown in the operations of the Treasury was perhaps one of the reasons why George 
III regularly overspent his approved civil list grants and then applied to Parliament 
for additional funding (Chubb, 1952). Parliament was then forced to consider the 
Crown's expenditure and approve the requests for more money. It increasingly began 
to realise its inability to determine if appropriation grants had been spent 
appropriately. The existing accounting procedures and audit arrangements were not 
effective, partly because they struggled to cope with increasing national expenditure 
on war and partly because it was not considered proper for Parliament to require any 
accounts from the Crown of the royal expenditure (Chester, 1981; Chubb, 1952).  
 
An attempt was made in 1780 to improve the existing public sector audit 
arrangements by enabling regular audit with 20 Geo. III, c.54—Audit of Public 
Accounts Act 1780 (Imp.), but the commission it enabled was not reappointed after 
1787 (Chubb, 1952; Normanton, 1966). More successful in strengthening 
Parliamentary control of the Crown's expenditure was 22 Geo. III, c.82—Civil List 
and Secret Service Money Act 1782 (Imp.) (Burke's Civil Establishment Act). Burke's 
Act curbed a great deal of civil list expenditure by abolishing over 100 sinecure 
placements and various outdated offices in the royal household and in the Exchequer 
(to be enacted upon the death of the incumbents) (Chester, 1981; Funnell, 2008; 
Treasury, 1869). The preamble to this legislation included that one of its purposes 
was "for better Security of the Liberty and Independence of Parliament"—a reference 
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to the "constitutional imperative" for "a strong, independent and vigilant parliament" 
with financial control (Funnell, 2007, pp. 275-276).  
 
Parliament further strengthened its control of the machinery of financial 
administration by implementing specific reforms to public sector audit: the passage, 
in 1785, of two Audit of Public Accounts Acts (Imp.) (25 Geo. III, c.52; c.68). These 
Audit Acts abolished the Auditors of the Imprest and replaced them with a board of 
five Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts. The board members were 
appointed by the Crown under the authority of Parliament and held office during 
good behaviour. However, they were not independent of the Executive and there 
were no provisions for them to report to Parliament or for giving effect to their 
recommendations (Chubb, 1952; Normanton, 1966). Despite the Audit Board's 
limited independence, it did initiate one significant action that assisted Parliament's 
ability to gain accurate and timely information on public accounts. This was the 
recommendation in the Board's 13th Report, in 1785, to consolidate all public 
accounts into "the Formation of one Fund, into which shall flow every Stream of the 
Public Revenue, and from whence shall issue the Supply for every Public Service" 
(Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts, 1785, p. 673). Implemented in 
1787 by 27 Geo. III, c.13—Customs and Excise Act 1787 (Imp.), this innovative 
concept created one single consolidated revenue fund. Parliament now had the means 
to provide for long-term regular (or even permanent) expenditure (Chester, 1981). In 
1802 this legislation was strengthened by 42 Geo. III, c.70—Public Accounts Act 
1802 (Imp.), which required the Treasury to annually table accounts of the British 
public finances in Parliament. Annual finance accounts were accordingly published 
in 1802 and, for the first time, an accurate view of the national income and 
expenditure could be obtained (Treasury, 1869). These new annual accounts also 
included the new heading of Miscellaneous Civil Services, for public works and 
buildings, civil service salaries, judicial costs, colonial services and education, 
science and art (Gretton, 1913). The cost of providing government services could 
now be determined annually through the process of appropriations. Previously, 
"either the enlargement of the sum or its diminution would be a serious matter, 
because such a change would not affect a single year, but would have to be as 
permanent as the original vote" (Gretton, 1913, p. 105). 
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By the early nineteenth century, then, Parliament was finally able to ascertain a 
reasonably accurate view of the public accounts—a crucial asset to maintaining 
control of public finances. Nonetheless, knowing what money had been allocated to 
public services (including colonies) in the annual appropriations provided only one 
part of Parliament's control of the public purse. Parliament also need to identify how 
that money had actually been spent—quite another part of financial control and one 
usually obtained via the auditing of accounts. It is true that Parliament had first 
gained "the never-before-held right to audit how the government had expended its 
funds" two centuries earlier, after the 1688 Revolution (North and Weingast, 1989, p. 
816). However, as checking processes these early audit and accounting instruments 
were "gravely deficient" (Chubb, 1952, p. 15). In fact, "until well into the nineteenth 
century the House of Commons had no certain way of knowing whether the money 
voted for specified uses or purposes had been spent accordingly" (Chester, 1981, p. 
209).  
 
As Parliamentary awareness of this gap in its public finance management control 
grew, various committees on finance and public expenditure were appointed between 
1797 and 1819 and issued literally dozens of reports recommending specific 
improvements for increasing efficiency and economy (Chester, 1981) (see Appendix 
3). It is true that the Imperial Parliament at this point was driven by an ideological 
desire for economic frugality. There was a "parsimonious attitude to the 
administrative activities of government that was to reign in Britain throughout the 
following [nineteenth] century. Economy rather than efficiency was the commodity 
that the state would ever be prepared to purchase" (Gladden, 1972, p. 268). However, 
the House of Commons sought to achieve control of government expenditure by 
identifying and preventing financial mismanagement and corruption—not by 
improving the existing system via effective conformance with appropriation grants.  
 
At no period in the annals of the history of this Country has 
Parliament in its legislative capacity, and as Guardians of the Public 
Purse, more imperiously been called upon to institute every 
practicable check against the mismanagement and misapplication of 
the Public Money, than at this time. (Committee on the Public 
Expenditure &c. of the United Kingdom, 1810, p. 37) 
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Although the cumulative result was considerable reform in public finance 
management, including government auditing processes and in accounting procedures 
in general, these reforms did not effect any real change in the subordinate status of 
the Audit Office to Treasury until after 1850 (Chester, 1981; Chubb, 1952; Edwards, 
2011; Funnell, 2004, 2008; Gladden, 1972; Keir, 1966; Young, 1961). For example, 
the enactment in 1806 of 46 Geo. III, c.141—Audit of Public Accounts Act 1806 
(Imp.) was intended to provide "for the more speedy and regular examination and 
audit of the public accounts of this kingdom" by separating the offices of the 
Comptroller of Army Accounts and of the Auditor of Public Accounts (Jacob and 
Tomlins, 1809). However, an examination of its impact by a Parliamentary 
Committee in 1810 reported that it had not increased the powers or discretion of the 
auditors, who were still subject to Treasury control (Committee on the Public 
Expenditure &c. of the United Kingdom, 1810). The Committee strongly 
recommended the Imperial auditors be given increased discretion in their work, 
despite their historical record of inefficiency, and that the annual report of the public 
accounts (including colonial accounts) provided by them to the Treasury should also 
be laid before the House of Commons. These recommendations, however, were not 
followed up by the Parliament. In fact, legislation passed in 1813 to hasten the audit 
of military expenditure in Spain and Portugal (53 Geo. III, c.150—Audit of Accounts 
etc. Act 1813 (Imp.)) also empowered the Treasury "to make new arrangements for 
the conduct and distribution of the business of the Audit Office" (Select Committee 
on Finance, 1819, p. 122). 
 
Public sector audit in Britain continued to be understood as merely a part of 
Treasury's overall financial administrative system until a "growing dissatisfaction 
with the role and working of the Exchequer" finally lead to a shift of focus to "the 
role of the auditor in securing proper conformance with the Appropriation Acts" 
(Chester, 1981, p. 211). The necessity of independent audit was noted in 1831 when 
a Commissioner of Public Accounts, appointed (by Treasury) to inquire on public 
money, recommended that 
 
the functions of the Exchequer of Receipt should be placed in the 
hands of a new Officer—a Comptroller-General of the 
Exchequer...[and] that a committee independent of the Crown should 
be chosen annually by the House of Commons to examine and report 
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on the general statement of accounts submitted by a Comptroller-
General before the Annual Budget was voted. (Chester, 1981, p. 
212) 
 
Parliament resolved the difference between controlling the issue of finance and 
auditing the expenditure by implementing legislation in 1832 for the first formal 
system of appropriation audit (Chester, 1981; Chubb, 1952).9 Applicable to the 
Naval accounts only, this legislation "required the Commissioners for Audit to 
examine the accounts and vouchers for naval expenditure side by side with the votes 
and the estimates" and to certify the accuracy of an annual account to Parliament 
(Chester, 1981, p. 213). The auditors were required to confirm if payments had been 
properly authorised, that they had been spent in accordance with appropriation 
grants, and the total had not been exceeded (National Archives, n.d.).  
 
It is notable that at the same time this shift to independent public sector audit was 
occurring, important extensions to the British franchise were also taking place. The 
passage of 2 & 3 Will. IV, c.45—Representation of the People Act 1832 (Imp.) 
(Reform Act 1832) increased the number of seats in the House of Commons and 
enabled about one out of every five adult males to vote in Parliamentary elections, 
with the result that, for virtually the first time, members of Parliament were chosen 
by the general public instead of via patronage and royal influence (Johnston, 2013). 
Butt (1969) described this legislation as the point at which the Crown lost its 
influence over membership in House of Commons. The ensuing proliferation of 
legislative reforms in the way public finance was managed throughout this period 
may have been successful simply because the electoral and franchise reforms 
established a powerful Lower House, which could finally add the power to check 
expenditure along with its long held control over financial issue. Earlier efforts of 
Parliament had literally led to revolution and civil war. Obtaining and enforcing the 
power of the purse could now be achieved peaceably, via legislative mechanisms—
and it was.  
 
The next three decades saw rapid transformation in Parliamentary control of 
finances. In 1834, by 4 & 5 Will IV, c.15—Office of Receipt of Exchequer Act 1834 
                                                 
9 2 & 3 Will. IV, c.40—Admiralty Act 1832 (Imp.) 
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(Imp.), the Exchequer's main function became that of ensuring "that all issues from 
the Bank to public officers were legal and it was to do this on behalf, not of the 
government, but of Parliament" (Chubb, 1952, p. 13). The system of appropriation 
audit implemented for Naval accounts in 1832 was extended in 1846 to the War 
Office, Commissariat and Ordnance departments, and the process of virement 
(transferring funds from one budget item to another) was severely restricted. All 
government departments were required to provide separate estimates of expenditure 
and revenue by the mid-1850s. The 1857 Select Committee on Public Moneys 
criticised the Exchequer control system established in 1834 and recommended 
extending appropriation audits to all revenue accounts and to civil services, and for 
the Audit Board to report directly to Parliament. In April 1862, a Standing Public 
Accounts Committee was established. Within a few years, the chair of the Audit 
Board was appointed as Comptroller-General of the Exchequer and in 1866 the role 
of Comptroller and Auditor General was created, significantly independent of 
Executive government and responsible to Parliament (by the Exchequer and Audit 
Departments Act 1866) (Funnell, 1994a).  
 
4.4 THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
The British colonies in Australia experienced a similar focus throughout the 
nineteenth century on Parliamentary control of Executive expenditure and, also like 
Britain, implemented legislation on public sector audit. As the first British colony in 
Australia commenced only in 1788 there is, of course, little to compare prior to the 
nineteenth century. Table 4.1 (below) shows a total of 18 acts affecting public sector 
audit in Australia in this period. Almost all of these (16) were passed in just six 
colonies in less than 50 years (between 1852 and 1899), creating an impressive 









Table 4.1: Key audit legislation, Australia, 18th and 19th centuries. 
 
Century Applicable Audit Acts in Australia (in five colonies) 
18th (1)  25 Geo. III, c.52 and c.68 (Audit of Public Accounts Act 1785 (Imp.). A copy 
of this legislation was given to Arthur Phillip, first Governor of NSW, in 1787 
(shortly before the embarkation of the first fleet) (Longhurst, 1995). 
19th (17)  1 & 2 Geo. IV, c.121—Commissariat Accounts Act 1821 (Imp.). Jurisdiction 
of Colonial Audit Office extended to NSW.  
 Revenue Audit Act 1852 (NSW) 
 Audit Act 1857 (Vic.) 
 The Audit Act 1858 (Tas.) 
 Audit Act 1859 (Vic.) 
 Audit Act 1861 (Qld.) 
 Audit of Public Accounts Act 1862 (SA) 
 Audit Act 1870 (NSW) 
 Audit Act 1874 (Qld.) 
 Audit Act 1881 (WA) 
 Audit Act 1882 (SA) 
 Audit Act 1888 (Tas.) 
 Audit Act 1890 (Vic.) 
 Audit Act 1891 (WA) 
 The Audit Act Amendment Act 1894 (Tas.) 
 Audit Act Amendment Act 1895 (SA) 
 The Audit Act Amendment Act 1899 (Tas.) 
 
Table 4.2 shows, albeit very simplistically, how each of the six separate British 
colonies in Australia introduced audit legislation at around the same period that they 
extended the franchise and established responsible government. The complex 
political movements behind these dates tell a story of colonists who wanted control 
of their Parliaments and a voice in how the government collected and used their 
colony's resources. The various audit acts did not always include full recognition of 
Auditor General independence, but the public and political debates around their 
passage (and around other failed legislations not shown here) indicate that the 
concept of an independent check on public finances was a growing desire in each 















Audit Act Franchise 
NSW (1788) 1855 1852 1850: Men; minimum land-holdings 
1858: Adult men; secret ballot 
Tas (1825) 1855 1858 
1888 
1850: Men; minimum land-holdings  
1856: Secret ballot  
1896: Adult men 
WA (1829) 1890 1881 
1891 
1877: Secret ballot 
1893: Adult men  
SA (1836) 1856 1882 1850: Men; minimum land-holdings  
1856: Adult men; secret ballot 
Vic (1851) 1855 1857 
1859 
1890 
1850: Men; minimum land-holdings  
1856: Secret ballot 
1857: Adult men 
Qld. (1859) 1859 1861 
1874 
1859: Secret ballot 
1872: Adult men 
 
For example, Table 4.2 reveals that in the 1850s, New South Wales gained public 
sector audit legislation, responsible government and the extension of voting rights 
from wealthy male landowners to all white men aged 21 years or older. 
 
The events in Western Australia are particularly revealing and are examined in detail 
in subsequent chapters. This British colony was provided with a legal mechanism for 
obtaining representative government in 1850, under 13 & 14 Vic., c.59—An Act for 
the better Government of Her Majesty’s Australian Colonies 1850 (Imp.) (also 
known as the Australian Colonies Government Act or the Australian Constitutions 
Act No. 2), but the provisions of this legislation were not implemented until 1870 
(mainly because of the late introduction of convictism to the colony) (de Garis, 
1981a, 1981b). However, it quickly became evident to the colonists that 
representative government did not provide any real control over Executive 
expenditure and the Imperial government was not willing to support a move to a 
fully elected responsible government despite the desire for such by the majority of 
colonists (Battye, 1924). The next two decades (1870-1890) were an almost 
continuous political struggle for the legislature to implement some control on the 
Executive. The Legislative Council fought for the appointment of an independent 
Auditor General (in lieu of obtaining responsible government) but although they 
were successful in gaining an Audit Act (46 Vic., No. 1—Audit Act 1881 (WA)) it 
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did not include the desired provisions of Auditor General independence and was 
understood by most as a political win for Executive government. Responsible 
government was finally granted in 1890. It was immediately followed by much 
stronger audit legislation that did include Auditor General independence (54 Vic., 
No. 12—The Audit Act 1891 (WA)), and in 1893 by the extension of voting rights to 
all adult white men (57 Vic., no. 15—The Electoral Act 1893 (WA)).  
 
4.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has provided an overview of the history of public sector audit 
administration in Britain and Australia, demonstrating a strong connection with 
Parliamentary and constitutional history. Analysing the history of Auditor General 
independence requires this interdisciplinary crossover because it increases 
understanding of the Auditor General's constitutional role in today's democratic 
governance. Parliamentary support of the independent Auditor General is weakened 
without such an understanding of these historical origins. 
 
The next chapter considers the administrative processes by which Imperial Britain 
managed finances in its global Empire of colonies (especially those in Australia). 
The Imperial Parliamentary understanding of the usefulness of appropriation audit as 
a check on Executive expenditure, coupled with the political desire for economic 
frugality and corresponding focus on government wastefulness, inevitably also 
resulted in increasing attention to how the annual appropriation grants to colonies 




CHAPTER 5  




This chapter examines how Imperial Britain managed public finances in its many 
colonies during the first half of the nineteenth century. The broader public sector 
audit reforms that occurred in eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain were 
examined in the previous chapter. A brief review of British administration (including 
financial management) of the first four years in the eastern Australian colonies can 
be found in Scorgie and Reiss (1997), and for the period 1818 to 1831 in Eddy 
(1969). 
 
Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, the supervision of its many and 
varied colonies was a highly complex task for the British Imperial government. 
Section 5.2 provides an overview of the size and economic impact of managing the 
Empire, providing contextual information for understanding the necessity of strictly 
controlled and regulated management of colonial finances in a political context of 
frugality.  
 
It is necessary to review the financial management system in its entirety as the notion 
of audit is only a part of the greater effort and is informed by the context of the 
broader financial management arrangements. Section 5.3 examines the actual 
administrative mechanisms implemented in efforts to achieve control of colonial 
finances, highlighting the difficulties caused by communication issues and the 
complex and shifting responsibilities between the Imperial Parliament, Colonial 
Office, Treasury and Audit office. The various measures implemented throughout 
this period to strengthen Parliament's administrative control over colonial finances 
(legislation, Parliamentary Committees and official instructions to colonial 
governors) are summarised, and the mechanisms for ensuring the integrity of non-




Section 5.4 provides some concluding remarks addressing the key themes and 
findings of this chapter.  
 
5.2 THE ADMINISTRATIVE IMPACT OF EMPIRE 
 
Britain's ideology of empire-building, with government policies of territorial 
expansion via military conquest and settlement and economic exploitation (trade), 
continued even after the loss of its 13 American colonies in the late eighteenth 
century (Keir, 1966).10 Throughout the nineteenth century Britain received goods and 
produce from its many colonies around the world (including slaves, until that trade 
was abolished throughout the British Empire in 180711), used its colonies to provide 
ready markets for its own manufactured goods and produce (and as places to send 
prisoners and emigrants12) and, importantly, received revenue (particularly from the 
sale of "Crown" land to settlers) (Medley, 1902). A more detailed analysis of British 
colonial policy between 1776 and the 1860s, especially in regard to the several 
economic and ideological arguments around issues of trade, emigration, labour and 
political economy, can be found in Winch (1965); see also (amongst others) Egerton 
(1913) and Gladden (1972).  
 
The British government managed and controlled this Empire by imposing its own 
legislative rule on colonies, authorising the size and structure of (and senior 
appointments to) local government, providing crucial financial support in the form of 
Parliamentary appropriation grants for the maintenance of local administrations (an 
annual civil list of salary payments, plus resources in kind such as uniforms and 
office equipment), providing the entire funding and resourcing of local military 
establishments, giving final authorisation to local legislative measures and 
supervising the emigration of settlers and transportation of convicted criminals 
(Beaglehole, 1941; Boot, 1998; Eddy, 1969; Egerton, 1913; Todd, 1880; Williams, 
1943; Young, 1961).  
                                                 
10 See Appendix 4 for a comprehensive list of Britain's colonies in 1837. 
11 However, the practice of slavery persisted in the British colonies until final abolition in 1848 
(British Library, n.d.). 
12 Emigration was a major consideration for the British Empire. Considerable attention was paid to 
philosophers such as Malthus, who contended the only way to avoid an impending disaster caused by 
overpopulation at Home was to export excess population to the colonies—an especially prescient idea 
between 1845 and 1852 in the context of the Irish potato famine (Eddy, 1969; Tombs, 2014). 
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Managing the enormous administrative impact of the colonies was, not surprisingly, 
a recurring matter of debate in the British Parliament throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In 1845, Parliamentary debate called for the creation of a specific 
Select Committee on Colonial Accounts, arguing that the size and complexity of 
colonial financial arrangements necessitated the implementation of accurate 
accounting mechanisms. For example:  
 
To the United Kingdom, these Colonies sent for the value of 
£10,500,000, while to these we export to the value of £17,000,000, 
of which nearly one-half consists of British produce and 
manufactures. This trade employs 3,000 ships, comprising 900,000 
tons. No one, therefore, could contend for a moment that the subject-
matter was one of a trifling character, or that the accounts which 
represent the revenues and expenditure of so vast and so varied an 
interest should be kept in any but a satisfactory state. (UK, HC, April 
1, 1845, vol. 78. cc. 1322) 
 
At this time there were more than 40 colonies "dependent upon this great Empire", 
with a combined resident population of over five million (UK, HC, April 1, 1845, 
vol. 78. cc. 1322). All aspects of the management of these colonies was overseen by 
the Imperial government, including the interwoven interests of all colonies and 
Britain in defence, trade and broader economic and social considerations—and all in 
the context of the cost to the Imperial Treasury (James, 1997).  
 
The majority of British expenditure on its colonies was provided via the annual 
Parliamentary appropriation grant of salaries for those on the local colonial civil lists. 
In the ongoing political demands for economy, expenditure on the internal 
bureaucracies, salaries and pensions of far-away colonies was an obvious area to 
target for savings (Young, 1961). By the mid-1840s, the House of Commons could 
complain without dispute that the "Colonies ought to be no expense to the mother 
country; whereas we were paying large sums for Australia and other of our 
possessions" (UK, HC, April 1, 1845, vol. 78. cc. 1330). Throughout the nineteenth 
century, and as its understanding of the need for improved public finance 
management increased, the British Parliament implemented a range of legislation, 
regulations, instructions and rules in order to strengthen its colonial oversight and to 
minimise its spending on what was a rapidly proliferating administrative business of 
government (Chester, 1981). 
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5.3 THE BRITISH COLONIAL OFFICE: ADMINISTRATION 
 
Constantly driven by the desire for government efficiency and economy, the Imperial 
processes for controlling and auditing colonial finances between 1800 and 1849 were 
complex and cumbersome.  
 
Supervising colonial administration in Britain after 1801 was the ultimate 
responsibility of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, a newly-created 
Cabinet position (Young, 1961).13 Support was increased in 1806 with the 
appointment of two Under-Secretaries: one to oversee Colonies and another for War 
duties (Mitchell, 2014). It is, however, difficult to pinpoint the exact point of creation 
of a supporting administrative government office focussed on colonial management, 
although references to a specific "Colonial Office" (or Department) appear from 
1812 (Beaglehole, 1941; Chester, 1981). Certainly a greater focus on colonial affairs 
began to be apparent following the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, but the one 
Secretary remained responsible for the two functions (War and Colonies) until the 
roles were split in 1854 (Chester, 1981).14  
 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies was responsible for establishing British 
oversight in colonies by appointing an official representative of the Crown, usually a 
governor, at the head of local government. All other strategic local government 
positions were also paid for, instructed and appointed or authorised by the Secretary 
of State.15 From the mid-1820s, a small Executive council to assist the governor in 
decision-making was customarily created from key officers of the civil and military 
establishments, although ultimate local authority and responsibility was strictly 
retained by the governor (Todd, 1880).  
 
Imperial colonial policy from the mid-1830s accepted that, as the population of 
colonies increased, they would become self-sustainable and would seek to become 
self-governed entities with some form of elected legislative Parliament modelled on 
                                                 
13 Hereafter referred to as the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or as the Secretary of State. 
14 For a more detailed study of the British Colonial Office in the early 1800s, see Young (1961); also 
Beaglehole (1941); Eddy (1969) and Williams (1943). 
15 For example, the governor was supported by a small staff of administrative officers forming the 
civil establishment—in today's Australian term, the public service—and frequently a military 
establishment which commonly also functioned initially as a de-facto police force. 
63 
the Westminster system and a consequent withdrawal of Imperial supervision and 
financial support (Gladden, 1972; Todd, 1880; Winch, 1965). The "transition from 
the paternal government of the colonial office in London to the establishment of self-
government" was described as being effected by 
 
the wise adaptation of British constitutional principles to colonial 
polity; and by the gradual introduction into each dependency, 
according to its political condition and circumstances, of the 
principle of self-government in all matters of local concern, coupled 
with the unreserved application, in regard to the same, of the 
constitutional maxim of ministerial responsibility to the colonial 
assembly. (Todd, 1880, p. 25) 
 
Those colonies without a representative or a fully responsible legislative government 
were known as "Crown colonies". These were more dependent on British support (in 
the case of immature settler colonies) for their survival or were exploitative colonies 
(such as India) (James, 1997). Consequently, such Crown colonies were far more 
closely administered by Britain. In colonies that had been permitted to adopt 
responsible government, the governor remained (as previously) responsible to the 
Crown—a constitutional arrangement that persists in Australia today—but the 
Executive council took responsibility for framing local government policies and 
embodying these in legislative bills, making official appointments, "and of 
superintending and controlling all public affairs through the appropriate departments 
of state in the colony" (Todd, 1880, p. 39). By late 1845 there were 42 British 
colonies, 19 of which were Crown colonies without representative assemblies (Select 
Committee on Colonial Accounts, 1845).16  
 
Chester (1981, p. 239) described the administrative operations of the Colonial Office 
as presenting "problems both to the political and the permanent elements.…[T]he 
nature of the business, dealings with numerous Colonies and overseas possessions, 
could be troublesome". The following sub-sections examine the specific 
administrative mechanisms used to control financial management processes in the 
British colonies. The information provides important contextual background for 
understanding the realities of nineteenth-century colonial audit systems.  
                                                 
16 These 19 Crown colonies in 1845 included the four in Australia: New South Wales; Van Diemen's 
Land; Western Australia; South Australia (Select Committee on Colonial Accounts, 1845).  
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5.3.1 Communication processes 
 
Communication between the colonies and Britain throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries was almost always by hand-written correspondence transported 
in despatches on the next available sailing ship. The transportation of mail by sailing 
ships meant that both colonies and the British government were forced to cope with 
long delays before receiving administrative authorisations and clarifications of 
official business (Young, 1961). In 1845, the Imperial Audit Office expected to wait 
for up to three months before receiving an answer to any query they might send to a 
colony about a particular account (Select Committee on Colonial Accounts, 1845). 
Colonial administrators could wait even longer for replies to their requests for 
advice, as there was no guarantee their correspondence, or even the operations of 
their colony in general, would be considered a priority and processed quickly even 
once their mail had arrived in London (Young, 1961).17  
 
Direct official government communication was only permitted between the colonial 
governor and the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Detailed instructions were 
issued as early as 1818 to colonial governors, specifying the appropriate subject 
headings to be used, the size of the paper and margins, and a requirement for strict 
confidentiality (Glenelg, 1837; Young, 1961).18 Additionally, colonial governors 
were "strictly enjoined to send home, punctually" copies of local newspapers and of 
proceedings in the local Legislative Council and Assembly (Glenelg, 1837, p. 9). 
This requirement may have been "particularly galling" to governors as it provided 
settlers with a direct communication channel to the British press and was often used 
to "cheekily" address "grievances and criticism directly to the incumbent Secretary of 
State" (Macphail, 2008, p. 51). 
                                                 
17 The Colonial Office handled more than 12,000 letters in 1824, with a staff of 17 officers (Macphail, 
2008, p. 30; Young, 1961). This was an increase in volume from 1816 of over 60% (corresponding 
with the earlier mentioned premise that the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 enabled the Imperial 
government to focus more attention on its colonies) (Young, 1961). From Australia alone (New South 
Wales and Van Diemen's Land), the Colonial Office in 1824 received almost 1,000 letters (totalling 
almost 2,300 pages) and despatched just over 1,100 letters (totalling about 730 pages) (Young, 1961). 
Such a rate of increase continued: the Colonial Office librarian asserted in 1839 that "the business of 
the office had increased a hundredfold since 1824" (Williams, 1943, p. 142). 
18 Interestingly, in April 1822, the Secretary of State was forced to issue a circular despatch to every 
colonial governor instructing that they must hand over all public despatches and documents to their 
successor: the confidentiality clause was being interpreted too strictly and incoming governors were 
complaining that their efficient administration was impeded by their predecessor withholding 
information (Watson (1917). Note 74. HRA Series 1, Vol. XI, p. 921). 
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Colonists could directly communicate with the Secretary of State via a process 
implemented in the interests of "justice and fairness to all parties concerned" and to 
regulate "the free resort of all His Majesty's subjects to the highest authority in the 
State for the redress of any grievances" (Glenelg, 1837, p. 91). Colonists with 
matters of concern had to first address these to their local governor. "Should the 
Governor's decision not prove satisfactory", the colonist could inform the governor 
of their dissatisfaction and request them to transmit their respectful "remonstrances" 
to the Secretary of State (which transmission was required to be accompanied, of 
course, by the governor's own opinion and report on the matter) (Glenelg, 1837, p. 
92). Clearly some colonists had attempted to circumvent the process, for the 
instructions also clearly stipulated: 
 
6. The practice which has in some instances been adopted of 
addressing memorials direct to this office, and only sending copies 
of them to the Governor, on the eve of the departure of the vessel 
which is to convey them, will not be recognised as a proper course 
of communication, and must therefore not be repeated. (Glenelg, 
1837, p. 92) 
 
Upon receipt at the Colonial Office, colonial correspondence and reports were 
usually forwarded to other relevant departments for advice and/or actioning. In this 
respect, "the Colonial Office was merely a post office between the governments of 
the colonies and those offices of government in Westminster whose authority 
extended to the colonies" (Young, 1961, p. 170).19 Williams (1943, p. 151) claimed 
"the Colonial Office was politically unimportant and the secretary of state sat in the 
cabinet only because the portfolio was combined from 1801 to 1854 with that of the 
minister of war" (see also Winch (1965)). Colonial Office staff could find their 
liaison with other departments to be a frustrating exercise. Williams (1943, p. 150) 
described the actions of many government departments in their dealings with the 
Colonial Office as "obstructive and pigeonholing"; he was particularly critical of the 
Board of Trade ("dilatory and greedy for authority"), the Customs and Post Offices 
                                                 
19 Those other "offices of government" could be numerous. For example, in the 1820s the oversight of 
political control in New South Wales was held by the Colonial Office, convict matters by the Home 
Office, transports by the Admiralty, finances by Treasury, auditing expenditure of Parliamentary 
grants by the Audit Office and of internal accounts by the Colonial Audit Office, military troops and 
pensioners by the Commissariat, military buildings by the Ordnance Office, mail by the Post Office, 
currency by the Mint, religious matters by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and customs revenue by 
the Board of Customs (Young, 1961). 
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("caused endless irritation") and the legal system ("colonial acts wandered off for 
long sojourns with the privy council").  
 
However, by far the majority of Colonial Office interaction was with the Treasury—
and certainly on financial issues (Young, 1961). Yet Williams (1943, p. 150) 
considered the Treasury "most difficult of all…the attitude of its officials was 
frequently arrogant and sometimes shortsighted". Young (1961, p. 182) claimed 
"Treasury delay was notorious" (as did Eddy, 1969), and quoted James Stephen20 as 
complaining to a colleague in 1840 that "it took not less than two months on an 
average to obtain an answer from the Treasury, and that in several cases there had 
been a delay of a year or more". 
 
Two examples of the tortuous routes that could be undertaken by a single piece of 
correspondence will suffice to illustrate how complicated, frustrating and slow the 
communications system could be. A request from Governor Darling in New South 
Wales, in the early 1820s, for iron bedsteads to be provided from England for his 
troops "went to the Commander-in-Chief, the Colonial Office, the Treasury, the 
Commissariat, the Ordnance, and finally back to the Treasury and Colonial Office 
again" (Eddy, 1969, p. 192). Similarly, in the Swan River colony, in August 1832, 
Lieutenant Governor Stirling issued a requisition including 150 pairs of shoes for 
soldiers (Broun to Lewis, 8 August 1832, CSO, SROWA, Cons 49 V3-5, No. 3241). 
The shoes were duly supplied by the Ordnance Department at the Cape of Good 
Hope, which then submitted an application for reimbursement (about £35) to Britain 
in February 1833. However, in Western Australia, the receipt of all the goods was 
recorded as being "for the use of the Settlement", not noting the shoes were for the 
military (Comptroller's Office to Treasury, 20 January 1835, T1/3426 (AJCP reel 
1086)). As Imperial expenditure on the colonies separated military funding from civil 
expenses, the Imperial Treasury was not prepared to decide from what funds the 
expense should be reimbursed without official confirmation as to what branch of the 
service the shoes were actually provided. Correspondence discussing the matter 
between the Treasury, Comptroller's Office, Board of Ordnance and Commissioners 
of Audit meant the matter was not concluded until July 1835, almost three years after 
                                                 
20 James Stephen, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies 1836-1848 (Williams, 1943). 
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the initial requisition, when Treasury finally accepted the shoes probably had been 
issued for military service and instructed that reimbursement could be made—with 
the proviso that the Commissariat in Western Australia still be required to report on 
the purpose for which the shoes had been supplied and to refund the relevant value 
from the colonial fund to the military chest if any had been provided to settlers 
(Treasury Minute, 6 July 1835, T1/3426 (AJCP reel 1086)). 
 
5.3.2 Financial administration 
 
The example above also provides evidence of how the decision making in colonial 
financial matters was the responsibility of the Treasury, and not the Colonial Office. 
The Imperial Treasury had held responsibility for British revenue collection and 
disbursement since the late 1700s, and throughout the 1800s the House of Commons 
began increasingly to also expect the Treasury to have similar sole authority over 
expenditure (Chester, 1981). Funds could not be issued without the consent of 
Treasury. The effect was that the Treasury centralised its supervisory control over all 
other government offices with an interest in colonial finances—including the 
Customs and Excise Boards, Board of Ordnance, Commissariat Department and, of 
course, the Commissioners of Audit (Chester, 1981; Eddy, 1969). By the mid-1820s, 
"the Treasury had begun to assume a very active role in the determination of colonial 
financial policy" (Young, 1961, p. 170). In 1855, Sir Charles Trevelyan claimed that 
the Treasury was "the chief office of the Government.…Two-thirds of the Civil 
Establishment are directly subordinate to it, and the expenditure of the remaining 
third is under its superintendence" (Chester, 1981, p. 208).21 
 
Treasury control of colonial finances was maintained administratively by using 
intricate and strict systems of checking, double-checking, and issuing of instructions. 
Further control over information may have been the rationale for the Treasury's 
general reluctance to simplify processes and to modernise its management of public 
finances, although such a reluctance to freely share information is not likely to have 
been officially admitted. For example, the Imperial Exchequer actively strategised to 
retain medieval methods for recording information (such as wooden tally sticks with 
                                                 
21 Broader discussion on the growth of Treasury control and power in Britain during the nineteenth 
century can be found in several sources (including Chester, 1981; Chubb, 1952; Clark, 1960; Eddy, 
1969; Macpherson, 2013; Normanton, 1966; Young, 1961). 
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carved notches, Latin and its own version of Roman numerals) until as late as 1834, 
more than a century after the rest of the British government had transitioned to the 
use of paper, English and Arabic numbering.22 Even serious criticism of the 
Treasury's ongoing usage of these "antiquated", "barbarous" and "incomprehensible" 
methods by a Select Committee on Finance was not sufficient to prompt change 
(Select Committee on Finance, 1819, p. 122).  
 
A further example, directly relevant to colonial accounting, is the fact that each 
British colony used local currencies for transactions, at varying rates of exchange 
established by the Imperial Treasury. The corresponding difficulties of auditing such 
a variety of accounts must be clear, yet the obvious simplification of "introducing a 
fixed and uniform medium of [ex]change for all transactions connected with the 
public service" was not even identified as a possible solution until the mid-1820s 
(Butlin, 1953, p. 161). The requirement to keep all public accounts in "sterling" 
currency finally came into effect in New South Wales on 1 January 1826 (Butlin, 
1953).  
 
The Colonial Office and the Treasury were, of course, the major advisors to the 
Imperial government and Parliament in their ongoing efforts to control colonial 
finances, particularly in regards to managing the annual appropriation grants to 
colonies. The role of audit became increasingly important to Parliament throughout 
the nineteenth century, both locally within the colonies and in the final authorising 
audit in Britain, as a means of obtaining accurate information on colonial expenditure 
and there were several Parliamentary Committees specifically targeting this issue. 
Legislation was passed and official instructions issued to colonial governors in 
ongoing attempts to improve the management and audit of colonial finances and to 
ensure the personal integrity of financial officers. These methods are briefly 
examined in the next sub-sections of this chapter. 
                                                 
22 The use of English and Arabic numerals was mandated for all judicial proceedings by 4 Geo. II, 
c.26—Proceedings in Courts of Justice Act 1730 (Imp.), but almost immediately the Exchequer 
decided "that this change was not desirable" and ensured new legislation was passed within two years 
(6 Geo. II, c.6—Receipt of the Exchequer Act 1732 (Imp.)) that exempted it from compliance and 
"specially enacted that its officers should … follow the ancient practice" (Treasury, 1869, p. 342). The 
1732 legislation was not abolished until 1834 (by Receipt of Exchequer Act 1834 (Imp.)), finally 
enabling the use of the English language and common numerals. Legislative permission to record 
receipts on paper had been enacted in 1783, but the use of wooden tally sticks continued until late 
1826 (Heath, 1927). 
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5.3.3 Imperial control over colonial audit: official instructions; legislation; 
parliamentary commissions and select committees  
 
From the late 1700s to the mid-1800s, the Imperial Parliament and the Colonial 
Office struggled to find ways to adequately control financial management systems in 
the colonies. Colonial governors received no standardised instructions, reporting 
requirements or legislative procedures for their guidance until well into the 
nineteenth century. Two very early and general instructions to colonial governors did 
not include any explicit requirement for audit: the first, a Treasury Minute of 1764, 
strictly forbade colonial governors from incurring "any Expense for which Money 
has not already been granted by Parliament, or which has not been previously 
approved", except in cases of real emergency (House of Commons, 1803, p. 183). A 
similar Treasury regulation in 1791 confirmed this principle and extended the 
requirements: colonial governors would be required to personally repay the cost of 
any non-Treasury approved projects they might initiate and, within three months 
after the end of each year, they were to provide Britain with both estimates of how 
they expected to spend the Imperial Parliamentary grant and accounts of actual 
expenditure, using the same heads of service for each and explaining any variance 
(House of Commons, 1803).  
 
The first official reference to Imperial auditing of colonial accounts appears to have 
been issued a few years later, in 1798, when the newly appointed Commissary of 
New South Wales was instructed to transmit annual estimates of required stores and 
specie and, "from time to time", to submit his accounts "duly Attested on Oath, to the 
Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts" (Treasury Instructions to 
Commissary Palmer, 1 November 1798. HRA Series I, Vol. IV, pp. 18-22). Despite a 
conviction in Britain that local colonial auditors could not provide reliable assurance 
on the colonial accounts, due to their lack of independence from the governor (as 
noted below), the Commissary was nevertheless expected to have the governor check 
and approve the accounts prior to their transmission to Britain. The process did thus 
provide for a rudimentary local audit that could be understood as providing a "real 
check, in most cases the only check, on local expenditure" (Young, 1961, p. 185).   
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Upon receiving the colonial accounts, the Imperial auditors were not required, or 
even able, to check conformance with the various colonial appropriation acts. The 
need to do so was simply not understood to be part of financial control and the 
physical processes made it almost impossible for Imperial auditors to provide a 
timely check. Crown colony estimates were passed locally in the form of annual 
appropriation acts, published in local newspapers. These were sent to the Colonial 
Office for legislative approval only and were not then passed on to the Audit Office 
(Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837). 
Imperial Auditors could only verify if public money had been spent according to the 
wishes of the Imperial Parliament by referring to general accounting reports and the 
vouchers accompanying each item of expenditure (Select Committee on the 
Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837). In any case, colonies did not 
vote their appropriation sums in detail, only for general services (although under 
specific heads) (Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and 
Expenditure, 1837). Given also the significant time lags between colonies passing 
their estimates and the Imperial Audit Office checks, there was "nothing to prevent 
the Governor from drawing warrants on the Treasury for monies not included in the 
estimates" for, by the time the warrants were checked by the Audit Office, "the 
money…has been previously paid away" (Select Committee on the Accounts of 
Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837, p. 112).  
 
In 1800, one of the first pieces of Imperial legislation focussing specifically on 
colonial accounts was passed (41 Geo. III, c.22—Expenditure in the West Indies Act 
1800 (Imp.)). It appointed five "Commissioners for the more effectual Examination 
of Accounts of Public Expenditure for His Majesty's Forces in the West Indies 
during the Present War" (Jacob and Tomlins, 1809). These new Commissioners were 
subordinate to the existing Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts but the 
Imperial Parliament's colonial focus at this time was obviously on the military 
expenses associated with the Napoleonic wars (and, by inference, not on the daily 
administrative processes in the Australian penal colonies of New South Wales and 
Van Diemen's Land).  
 
An auditing requirement imposed in 1806 (by Audit of Public Accounts Act 1806 
(Imp.)) required all persons accountable for public money (not just those in the 
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colonies) to submit annual accounts to the Auditors of Public Accounts within three 
months of the year end (Select Committee on Colonial Accounts, 1845). This 
legislation also included a specific reference to the management of colonial finances 
by formalising that any officer who improperly authorised colonial expenditure 
would be held personally responsible for repayment.  
 
Perhaps in recognition of the growing workload and complexity of managing the 
colonial Empire, a new, separate Colonial Audit Office focussed on auditing the 
colonial expenditure of Parliamentary grants was created in 1814 by 54 Geo. III, 
c.184—Accounts of Colonial Revenues Act 1814 (Imp.). Its jurisdiction was only for 
five colonies (Ceylon, Mauritius, Malta, Trinidad and the Cape of Good Hope), 
which were now required to submit regular accounts to Britain (Select Committee on 
the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837). Soon after its creation, the 
Colonial Audit Office prepared account-keeping instructions issued to colonial 
governors in 1815 by the Imperial Treasury but "the directions as to the revenue, 
were very general, and to the effect that the receipts were to be examined by the local 
authorities" (Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and 
Expenditure, 1837, p. 49). Colonial governors must have appreciated them even so, 
as there was certainly a need for clear and current guidance: the financial 
management instructions (Treasury minutes) initially provided to the Governor of 
New South Wales in 1816 (Governor Macquarie) were those from 1764 and 1791 
and were thus at least 25 years out of date (Eddy, 1969).  
 
The Colonial Audit Office's jurisdiction was extended in 1821 to other colonies 
(including New South Wales) by 1 & 2 Geo. IV, c.121—Commissariat Accounts Act 
1821 (Imp.) (Di Francesco, 1999; Longhurst, 1995; Select Committee on the 
Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837). This 1821 legislation gave 
more substance to the requirement holding both colonial treasurers and governors 
personally responsible for any improperly authorised or directed expenditure.23 
Further, it broadened the audit investigative powers by providing three 
Commissioners in the Imperial office to specifically examine both colonial receipts 
                                                 
23 The "accountant" appointed in Crown colonies as responsible for submitting accounts to Britain for 
audit was usually the treasurer, but in the Canadian provinces was the receiver-general, and in others 
the governor (Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837, p. 47). 
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(from colonial revenues) and expenditure (Parliamentary grants). Nevertheless, the 
real control of colonial finances was still firmly held by the Treasury—evidenced by 
the contemporary description of this legislation as superseding "the ancient and 
inconvenient system of keeping the public accounts" by ensuring the "whole of the 
arrangements in the Audit Office are now subjected to the control of the lords of the 
treasury" (Knight, 1835, p. 81).  
 
Several independent commissions of enquiry were appointed by the Imperial 
Parliament in the early nineteenth century to obtain first-hand information on 
colonial activities and expenditure. Such commissions were sent in 1802 to Trinidad, 
West Africa (1811), the customs service in the American colonies (1812) and to 
Malta (1812) (Young, 1961). The House of Commons also called regularly for 
Parliamentary returns (requests for specific information) on the size and various 
expenses of colonies, to be supplied directly by the relevant government department 
(usually the Colonial Office or Treasury). For example, in 1817 the Parliament 
requested the Colonial Office to provide an account of all civil and military colonial 
offices, including names, salaries, and dates of appointments (Colonial Office, 1817).  
 
The Imperial Parliament could also investigate areas of concern via the appointment 
of Select Committees. These operated independently of the Executive government in 
a similar manner to modern Parliamentary select committees or even Royal 
Commissions. Committee members were appointed by Parliament and given 
extensive powers to call for witnesses and papers. Their recommendations were 
contained in substantial reports with literally hundreds, sometimes thousands, of 
pages of evidence. At least three such high-level committees were appointed to 
inquire into colonial accounts, in 1819, 1837 and in 1845: their findings are 
discussed below. 
 
The first of these Select Committees, in 1819, examined the operations of the 
Colonial Audit Office established under the Accounts of Colonial Revenues Act 
1814. The Chair of the Commissioners for Auditing the Colonial Accounts was 
asked if it would improve on-site financial management if the colonies employed 
professional auditors (that is, people with some training or experience in auditing or 
accounting). The Chair advised that there were auditors in Ceylon and Mauritius, 
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"acting under very strict regulations", but extending the requirement was unnecessary 
because colonial accounts subjected to a local audit also needed examination in 
Britain, both to pick up local errors and because colonial auditors were not 
independent of the governor: 
 
An auditor in the colonies must be subject to the governor, and 
bound to admit any expenditure which the governor may authorize; 
and therefore that a mere local audit would not operate as an 
effectual check upon any expenditure by the governor, even if it 
should be contrary to the directions of His Majesty's government. 
(Select Committee on Finance, 1819, p. 142) 
 
This is authoritative evidence that colonial auditors in the early nineteenth century 
operated as part of Executive government, and no recommendation was made for 
placing auditors in the colonies.  
 
Imperial oversight of colonial finances was not helped by the refusal of the Secretary 
of State for the Colonies 1812-1827, Lord Bathurst, to permit Imperial auditors to 
communicate directly with colonial governors or to access general colonial 
correspondence (Young, 1961). Bathurst's own innovation for strengthened Colonial 
Office administrative oversight was implementing a requirement for governors to 
provide annual statistical reports using standardised headings. Beginning in 1822, 
these "Blue Books" provided readily available information on each colony's revenue, 
expenditure, taxes, fees, civil establishment, population and other details according 
to standardised templates (Young, 1961). No new audit requirements were included 
with the financial reporting templates but it was believed that the consistent 
formatting would aid the Imperial Parliament in accurately forecasting its own 
expenditure on the colonies (Horton to Brisbane, 13 March 1824. HRA Series I, Vol. 
XI). Unfortunately, however, the amount of information provided was 
overwhelming. For example, in 1838 the House of Commons called at least twice for 
information on colonies that had already been published in the Blue Books, 
indicating the difficulty of finding specific information (Colonial Office, 1838a, 
1838b). A Parliamentary Select Committee in 1837 considered the possibility of 
collating the Blue Book information into a more manageable publication but resolved 
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the process would be too expensive (Martin, 1843; Select Committee on the 
Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837).24  
  
An Imperial Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry was appointed in 1830 to examine 
the revenue and expenditure of colonies in Malta, Gibraltar, New South Wales and 
Mauritius, and "to suggest to the Commissioners of our Treasury such regulations 
and arrangements…for the better collection…of the revenue, or for the reduction of 
expenditure therein" (Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and 
Expenditure, 1837, p. 3). This Commission's report endorsed strict Treasury control 
"over every branch & every article of Colonial Expenditure" (Young, 1961, p. 194). 
It recommended adopting a more uniform system for stating the accounts and 
implied that while the Colonial Audit Office (created in 1814) had made some useful 
suggestions (including the separation of the military from civil expenditure), these 
efforts were "very imperfectly carried out;…have nothing of a complete or 
comprehensive character, and have proved wholly inadequate to remove the mass of 
irregularity and abuse" (UK, HC, April 1, 1845, vol. 78. cc. 1327). The criticism of 
the Colonial Audit Office resulted in its abolition in 1832, by legislation that 
specifically referred to there being "several Accounts...which have not been 
examined".25 The responsibility for auditing all unexamined and future colonial 
accounts was transferred back to the Commissioners for Auditing the Public 
Accounts, which continued to operate as a sub-department of Treasury (Knight, 
1835; Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837; 
Tomlins and Granger, 1835).  
 
Dozens of pages of highly specific financial management instructions were provided 
by the Imperial Treasury in 1826 to the newly incoming Governor of New South 
Wales (Darling) (see Chapter 6 and Appendix 6), but this advice was not 
standardised nor widely distributed to other colonial governors. The first set of 
standard operating instructions to colonial governors appears to have been 
implemented in March 1837, when the then-Secretary of State for the Colonies 
                                                 
24 The task was instead taken up by Robert Montgomery Martin, a civil servant and writer, who used 
the Blue Books to produce two dense statistical publications (Martin, 1839, 1843). Martin stated in the 
later publication that it contained "about three million figures" (p. v): such an intense level of detail 
might explain why his efforts do not appear to have been repeated in subsequent years. 
25 2 & 3 Will. IV, c.26—Colonial Audit Revenues Act 1832 (Imp.). 
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compiled and published in one document all of the various standing regulations for 
colonial governors and senior officers that had been dispersed over the years via 
correspondence (Glenelg, 1837).26 These innovative "Rules and Regulations for Her 
Majesty's Colonial Service" included financial instructions increasing the 
accountability for expenditure of public money and the provision of financial returns, 
and clarifying provisions of the Commissariat Accounts Act 1821 (Imp.). Highly 
successful, the publication was revised many times throughout the nineteenth 
century. A later edition provided financial management instructions considerably 
expanded from the original 1837 publication (Select Committee on Colonial 
Accounts, 1845). For example, one new inclusion concerned correspondence 
between the Commissioners of Audit in Britain and "the Officer of Account in the 
Colonies", and other new sections gave detailed instructions for the secure custody of 
public money (Select Committee on Colonial Accounts, 1845, pp. 724-725). 
 
In late April 1837, the House of Commons appointed a second Select Committee to 
examine colonial accounts and find a way "to introduce uniformity, regularity, 
correctness, and completeness" (Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial 
Receipt and Expenditure, 1837, p. ii). This Committee interviewed 16 officers with 
wide-ranging experience in colonial accounting, from a variety of departments 
including the Treasury, Colonial Office, Paymaster General's department and the 
Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts. Its report was tabled in Parliament 
on 13 July 1837 and included over 200 pages of detailed evidence but no 
recommendations for reform.27 The Committee was able to confirm Parliament's 
suspicion that it was not receiving adequate information on colonial finances, noting 
the financial information contained in colonial reports generally remained at the 
Colonial Office and the Treasury and was not usually submitted to Parliament except 
as abstracts of the annual estimates. Even these were not printed nor provided to 
Parliament in any detail (Gretton, 1913).  
 
It was not until April 1845 that a third Parliamentary Select Committee was formed 
to investigate colonial accounts. The formal motion calling for its appointment 
                                                 
26 Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies 1835-1839. 
27 The report was almost certainly finished hurriedly as the date of tabling was just over three weeks 
after Victoria ascended the British throne following the death of William IV; just four days after this 
tabling the Parliamentary session was prorogued and all Select Committees automatically ceased. 
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deliberately used exactly the same words as for the 1837 Select Committee. Once 
again the Imperial Parliament wanted to examine colonial accounts "in order to 
introduce uniformity, regularity, correctness, and completeness" (Select Committee 
on Colonial Accounts, 1845, p. ii). That Parliament was still required to prepare its 
annual appropriation grants to Crown colonies without accurate information on the 
actual (or even estimated) receipt and expenditure is apparent from the motion 
calling for this Committee: 
 
We voted £9,812 [to the Falkland Islands] in the year 1844; many 
votes had preceded this, to an amount not probably less than £20,000 
more. Of its application we know nothing—of the revenue of the 
Island we know nothing. 
 
Of the accounts presented nothing could be more irregular or less 
uniform than their character.…In a word, there is no unity of plan or 
purpose—no general model—no system pervading the whole—no 
two [colonies], indeed, adopting the same plan. 
 
Equally irregular are the records of Colonial outlay.…The details of 
the expenditure of New South Wales, for example, being above 
£800,000 occupy nine folio pages—that of Canada, which is 
£476,000, is despatched in less than a page and a half—or in less 
space than is occupied to account for the £20,000 which is disposed 
of in Prince Edward's Island, or the £13,500 spent in Honduras. (UK, 
HC, April 1, 1845, vol. 78. cc. 1322-25) 
 
The 1845 Select Committee found the lack of a standardised reporting format and the 
inconsistency in colonial account reporting to be of real concern (Select Committee 
on Colonial Accounts, 1845). Its report included over 800 pages of evidence and 19 
recommendations for improvement that were eventually adapted by the Treasury and 
Audit Office into standardised accounting instructions and forms. As a direct result, 
all Crown colonies were expected to have implemented this new and comprehensive 
system for managing and reporting their accounts by 1848—and certainly by 1850 
(Treasury, 1847).28 Finally, an effective system was in place and by 1849 "the votes 
for Civil Establishments at home and abroad" could be arranged under the head of 
Civil Estimates and presented separately to Parliament—that is, colonial 
appropriations could be separated from those for Great Britain (Chubb, 1952, p. 12). 
 
                                                 
28 A summary of these requirements is provided in Appendix 5. 
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5.3.4 Imperial control over colonial audit: ensuring audit integrity 
 
The concept of auditor independence was not, as it is today, viewed as a necessary 
pre-requisite for audit integrity partly at least because the cultural context of personal 
reputation operated at a more fundamental level to maintain effective control. The 
failure of a nineteenth-century auditor in either the private or public sector to report 
any discovered problems was considered a breach of their professional reputation 
that served "as a bond for the auditor's independence" (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983, 
p. 630).  
 
The requirement for colonial administrators (including auditors) to adhere to official 
Imperial instructions cannot be separated, in the context of the era, from the 
individual need to sustain and enhance personal reputation, honour and integrity. 
Individual personal reputation was a central aspect regulating nineteenth-century 
social and business life to a degree that can be difficult to understand today, affecting 
even the most casual daily relationships. For example, as late as July 1892, an 
English-born clergyman wrote in the Church of England Diocese of Perth's 
Quarterly Magazine to advise potential emigrants that "Government officials, 
professional men, the descendants of the first colonists, and others form a quasi 
aristocracy, and any attempt on the part of a new comer to treat all the colonists on 
the same level proves itself a mistake" (as cited by Bunn, 1994, p. 30). 
 
The considerably smaller populations in colonial Australia meant everyone was 
known to everyone else and personal reputation could be even more important than 
in Britain (Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013). One's personal reputation was also essential 
for employment, as appointments and promotions were almost always via accepted 
systems of nepotism and patronage. Appointments for government positions, 
including colonial auditors, were made by the Crown (generally the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, who either personally nominated the appointee or officially 
confirmed the local governor's nomination) (Select Committee on Colonial 
Accounts, 1845). For more information on the actual operation of patronage in the 
colonial New South Wales civil service, see McMartin (1959, 1983, 1987). 
Appointing people to public service positions on the basis of merit was not to occur 
in Britain until 1870, after a series of reforms beginning with the now well-known 
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Northcote-Trevelyan Report (tabled in the Imperial Parliament February 1854) and 
the subsequent establishment of the Civil Service Commission in 1855. These 
reforms and their effects on public sector administration, including public 
accounting, have been well-documented elsewhere (see, for example, Edwards, 
2011; Gladden, 1956; Macphail, 2008; Williams, 1943).  
 
On a more overt level, and as noted earlier, audit integrity was also motivated by the 
Imperial legislation requiring those who sanctioned any expenditure of public funds 
in the colonies without proper authority to be held personally responsible for 
repaying the sums (Audit of Public Accounts Act 1806 and Commissariat Accounts 
Act 1821 (s.20)). In 1825, those responsible for colonial government finances also 
became required to provide a financial security bond (James Stephen, Jr. to Horton, 
27 March 1825. HRA Series IV, Legal Papers, Section A, Vol. I, p. 592). The 
amount of the security bond required from colonial treasurers was determined on a 
case by case basis, "proportioned to the amount [of cash] that he must necessarily 
have in his hands for current purposes" and could be substantial (Select Committee 
on Colonial Accounts, 1845, p. 90). For example, in 1832, the newly appointed 
Collector of Revenue in Western Australia was advised that "for the just 
Performance of the several Duties specified you will be required at your earliest 
Convenience to enter into Bond for the Sum of One Thousand Pounds with one 
Surety"—a sum five times more than the £200 annual salary (Colonial Secretary to 
Collector of Revenue, 27 June 1832, CSO, SROWA, Cons 49, v.3-5, no. 3089).  
 
That it might prove difficult to actually find and appoint people financially capable 
of providing such a security was acknowledged by the Colonial Office ((1835, 
August 8). Stanley to Stirling, 8 March 1833. The Perth Gazette and Western 
Australian Journal, p. 543). Yet even this ratio seems slight when compared to the 
personal bond of £30,000 (50,000 Spanish dollars) required seven years earlier from 
the newly appointed Treasurer of New South Wales (William Balcombe), whose 
authorised salary was £1,000 per annum (Bathurst to Brisbane, 6 February 1825. 
HRA Series I, Vol. XI, p. 494; Brisbane to Bathurst, 8 February 1825. HRA Series I, 
Vol. XI, p. 514). Instructions from Britain on the size of the security bonds to be 
provided "by officers entrusted with public money in Western Australia" were still 
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being received as late as 1862 (Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 February 1862 
(Despatch No. 10). WA, LC, May 23, 1862, p. 1006). 
 
As a method of providing security, however, personal bonds were not necessarily 
guaranteed. The liability of Balcombe for the public money in New South Wales was 
acknowledged by Governor Darling but he also pointed out to the Colonial Office 
that Balcombe possessed no property and, in the event of loss, "the recovery of the 
money would, I have no doubt, been found totally impracticable" (Darling to 
Bathurst, 22 May 1826. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, p. 323).  
 
5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter examined how Imperial Britain gradually improved its ability to 
administratively manage the public finances in its many colonies during the first half 
of the nineteenth century. The power to administer the financial systems in the 
colonies was a struggle between the Colonial Office and the Imperial Treasury, 
complicated by communication problems, but the Imperial Parliament, driven by a 
political need to reduce expenditure, was able to introduce methods for standardising 
both instructions to colonial governors and reporting from the colonies.  
 
There is ample evidence that those responsible in the colonies for the management of 
government finances were subject in this same period to increasing sanctions for any 
misuse of their authority in addition to strong social expectations of compliance. 
These assisted in providing local control over colonial finances despite audit 
functions being contained within the Executive. 
 
The following chapter provides a case study of how Imperial oversight of financial 
management was applied in New South Wales. In particular, the problems that arose 
from initial deficiencies in official instructions are shown, and the resultant 
implementation of a new system of audit in the 1820s. This study is important as 
these experiences in New South Wales informed the financial management system 
established in the 1830s in Western Australia.  
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CHAPTER 6  




This chapter examines how early nineteenth-century Imperial government oversight 
of financial management was applied in the British colony of New South Wales, on 
the east coast of Australia, during the first five decades of settlement. A particular 
focus is given on the early problems in financial management arising from 
deficiencies in instructions concerning audit processes and in the personal integrity 
of key personnel, and the subsequent preparation and implementation of a new 
system of audit in the 1820s. This study of this administrative system is valuable as it 
was the precursor—and contrast—to the public sector audit administration processes 
in the later Swan River colony established on the west coast of Australia in 1829 
(discussed in subsequent chapters). New South Wales, Swan River and South 
Australia (established in 1834) were the only British colonies in Australia instituted 
with their own administration from the beginning of settlement. Further, neither 
Swan River nor South Australia were established as penal colonies. 
 
6.2 EARLY FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION (1788-1820) 
 
The penal colony of New South Wales, founded in 1788, originally encompassed 
virtually all of the Australian continent's eastern two-thirds. For almost the next four 
decades, the various governors of New South Wales held administrative 
responsibility for all of the British settlements within that geographic area as well as 
for New Zealand, which became a separate Crown colony in 1841.29 
 
The experience of New South Wales in the management of public finances from the 
late 1700s to the early 1800s was one of administrative inefficiencies. There were 
serious problems in both the New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land settlements 
                                                 
29 The British settlement begun in 1803 in Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania) was not formally separated 
from New South Wales and established as a separate colony with its own administration until 1825. 
Port Phillip was first settled by Britain in 1836 and was administratively separated from New South 
Wales (as Victoria) in 1851; the Moreton Bay convict settlement began in 1825 but was not separated 
(Queensland) until 1859. The British colony in South Australia, legislatively established in 1834 and 
officially proclaimed in late 1836, originally included all of central Australia—what is now the 
Northern Territory was not transferred from South Australian to Commonwealth control until 1911.  
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that resulted in, most notably perhaps, the "Rum Rebellion" of 1808 (see, amongst 
others, Evatt (1939); Butlin (1953)). There was no official, physical government 
Treasury and, at least to begin with, little actual specie (Butlin, 1953). Until the mid-
1820s, government finances in colonial New South Wales were managed locally by 
the Commissary, the Naval Officer and the Treasurers of the Police and Orphan 
funds (Watson (1917) "Commentary". HRA Series I, Vol. XI, pp. 913-914). The few 
private labourers were originally paid locally in bills upon the Imperial Treasury, 
which were "of little Service to them in this part of the World" (Phillip to Nepean, 17 
November 1788. HRA Series I, Vol. I, p. 104). Most of the colony's resources (food, 
clothing, other stores and specie) were stored in and issued from the Commissary, 
which effectively also provided the only banking facilities (Beckett, 2012; Butlin, 
1953). The workload of Commissary Miller was so great that Governor Phillip30 
appointed an assistant within a few weeks of landing in Australia (Phillip to Sydney, 
15 May 1788. HRA Series I, Vol. I, p. 35). 
 
Later, as the colony in New South Wales transitioned from a strictly penal settlement 
to one increasingly attractive to free settlers, the consequent booming free-market 
capitalist economy overwhelmed the existing financial systems (Butlin, 1953; Di 
Francesco, 1999; Young, 1961). It is the underlying reasons for the management 
system failures that are of particular interest here. Chapter 5 discussed the complex 
and cumbersome processes that existed in Britain in the early nineteenth century for 
managing colonial finances and a great deal of the financial problems experienced in 
early New South Wales can be attributed to those deficiencies in instructions and 
oversight from Imperial Britain. The lack of guidance and effective management 
meant the system struggled to cope with the rapidly changing local environment, and 
was not able to prevent mismanagement by some poor choices of individuals in key 
financial management roles. Both these factors are discussed below. 
 
6.2.1 Deficiencies in instructions and audit control 
 
Searching early official correspondence reveals the various governors of early New 
South Wales had little assistance from Britain in terms of how they were expected to 
manage public finances. Instructions were very general and there was certainly no 
                                                 
30 First Governor of New South Wales (7 February 1788 to 10 December 1792). 
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mention of any form of financial audit until the passage of the Audit of Public 
Accounts Act 1806 (Imp.). Within the colonies, "the governors directed the 
Commissary, dealing with each situation as it arose. There was no full and complete 
set of rules for procedure" (Butlin, 1953, p. 31).  
 
The over-riding duty for colonial governors was to maintain strict economic 
frugality. A Treasury Minute of 1764 forbade colonial governors from incurring 
expenses not included in the Parliamentary appropriations, and a similar Treasury 
regulation of 1791 confirmed this principle and instructed colonial governors to 
provide annual accounts of estimates and expenditure (House of Commons, 1803) 
(as noted in Chapter 5). Governor Phillip's official original instructions in 1787 
authorised him to purchase provisions for the colony using bills of exchange and to 
account for these purchases by ensuring the Commissary transmitted accounts "from 
time to time" to the Imperial Treasury, but included the warning that "we are 
desirous to diminish as much as possible the expences [sic] which the intended 
establishment occasions" (Governor Phillip's Instructions, 25 April 1787. HRA 
Series I, Vol. I, p. 11; 13). It is true Phillip's official Commission provided a general 
authority over public finance in the new colony, permitting expenditure as directed 
by the Parliamentary grants for funding the civil establishment in New South Wales 
(2nd Commission, 2 April 1787. HRA Series I, Vol. I, p. 7). However, as Phillip did 
not receive a copy of the Parliamentary Estimates for the financial year 1788-1789 
until mid-1790 it would have been impossible to ascertain what that annual 
appropriation grant actually included (Phillip to Nepean, 14 June 1790. HRA Series 
I, Vol. I, p. 178).  
 
The second Governor of New South Wales, Hunter (September 1795 to September 
1800), received similarly brief advice on financial management. Hunter's instructions 
were that he alone, as Governor, would be solely responsible for drawing bills for 
public purposes on the Imperial Treasury and he was required to ensure the 
Commissary transmitted regular accounts to the Treasury (Instructions to Governor 
Hunter, 1 July 1794. HRA Series I, Vol. II, p. 521). The third Governor, King 
(September 1800 to August 1806), acknowledged his receipt in 1800 of Treasury 
instructions provided to the Commissary regarding the process for payment of 
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purchases (dated 1 November 179831) but noted specifically that he himself had 
received "no orders on this Head", except for some conversation had with the 
Secretary of State while in England, plus copies of the 1794 instructions to Governor 
Hunter and the Treasury minutes of 1764 and 1791 (King to Treasury, 8 November 
1800. HRA Series I, Vol. II, p. 693).  
 
It is not clear when (or even if) colonial governors were officially advised of the 
implications of the Audit of Public Accounts Act 1806 (Imp.). This legislation applied 
to all persons accountable for public moneys, including those in colonial settlements, 
and required accounts to be submitted to the Imperial Auditors of Public Accounts 
within three months of year end and enforced personal responsibility for 
unauthorised expenditure.32 These requirements were of little use to the fourth 
Governor of New South Wales, Bligh, in his attempts to manage the events leading 
up to what became known as the "Rum Rebellion" in 1808 and the ensuing "scandal" 
in Britain (Eddy, 1969, p. 155). Governor Bligh was replaced in 1810 by Governor 
Macquarie.33  
 
Given that the management of public finances was a core factor in the overthrow of 
Bligh's administration, it is difficult to understand why Macquarie was not provided 
with improved (or at least updated) instructions on managing colonial finances. 
Macquarie's Commission in 1809 contained exactly the same very general authority 
on managing finances as that provided to Phillip in 1787 (Macquarie, 8 May 1809, 
HRA Series I, Vol. VII, p. 188). The data revealed in official and private 
correspondence demonstrate that the Imperial government was apparently content to 
merely provide Macquarie with an overview of its concerns and then to rely on 
Macquarie's own administrative skills to provide solutions. For example, Macquarie 
was instructed to have the Commissary's accounts "properly examined, and that 
office placed upon a proper footing", but no specific suggestions were provided as to 
how that task might be effected (Castlereagh to Macquarie, 14 May 1809, HRA 
Series I, Vol. VII, p. 84). Fortunately, Macquarie's experience seems to have been up 
to the task, as evidenced by his following letter to the Secretary of State: 
                                                 
31 Treasury Instructions to Commissary Palmer, 1 November 1798. HRA Series I, Vol. IV, pp. 18-22. 
32 As discussed in Chapter 5, the first legislation focussed specifically on colonial accounts 
(Expenditure in the West Indies Act 1800 (Imp.)) did not apply to New South Wales. 
33 Fifth Governor of New South Wales (1 January 1810 to 1 December 1821). 
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Agreeably to Your Lordship's Instructions I have framed and 
published such New Regulations as appeared to me adviseable [sic] 
and Necessary for simplifying the Accounts and improving the 
System of Conducting the Various Duties of the Commissariat 
Department, and I am happy to say that Office is now placed on a 
respectable and regular Footing. (Macquarie to Castlereagh, 30 April 
1810. HRA Series I, Vol. VII, p. 253) 
 
Macquarie's several strategies for managing colonial finances included implementing 
a uniform colonial currency and consolidating the separately maintained accounts in 
the several settlements (for detailed discussion, see Butlin (1953)). It is clear 
Macquarie considered the amalgamation of accounts would simplify them, thereby 
achieving "the desireable [sic] object of forming a strong check and controul [sic] 
over the Accounts of the Subordinate Settlements...with very considerable 
advantages to the Public (Macquarie to Liverpool, 9 November 1812. HRA Series I, 
Vol. VII, p. 533). In May 1812, Macquarie was sent directions "that a Statement of 
every Branch of Colonial Revenue should be made up and transmitted Home, 
Annually, with the purposes to which the said Revenue is Applied", which he 
acknowledged in a letter accompanied with a copy of the most recent quarterly 
account (Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 June 1813. HRA Series I, Vol. VII, p. 721). 
However, there is no evidence that Macquarie was made specifically aware of the 
reporting requirements of the Audit of Public Accounts Act 1806 (Imp.) prior to 
August 1814. This was when Deputy Commissary-General Allan (who had arrived in 
the colony a year earlier, in June 1813) informed Macquarie he had just been 
instructed to adhere to them, and therefore required Macquarie to witness that the 
accounts were "attested upon Oath…before the Governor, …accompanied with the 
necessary Vouchers in support thereof" (Allan to Macquarie, 7 April 1815. HRA 
Series I, Vol. VIII, p. 548). Imperial instructions for receipts to be examined in the 
colonies before transmittal to Britain had been prepared by the Colonial Audit Office 
in 1815 but, as noted earlier, its jurisdiction was not officially extended to New 
South Wales until 1821. In 1816, Governor Macquarie was instead sent the "ancient 
[Treasury] minutes" from 1764 and 1791 on the regulation and reduction of 
expenditure (Eddy, 1969, p. 155).  
 
The conclusion from this evidence must be that colonial governors in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were very much expected by Britain to use 
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their own personal initiative and experience to provide security and accountability 
for the local management of government money. Without clearly defined systems of 
checks and procedures, it is not overly surprising that colonial governors failed, at 
times, to ensure that security. 
 
There was no official colonial treasury and no auditor in New South Wales or Van 
Diemen's Land until the mid-1820s, some 35 years after the arrival of the first fleet 
(Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013). A Parliamentary Select Committee on Finance found in 
1819 there were only two colonies employing the services of professional auditors 
(Ceylon and Mauritius). Longhurst (1995, p. 6) attributed the lack of a public sector 
auditor or even a controller of accounts in New South Wales to the "peculiar nature 
of the penal settlement" but it seems that this colony, despite its function as a British 
prison, was not unique and conformed to the standard system of financial 





A second important factor underlying the financial problems experienced in early 
New South Wales was the appointment to key financial management roles of some 
individuals with questionable personal ethics and experience. Existing official 
sanctions against dishonesty were insufficient to prevent its occurrence, being limited 
to Imperial legislation holding those who authorised any expenditure of public funds 
without proper authority to be personally responsible for repayment (Audit of Public 
Accounts Act 1806; Commissariat Accounts Act 1821 (s.20)). Governor Macquarie 
implemented his own much stronger precautions in 1813 to ensure the accountability 
of his sub-ordinate, the newly appointed Lieutenant Governor of Van Diemen's 
Land, explaining: 
 
For, if I am to be held Accountable by His Majesty's Ministers for 
the…Expences [sic] of those Settlements, it is equally Necessary 
that Lieutenant Governor Davey should be tied down by Rules, and 
held Accountable to me for his Conduct and Measures in the 
immediate Administration of them….I Conceive there cannot be too 
many Checks imposed on an Officer situated at so great a Distance 
from Head Quarters, in respect to his public Measures, and 
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Expenditure of the Public Money. (Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 June 
1813. HRA Series I, Vol. VII, p. 709) 
 
Even so, Macquarie was pessimistic about the effectiveness of detecting problems 
"unless He is a Man of strict honor and sound integrity", although he intended to take 
immediate measures "the moment I discover that He sanctions any peculation of the 
Public property, or applies any part thereof, or any Public Money he may be 
entrusted with, to His own use" (Macquarie to Goulburn, 30 June 1813. HRA Series 
I, Vol. VII, p. 790).  
 
The reliance on personal integrity and trustworthy morals, combined with a lack of 
clear administrative instructions and extensive time-lags in communication and 
checking procedures, resulted in many examples of misconduct in the New South 
Wales colonial settlements including corruption, embezzlement, fraud, illegal 
taxation and unauthorised loans of public money to private citizens (see, for instance, 
Bunn and Gilchrist (2013); Butlin (1953); Evatt (1939); McMartin (1958b, 1983)). 
Certainly Governor Darling (Governor of New South Wales 1824 to 1831) claimed 
that government officials "had long been using government funds for their own 
profit" ("Darling, Sir Ralph (1772-1858).", 1966). Such issues were particularly 
evident in the operations of the various Commissariat officials who, as noted earlier, 
carried the bulk of the workload for managing government finances under the 
ultimate authority of the governor. Eddy (1969, p. 157) described the record of 
Commissariat officials in the Australian colonies as "black" and Longhurst (1995, p. 
6) referred to "a series of corrupt Commissariat officials [that] feathered their own 
nests".  
 
In particular, the interpretations of official instructions and "various private 
speculations" by Deputy Commissary-General Allan between 1813 and late 1818 
eventually led to his suspension from office by the Imperial Treasury (Butlin, 1953, 
p. 96). The scale and extent of the dishonesty from Allan's replacement, Drennan 
(appointed as head of the New South Wales Commissariat in 1818), were arguably 
even worse. An 1821 committee of inquiry found Drennan had misappropriated over 
£6000 of government funds—for this fraud and malfeasance Drennan was sent to 
England by Governor Brisbane in 1822 under military arrest and dishonourably 
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discharged (Beckett, 2012; Butlin, 1953; Di Francesco, 1999; Eddy, 1969; Parsons, 
1967). In Van Diemen's Land, the Colonial Naval Officer/Treasurer, Bromley, was 
discovered in 1824 to have embezzled an amount equivalent to a quarter of that 
colony's total annual revenue for that year (Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013; Di Francesco, 
1999; Eldershaw, 2011; Scripps, 2006).  
 
The management systems for ensuring personal accountability evidently failed, quite 
spectacularly at times, to ensure proper accountability of government finances in the 
early 1800s. These administrative failures were to eventually result in the 
implementation of an official colonial Treasury and Auditor General in the mid-
1820s to provide more effective controls (Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013).  
 
6.3 IMPLEMENTING AUDIT CONTROLS (1819-1829) 
 
The poor state of administrative affairs in New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land 
led Lord Bathurst (Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1812-1827) to institute a 
commission of inquiry to investigate complaints, inquire into all the laws and 
regulations and recommend improvements in the system of government (Bennett, 
1966; Young, 1961). Arriving in Sydney in September 1819, Commissioner Bigge 
was accorded precedence in the colony second only to Governor Macquarie and 
spent two years investigating and interviewing (Bennett, 1966). His efforts 
culminated in three comprehensive reports to the House of Commons, respectively 
printed in June 1822, February 1823 and March 1823 (Bigge, 1823). The principal 
outcome of these reports was the passage in 1823 of Imperial legislation 
implementing a Legislative Council in New South Wales, with members appointed 
by the Secretary of State to act as an advisory body to the governor (Justice, New 
South Wales Act 1823 (Imp.)) (Young (1961); Watson (1917) "Introduction". HRA 
Series I, Vol. XI, p. viii). This step has been identified as the first in the 
"devolutionary intentions" of Britain in regards to administration of its colonies in 
Australia (Eddy, 1969, p. 23).  
 
However, it was "the gradual establishment of an honest and effective colonial audit" 
that was acknowledged as "one of the most notable imperial achievements of the 
1820s" (Eddy, 1969, p. 157). Bigge proposed a complete reform in the administrative 
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machinery of colonial public finances: to replace the existing confused and misused 
system of revenue collection with both a colonial Treasury and a Commissary of 
Accounts, accountable to the governor (Bigge, 1823). The Imperial Treasury agreed 
this system would achieve an effective local check on internal expenditure. By 
October 1823 it had appointed the first Australian Colonial Treasurer (Balcombe) 
and in early 1824 a Commissary of (military) Accounts (Lithgow).  
 
However, administrative problems continued as a result of delays in receiving and 
implementing proper instructions. In 1822 the Colonial Office sent template forms to 
all its colonies with instructions on implementing a new, more consistent system of 
account reporting (see Chapter 5), but New South Wales was mistakenly omitted 
from the list. The forms were not sent to Australia until May 1823, finally being 
received in October that year (Horton to Brisbane, 19 May 1823. HRA Series I, Vol. 
XI, p. 83). In early 1824, Governor Brisbane34 acknowledged that the required 
format was so "altogether new", and "attended with so much labor", that he was 
unable to provide "this detailed information respecting the financial resources" of the 
colony, and instead provided a summary of expenses and resources for 1822 "as a 
temporary Substitute for this Omission" (Brisbane to Horton, 28 January 1824. HRA 
Series I, Vol. XI, p. 206). Before that letter could have arrived in Britain, the 
Secretary of State wrote to Brisbane to remind him it was a matter "of extreme 
importance" for the British government to receive the completed forms "as soon as 
possible" because they had "pledged to make out the Estimate next year on an 
entirely new System": 
 
The object of this new formation of the Estimates is to shew [sic] on 
one side the whole expenditure of the Colony, and on the other, the 
amount, nature, and application of the Colonial Revenue, and the 
Sum which the Mother Country is obliged to pay to make up the 
deficiency, and to balance expenditure with Revenue. (Horton to 
Brisbane, 13 March 1824. HRA Series I, Vol. XI, pp. 243-244) 
 
This is clear evidence that the Imperial Parliament was paying increasing attention to 
financial management in its colonies; nevertheless, the newly appointed Colonial 
Treasurer, Balcombe, arrived in April 1824 in New South Wales without 
                                                 
34 Sixth Governor of New South Wales (December 1821 to December 1825). 
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instructions—a situation described as "typical of the empiricism of the Colonial 
Office" by Eddy (1969, p. 160). Even directions for a procedure as fundamental as 
secure storage of specie had not been provided. Balcombe responded in May 1826 to 
an inquiry from Governor Darling that he had "never received any specific 
Instructions as to the mode, in which I should keep the Public Money; but as it has 
been the custom with my predecessor in Office to keep it in the Bank, …I conceived 
I was justified in following the example" (Balcombe to Colonial Secretary, 26 May 
1826. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, p. 337). 
 
About one week before Governor Brisbane received the reminder letter of 13 March 
1824 and another set of the new templates, the Prince Regent had left Sydney 
bearing a request from Brisbane for more administrative assistance in managing 
colonial finances (http://www.jenwilletts.com/convict_ship_mangles_1824.htm). 
Specifically, Brisbane wanted to extend Lithgow's responsibility as Commissary of 
Military Accounts to auditing "the whole Colonial Revenue, in order that He may 
have the entire financial state of the colony under His eye" (Brisbane to Bathurst, 2 
October 1824. HRA Series I, Vol. XI, p. 379). The request was approved, with 
Secretary of State Bathurst noting "the measure…agrees with one which had been 
recommended to the Lords Commiss'rs [sic] of His Majesty's Treasury for adoption 
previously to my receiving your Dispatch" (Bathurst to Brisbane, 14 June 1825. 
HRA Series I, Vol. XI, p. 645). In June 1825, Lithgow was thus officially appointed 
as the first Colonial Auditor in Australia (Di Francesco, 1999). 
 
In October 1825, shortly before his term ended, Governor Brisbane published in the 
local newspaper regulations he had received from the Imperial Treasury "for the 
Guidance of Financial Officers of New South Wales and its Dependencies" (Colonial 
Secretary's Office. (1825, October 3). Government and General Order. The Sydney 
Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser, p. 4).35 There were 31 specific instructions 
for the Colonial Treasurer, Naval Officer and officers in charge of bonded stores and 
other various branches of revenue collection—and none for the Colonial Auditor. 
The method of formatting accounts was detailed and revenue collectors were 
instructed to regularly pay over sums collected to the Colonial Treasurer. All officers 
                                                 
35 Extensive searching of correspondence in the HRA and other sources has not identified when these 
instructions were sent from Britain or actually received by Brisbane. 
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were required to submit regular accounts "to Government, for Examination"; this 
may have been for the colonial audit. The Treasurer was also to ensure all vouchers 
supporting the accounts were taken in duplicate so a complete set could be 
transmitted for examination by the Imperial Auditors.  
 
Later that same year (1825), Britain formally granted independent government to 
Van Diemen's Land and separated its administration from New South Wales. Its new 
Lieutenant Governor, Sir Arthur, implemented an administrative establishment on 
the same model as that in New South Wales with a Treasury, Commissariat and 
Auditor of Civil Accounts (Di Francesco, 1999).  
 
The British colonies in Australia in 1825 at last possessed a system of public sector 
audit that could provide some rudimentary (in today's terms) oversight of 
government finances. Final verification of government financial management in the 
colonies was maintained by the Imperial government—the Imperial Treasury and/or 
the Commissioners of Audit—to which all colonial administrations had to report (via 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies), but "public finance was, in appearance at 
least, regularized" (Barnard, 1962, p. 373). Although this audit function did not 
operate independently of the Executive, it did provide "a competent accounting 
function for the colonial administration" (Di Francesco, 1999, p. 44). A better system 
of managing finances was still a few years off and is discussed below. 
 
6.3.1 Preparing and implementing a "new system of accounts" 
 
Throughout the early 1820s, the Colonial Office and Imperial Treasury were 
finalising financial reporting templates, establishing constitutional legislation for 
New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, and agreeing to appoint official local 
Treasuries and audit checks. They were also busy preparing for a new Governor of 
New South Wales. Sir Darling was appointed in 1824 and arrived in December 1825 
to replace Governor Brisbane ("Darling, Sir Ralph (1772-1858).", 1966). Despite the 
instructions to financial officers Brisbane had published in October 1825 (noted 
above), both Darling and the Imperial government were well aware that further 
explanation was needed for effective management of colonial finances. Darling was 
obviously not impressed by the general administrative system left by Brisbane, 
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describing a system of "confusion and disorder" and noting that "no Steps had been 
taken, previous to my arrival, to establish regulations for the Conduct of any of the 
Departments, either Civil or Military" (Darling to Bathurst, 12 April 1827. HRA 
Series I, Vol. XIII, p. 249). 
 
On my assuming the Government, every Department appeared to act 
for itself, without check or control, and indeed without any 
responsibility. Money was drawn without any specific authority, and 
issued without any Regulation, or even a Voucher of any validity for 
its expenditure…I, therefore, judged it necessary immediately to 
forbid the issue of Money without my special authority. (Darling to 
Bathurst, 2 February 1826. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, p. 149) 
 
Darling was particularly concerned with the operations of the Naval Officer's 
Department which was responsible for the majority of revenue collection but, as it 
consisted only of the Naval Officer and one unpaid clerk, it was "totally unequal to 
the Duties it has to perform; and there can be no doubt that the losses sustained by 
Government have in consequence been very considerable" (Darling to Bathurst, 2 
February 1826. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, pp. 150-51). 
 
More than the usual attention had been given in the Colonial Office to preparing 
Darling's official commission and instructions, partly because the standard 
instructions to colonial governors, "so often transcribed, [were] now no longer 
applicable 'in any part'" (Eddy, 1969, p. 28). Primarily, however, questions about 
how financial accountability should be allocated between the governor and the newly 
appointed Colonial Treasurer needed clarification. Archival correspondence confirms 
that in March 1825 the Imperial Treasury and Colonial Office sought legal advice on 
this matter (from Stephen, later to be Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office himself 
(Chester, 1981)). The legal opinion provided was pragmatic. Colonial Treasurers 
should hold responsibility for issuing funds in the colonies and for submitting 
colonial accounts for audit in Britain (albeit in obedience to official warrants issued 
by the governor) because they were the ones who actually handled the money, they 
were usually professional accountants and they were required to provide a security 
bond. In contrast, argued Stephen, colonial governors were specifically restricted 
from direct receipt of any Crown revenue. Their function was "merely to prescribe to 
the Treasury, or to the Commissariat, the proper time and manner of issuing the 
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Funds placed under the control of those Departments" (Stephen to Horton, 27 March 
1825. HRA Series IV, Legal Papers, Section A, Vol. I, p. 592). Legally, Stephen 
argued, 
 
The warrant of the Governor for issuing public money, and the 
receipt of the person into whose hands the money is accordingly 
paid, form the proper vouchers of the Treasurer. If those Warrants 
are issued improperly, I cannot think that the Governor should be 
held directly responsible to make good the amount from his own 
pocket. A Governor authorizing a misapplication of the public 
money does not become a public Debtor, but a State delinquent; his 
offence is not within the cognizance of public sector auditors, but of 
the Secretary of State, or of Parliament. (Stephen to Horton, 27 
March 1825. HRA Series IV, Legal Papers, Section A, Vol. I, p. 
592) [emphasis added] 
 
Stephen further recommended that the "Instructions to Colonial Governors" should 
also be updated and suggested framing them as a set of guiding regulations covering 
all administrative branches, namely, "Executive Government, Legislative, Revenue, 
Crown lands, Judicial affairs, Ecclesiastical affairs and Education, Police, Convicts, 
Native inhabitants, and New Settlements" (Eddy, 1969, p. 29). However, this idea 
was not implemented until 1837, as noted earlier (Glenelg, 1837). 
 
Darling's powers as Governor of New South Wales were finalised in July 1825 and 
enclosed in a despatch containing his official Commission, official Instructions and 
the Royal Warrant for appointing a Legislative Council (Bathurst to Darling, 14-16 
July 1825. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, pp. 18-23; 99-126). Bathurst also intended to 
enclose a copy of Treasury advice (prepared by the Commissioners of Colonial 
Audit) "by which you will perceive how far it is intended to deviate from the system 
of accounting hitherto observed by the respective Governor of the Colonies" 
(Bathurst to Darling, 14 July 1825. CO 202/14 (AJCP reel 217), p. 275).36 It seems, 
though, that the Treasury was not moving at the same speed. Under-Secretary Hay 
was forced to apologise to Darling a fortnight later, as the advice had still not been 
officially issued (Hay to Darling (Private), 28 July 1825. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, p. 
44). The instructions were eventually finalised in June 1826, transmitted in August 
1826, and finally received by Darling in February 1827—well over a year after his 
                                                 
36 Interestingly, this part of the relevant sentence is not included in the HRA transcript of this letter 
(Bathurst to Darling, 14 July 1825. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, p. 20). 
93 
actual arrival in New South Wales (Bathurst to Darling, 11 August 1826. HRA Series 
I, Vol. XII, p. 483-93; Darling to Bathurst, 16 February 1827. HRA Series I, Vol. 
XIII, p. 113).  
 
These "sweeping new instructions" of June 1826 finally provided sufficient detail on 
how to manage colonial finances for Governor Darling, the Colonial Treasurer and 
the Colonial Auditor and were implemented in 1827 (Eddy, 1969, p. 164). The 26 
detailed instructions for the Auditor of Accounts alone filled 11 pages with hand-
writing.37 These were the first official instructions from Britain provided for the 
Colonial Auditor and evidently remained operational for many years (New South 
Wales Auditor General's Office, 1963). Also included in the despatch were 24 
detailed instructions for the Treasurer (14 hand-written pages) and a further 62 
instructions (30 hand-written pages) to Darling, "respecting the Revenue and 
Expenditure of the Colony, and the mode of accounting for the same", plus various 
template forms for recording and reporting the finances (Treasury to Darling, 13 June 
1826. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, pp. 483-493). Evidently the original template 
reporting forms of 1822, which Governor Brisbane had found so complex, had not 
been effective, for the final instruction to the Colonial Auditor chided: 
 
26th. From the very irregular and senseless manner in which many of 
the Colonial Accounts have been submitted to this Country, We 
strictly admonish you to pay the greatest attention to these 
Instructions, and adhere closely thereto. (Treasury to Auditor of 
Accounts in NSW, 13 June 1826. AO 16/44 (AJCP reel 1541, 1787-
1826)) 
 
It is self-evident that the final authority for accepting colonial accounts as correct still 
rested with the Imperial Treasury. Although the instructions were transmitted to 
Governor Darling via the Secretary of State for the Colonies and included the 
provision that they were not to supersede or interfere with any previous or 
subsequent orders issued by the Secretary of State, that provision seems 
disingenuous given it was included only as the sixtieth of 62 detailed paragraphs. It 
was the Lords Commissioners of the Imperial Treasury who had prepared and issued 
                                                 
37 Appendix 6 contains a transcription of these instructions to the Colonial Auditor. 
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these instructions, which repeatedly stated that reports on colonial finance were for 
the use of the Treasury (even though transmitted to them via the Secretary of State).  
 
One of the new accounting requirements included in these 1826 instructions was the 
separation of expenditure on the military and convict systems (to be met by Imperial 
Britain) from that on the colony (to be funded by the local government) (Eddy, 1969; 
Shaw, 1966). This attempt at reducing Imperial expenditure appears to have been 
applied to all colonies, as it was noted in House of Commons debate years later as 
having been one of the few useful suggestions of the Colonial Audit Office (UK, HC, 
April 1, 1845, vol. 78. cc. 1327). Nevertheless, separating the military and colonial 
accounts increased the workload of managing finances to such an extent that 
Governor Darling found it necessary to split the workload by also separating the 
offices. Having begun to implement the "New System of Accounts" immediately 
after receipt in February 1827, Darling acknowledged to the Colonial Office that the 
Colonial Auditor, Lithgow, had been of such great assistance that he had appointed 
Lithgow to the new position of Auditor of Colonial Accounts and he believed "there 
is perhaps hardly an Office of more real importance under the Government. At … 
Mauritius, the Auditor ranks next to the Colonial Secretary" (Darling to Bathurst, 12 
April 1827. HRA Series I, Vol. XIII, p. 50). In Van Diemen's Land, Lieutenant 
Governor Arthur noted the "great benefit to the Public" that had resulted from 
Darling's initiative of appointing Lithgow as Auditor of Colonial Accounts and 
effected a similar system by appointing Boyes in November 1826 as Auditor of Civil 
Accounts. Arthur also envisioned this appointment would significantly improve 
financial accountability, as per his explanation in early 1827 to the Colonial Office: 
 
Perceiving the necessity for establishing every possible Check upon 
the disbursements from the Colonial Revenue, and the consumption 
of Stores by the various Public departments, Mr Boyes has been 
directed to examine them, most attentively and minutely, before any 
Warrant is issued or any Account passed, and I feel a confidence that 
a very considerable Public Saving may be anticipated. The fraud and 
robbery in every way is beyond description. (Arthur to Bathurst, 2 





6.4 EFFECT OF THE NEW SYSTEM (1830-1839) 
 
A detailed picture of colonial audit processes in the 1830s and earlier is revealed in 
evidence provided to the 1837 Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial 
Receipt and Expenditure, and confirms that audit remained under Treasury authority. 
The evidence shows that by the mid-1830s all governors of Crown colonies had 
received strict instructions from the Imperial Treasury as "to the mode of conducting 
the revenue and expenditure, and accounting for it" and were expected to provide 
regular detailed reports including a preliminary local examination of accounts (by an 
auditor in the larger colonies and committees of the Council in smaller ones); 
quarterly returns to the Secretary of State of colonial chest transactions; annual 
estimates of receipt and expenditure (included in the Blue Books); and annual locally 
audited accounts to the Treasury for Imperial audit (Select Committee on the 
Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837, para. 31, p. 4). Self-governing 
colonies with representative assemblies had some independence from Imperial 
oversight, providing their annual statements of civil revenue and expenditure "merely 
for information" (Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and 
Expenditure, 1837, para. 30, p. 4), but still had to provide their military accounts to 
Britain for audit (Select Committee on Colonial Accounts, 1845). The Audit 
Commissioners also used the information received to produce regular abstracts of 
colonial expenditure, receipt and revenue for the Treasury and Parliament (Select 
Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837; Young, 
1961). 
 
The instructions to colonial governors "for the better keeping of accounts" may have 
been prepared in the Audit Office, but they were "submitted by the Audit-office to 
the Treasury" for approval and issued to colonies under Treasury authority (Select 
Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837, p. 49). 
Further, evidence from the Treasury's "Principal Clerk for Colonial Business" 
confirms that colonial accounts, once received in Britain, may well have been 
forwarded to the Audit Office for the actual work of audit but final approval (control) 
was held by the Imperial Treasury: 
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118. I understand from you that there is a previous audit in the 
colony; is there any audit at the Treasury, in the progress of the 
accounts towards the Audit Office here?—None whatever; …the 
accounts are stated by the Commissioners of Audit to the Treasury, 
who either approve or disallow them, as the Treasury Board think fit. 
(Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and 
Expenditure, 1837, p. 38) 
 
Evidence from Deputy Commissary-General Wemyss38 verified that the same 
process had been followed in the 1820s by the Commissary of Accounts in New 
South Wales and added that, in one case, it had taken nine years from the close of the 
accounts in the colony to the final audit clearance in London (Parsons, 1967; Select 
Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 1837). The reason 
for such lengthy delays, according to an Inspector in the Audit Office, was because 
colonial accounts "differ very much from other accounts…charges frequently occur 
which are excesses of establishment, or charges of a novel or unusual nature, or 
charges which exceed in amount the sum which the governor is empowered to 
authorize" (Select Committee on the Accounts of Colonial Receipt and Expenditure, 
1837, p. 48). Subsequent chapters demonstrate that all of these complicating factors 
were evident in the Swan River colony and were viewed by aggrieved settlers as 
breaching their constitutional right of control over government expenditure. 
 
6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter has briefly explored the application of British oversight of colonial 
finances in the early eastern Australian settlements, particularly in regard to colonial 
and Imperial audit. It is demonstrated that these first Australian administrations 
suffered from mismanagement of government finances prior to the introduction of an 
on-site public sector audit role (a colonial auditor) in 1824 and the receipt of detailed 
instructions and reporting templates (Di Francesco, 1999; Longhurst, 1995; Scripps, 
2006; Yule, 2002b). Public sector auditors operated under Treasury (Executive) 
control, fulfilling "the traditional function of state auditors, which is solely to 
confirm the formal correctness, the 'regularity'—as distinct from irregularity—of 
government accounts" (Normanton, 1966, p. xvi). 
 
                                                 
38 Commissary-General for New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land for seven years from 1821. 
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There is no doubt that by the 1820s and 1830s colonial auditors in Australian public 
finance systems were considered essential for effective on-site oversight of 
government resources (Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013). Even so, colonial government 
continued to experience problems in managing public finances. Some of these 
problems arose from external pressures, such as the administrative "chaos" in 
Victoria ensuing from the sudden and huge population increases in the 1850s gold 
rushes (Yule, 2002a, p. 208). The Victorian Government's efforts to redress the 
serious financial crisis of 1854 (a deficit of over two million pounds), via increased 
attempts to collect unpopular gold licence fees, directly resulted in the Eureka 
Stockade events. "It is hard to believe that [Governor] Hotham would have persisted 
with the collection of an unpopular tax to the point of provoking a rebellion if he had 
not believed that the alternative was financial collapse" (Yule, 2002a, p. 214).  
 
However, sometimes these problems arose from the "great ingenuity, and sometimes 
effrontery" of deliberate Executive efforts to evade Parliamentary control, as noted 
by Waugh (1998, p. 28) in case studies from New South Wales and Victoria in the 
1860s and 1870s. The New South Wales experience provides both a background to 
the state of colonial administration and audit on the eve of the establishment of the 
Swan River colony and a lens through which to assess the experience of the Swan 
River colony. The remaining chapters of this thesis contain an examination of the 
efforts of the colonial government in Western Australia to control the expenditure of 
public funds. It is in this examination that the transition of the colonial auditor from a 




CHAPTER 7  




This chapter examines the administrative operation of colonial audit and the control 
of Executive government expenditure in Western Australia, in the context of its 
constitutional governance under gubernatorial authoritarianism (1828-1838), a part-
nominated Legislative Council (1839-1869) and under representative government 
(1870-1878). Increasing pressure from colonists for control over government 
expenditure is identified as a key factor in demands for representative government, 
and the subsequent political strategies implemented by elected representatives when 
it became clear that this form of governance still did not provide colonists with the 
expected control over Executive expenditure are discussed. 
 
The third British colony in Australia was settled at Swan River, now Perth, 
Fremantle and Guildford, in Western Australia in June 1829.39 A small military 
outpost had been established on the southern coast in 1826 at the deep harbour of 
King Georges Sound, now Albany, but it was at Swan River that Lieutenant 
Governor Stirling proclaimed the new colony. Unlike the two earlier colonies in New 
South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, Swan River was not established as a penal 
colony but as a private settlement, with land grants allocated to settlers according to 
the value of their imported assets.40 The Swan River colony's foundation and 
development throughout the nineteenth century have been extensively written about 
elsewhere, including aspects of legislative, economic and political history.41 
However, there is little research on the local government's financial management 
administration, especially in regard to the operation of public sector audit. The 
examination in this chapter identifies that attempts to obtain control of Executive 
                                                 
39 A map of the south-western portion of Western Australia showing the relative positions of major 
settlements is provided at Appendix 7. 
40 Western Australia did eventually receive some convicts from Britain, principally to provide a 
source of labour, but the first did not arrive until June 1850 and the last ship in January 1868. For 
further information relating to the convict period, fruitful reference may be made to Bavin (1994); 
Bunn (1994); Hasluck (1978); Honnibal (2001); Macphail (2008); Phillips (1985) and Shaw (1966) 
(amongst others). 
41 For example, see Battye (1912, 1924); Black (1991); Crowley (1960); de Garis (1981a); Hasluck 
(1965); Kimberly (1897); Lumb (1991); Macphail (2008); Stannage (1981); Statham (1980, 1981) and 
Statham-Drew (2003). 
99 
government financial expenditure were an ongoing feature of the legislative 
processes in Western Australia and were integral to its constitutional development. 
 
7.2 EARLY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (1828–1835) 
 
By the 1820s and 1830s, colonial auditors in the eastern Australian colonies were 
firmly entrenched within the Executive administration and providing effective on-site 
oversight of government resources. It is, perhaps, not surprising that the Swan River 
colony’s Board of Audit was established as one of the first official instruments of the 
new government on the voyage out to Western Australia (Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013). 
Yet the first Lieutenant Governor of the Swan River colony, James Stirling,42 had not 
been given any detailed instructions on how to establish a system of government in 
the new colony. In fact, just before his departure from Britain, Stirling was 
specifically warned by the Secretary of State for the Colonies about "the absence of 
all Civil Institutions, Legislative, Judicial or Financial" he would face and it was 
made very clear that he would be expected to manage it "with your own firmness and 
discretion" (Murray to Stirling, 30 December 1828. Retrieved from 
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au). In regards to the management of colonial 
finances, Stirling received no specific instructions apart from a general authority 
even though Governor Darling in New South Wales had received and implemented 
very detailed instructions from the Imperial Treasury almost two years earlier, in 
1827. The Secretary of State had to defend Stirling in 1830, when Imperial Auditors 
queried why vouchers for the colony's first set of accounts had not been provided, 
admitting that Stirling "could not have been aware of the mode in which he was to 
account for all monies received by him" as he had not "been furnished with detailed 
instructions on that subject" (Hay to Dawson, 15 September 1830. T1/3426 (AJCP 
reel 1085)).  
 
This apparent oversight by the Imperial government can perhaps be attributed to the 
rush in getting the new colony approved, equipped and on the way, and also perhaps 
because the Imperial government had no intention of financing the Swan River 
                                                 
42 Lieutenant Governor from December 1828 to February 1832; then Governor to January 1839. 
Stirling's tenure as Governor was interrupted for two years (August 1832-August 1834) when he left 
the Swan River colony on an extended visit to England; during this period successive administrators 
were appointed responsibility for the local government (Parliamentary Library WA, 2013a). 
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colony beyond the salaries of the small official establishment and a grant in aid 
(Battye, 1924; de Garis, 1981a). The lobbying for Britain to commence a colony in 
this location included the argument that a settler colony would soon become self-
sufficient and a source of revenue to Britain, principally via land sales, rather than an 
expense (see, for example, Statham-Drew, 2003). The official notification from the 
Colonial Office to the Imperial Treasury, advising of the decision to establish the 
colony, specifically assured that the initial financial support would be minimal and 
short-term, and all preparations were being made "on the least expensive scale 
compatible with the nature & effectual accomplishment of the project in view" (Hay 
to Dawson, 31 December 1828. CO 397/1 (AJCP reel 303); T1/3426 (AJCP reel 
1085)). Such Imperial parsimony was entirely in keeping with the growing concerns 
in Britain at the time over the cost of colonies and of government administration in 
general, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
The Colonial Office approved a small civil list to assist Stirling in the government 
administration but did not include any officer responsible for financial management. 
Realising this omission, Stirling allocated audit and treasury functions to various 
officers already holding other positions in the official civil establishment, while en-
route for Western Australia. Stirling formulated regulations for the Colonial 
Secretary that added the role of Acting Treasurer to his duties (Bryan and Bray, 
1935; Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013). The Harbour Master, Surveyor-General and 
Registrar were appointed as Commissioners to "a Board of Counsel and Audit in the 
management of the property of the Crown and of public property within the 
settlement" (Government Notice, 8 June 1829, CSO, SROWA, Cons 49 v.1, no. 18).  
 
This Board of Audit became responsible for examining and certifying official 
government accounts, and for providing valuations of the assets being imported by 
settlers that determined the amount of land they could be granted (Bowyer, 1966; 
Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013). In July 1831, Stirling abolished the Board of Counsel and 
Audit and separated its responsibilities into two new offices: an Auditor's Office and 
the Commissioners of Crown Lands (Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013). Stirling appointed 
one of the former Board members, Mark Currie, to be the first Colonial Auditor and 
to examine the quarterly accounts from departments "with reference to existing 
Regulations and according to the usual mode pursued in Auditing Accounts" 
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(Secretary to Audit Department, 11 July 1831, CSO, SROWA, Cons 49, v.3-4, no. 
2167). Some details on the process to be followed in certifying and reporting the 
accounts were included, but the "existing Regulations" were not specified.  
 
The financial management system implemented by Stirling therefore included a non-
independent public sector audit function similar to the systems that had eventually 
been established in the older colonies (Di Francesco, 1999). A close examination of 
original official government records by Bunn and Gilchrist (2013) found no evidence 
to indicate the Swan River colony experienced serious mismanagement of public 
finances in its early years, other than minor clerical errors and administrative 
oversights—quite unlike the experiences of the earlier colonies in Australia. The 
early establishment of a financial management administrative system that included 
the operation of colonial audit as a check, and the fact that competent and ethical 
administrators were appointed to relevant government roles, were considered to be 
key factors in the colony's good management (Bunn and Gilchrist, 2013).  
 
In early January 1832 Stirling at last received a despatch from the Colonial Office 
containing the formal Commission appointing him as Governor and Commander-in-
Chief, instructions for him to appoint both a Legislative Council and an Executive 
Council to assist him with advice on the government administration, and a revised 
list of approved positions and salaries for the civil establishment (Battye, 1924; 
Bathurst to Stirling, 4 March 1831. Retrieved from http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au; 
Statham-Drew, 2003). However, an auditor was not included in the civil 
establishment. In order to maintain Currie on the civil list as Colonial Auditor, at the 
very first meeting of the Legislative Council, on 7 February 183243, Stirling had the 
colony's expenses as the principal agenda item and requested the Council to approve 
the appointment of a salaried Auditor—which, of course, they did (Statham-Drew, 
2003). Stirling then reported to the Colonial Office on the arrangements he had made 
regarding the civil establishment and was able to justify the decision to keep an 
Auditor on the payroll because "my executive council on a due consideration of the 
case, advised me to continue him in the Office, at the salary aforesaid, & to 
recommend to your Lordship’s notice the necessity of such an office" (Stirling to 
                                                 
43 The Executive Council had met for the first time the previous day. 
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Goderich, 28 June 1832. Contained as attachment in Hay to Stewart, 25 April 1833. 
T1/3426 (AJCP reel 1086)). 
 
In March 1831 the Imperial Treasury agreed to establish a Commissariat Department 
in Swan River, recognising "the increasing Extent of the Expenditure" and the 
consequent "great Importance of establishing an accurate & well Regulated System 
of Accounts" (Treasury to Hay, 8 March 1831. T1/3426 (AJCP reel 1085)). The 
officer in charge would also take on the role of Colonial Treasurer, being "charged 
with the Receipt & Expenditure of all public Monies", account keeping and reporting 
to the Treasury "at stated Periods, & according to the Forms & Regulations 
prescribed for Officers of the Commifsariat [sic] Department at foreign Stations" 
(Treasury to Hay, 8 March 1831. T1/3426 (AJCP reel 1085)). An audit function was 
not included in the responsibilities. 
 
The Imperial Treasury appointed John Lewis as Deputy Assistant Commissary 
General (DACG) and approved the supply of appropriate equipment, including scales 
to weigh specie, brass and iron weights, two iron chests to store the cash (each with 
two separate locks and keys), measures for corn and spirits, and two office tables 
(Ordnance to Treasury, 26 August 1831. T1/3426 (AJCP reel 1086); Comptrollers to 
Treasury, 26 October 1831. T1/3426 (reel 1086)). The Colonial Secretary, Peter 
Brown (later Broun), had held the additional role of Acting Treasurer for three years 
and when DACG Lewis arrived in December 1831, preparations were made to hand 
over the work of the Colonial Treasurer (Lewis to Stirling, 30 December 1831, CSO, 
SROWA, Cons 36, v.19, no. 55). Stirling directed Lewis to commence his duties 
"without further Delay", including taking charge of receipt and expenditure of public 
money and keeping separate accounts for military and colonial affairs (Stirling to 
Lewis, 8 February 1832. CSO, SROWA, Cons 49 v.3-4, no. 2741).  
 
However, the instruction to thus take on the role of Treasurer appears to have been a 
surprise to DACG Lewis, for the very same day he wrote to the Imperial 
Commissariat Office asserting he felt "perfectly incompetent" to take on the role and 
requesting that another officer be appointed "to relieve me from a Situation that will 
not only embarafs [sic] myself but do material injury to the public" (Lewis to 
Stewart, 8 February 1832. T1/3426 (AJCP reel 1086)). This anxiety was 
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unfounded.44 Lewis was to continue his duties as DACG and Colonial Treasurer in 
the Swan River colony in an "able and efficient manner" until he obtained a 
promotion and returned to Britain in late 1839 ((1839, November 9). The Western 
Australian Journal. Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 178).45  
 
Lewis also took on the responsibilities of Colonial Auditor, following the departure 
of Mark Currie in June 1832, although this appointment does not appear to have been 
officially recognised by the Colonial Office (Bowyer, 1966; Bunn and Gilchrist, 
2013). Having the same person administer both the colonial audit and treasury 
functions was not ideal, even though in Britain at this point the Commissioners for 
Auditing the Public Accounts were still reporting to the Imperial Treasury. 
Throughout most of late 1832 and 1833, while Stirling was in Britain on leave, there 
were several discussions over the most efficient way to organise the colony's 
financial management arrangements between the Imperial departments of Treasury, 
Audit, Comptrollers of Ordnance, Colonial Office and with Governor Stirling. 
Eventually the various Imperial departments reached agreement on how to allocate 
the various responsibilities of the Colonial Treasurer, Auditor, Secretary, 
Commissariat and Collector of Revenue amongst the limited personnel in the colony, 
determined appropriate salaries and agreed on satisfactory accounting procedures 
that adequately distinguished the military and civil accounts and the Parliamentary 
grant. "Instructions regarding the Revenue & Expenditure, as well as the 
Establishments of your Government" were given directly to Stirling by the Colonial 
Office in July 1833, and the Audit Office developed further "Instructions to the 
Governor in regard to the future expenditure of that Settlement and the regular 
accounting for the same" which were approved by the Treasury in September 1833 
(Stanley to Stirling, July 1833; Audit Office to Treasury, 29 August 1833; Treasury 
Minute, 10 September 1833. T1/3426 (AJCP reel 1086)).  
 
                                                 
44 DACG Lewis was so concerned about his inadequacy for the role that he became quite unwell and 
was diagnosed in April 1832 with "derangement of the Digestive Organs and Hypochondriasis to such 
an extent as to endanger his life" (Milligan and Littleton, Surgeons, to Stirling, 6 April 1832. CSO, 
SROWA, Cons 36, v.21, no. 156). Today Lewis would probably be assessed as having severe anxiety 
and depression.  
45 There is a sad postscript. Lewis returned to Western Australia in March 1841 to oversee the 
establishment of a new branch of the Bank of Australasia but the pressure of the responsibility appears 
to have triggered another bout of "temporary derangement"—he committed suicide the day after its 
official opening ((1841, May 8). Died. Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 2). 
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These new financial management arrangements were implemented by Stirling on his 
arrival back in the Swan River colony in August 1834 and the new civil 
establishment, salaries and general regulations for administration were published 
(Colonial Secretary's Office. (1834, August 30). Government Notice. The Perth 
Gazette and Western Australian Journal, pp. 345-346). DACG John Lewis was the 
official Colonial Treasurer, with an Assistant at King Georges Sound (Albany), and 
remained in charge of colonial and military funds and stores. Peter Brown, Colonial 
Secretary, also became Registrar of Deeds and Clerk of Council. A permanent 
Collector of Revenue (Henry Sutherland, with four regional assistants) was 
confirmed.  
 
Only the Treasury and Revenue Collection departments were to hold responsibility 
for account and money transactions. The responsibility of auditing accounts was 
given to a two-person Committee, meeting once a month. "Two senior Members of 
Council (Capt. R. Daniell,…Commandant, and the Hon. P. Brown, Colonial 
Secretary,) have been appointed to audit the accounts relating to the collection and 
disbursement of Public Money" ((1834, October 11). The Western Australian 
Journal. The Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 370). Following the 
local audit, quarterly accounts of receipts and disbursements were still to be sent to 
Britain every three months for final audit. By the end of 1835, then, an effective 
system of managing public finances, including a public sector audit function, was 
operating in Western Australia to the satisfaction of both Britain and the local 
administrators. 
 
7.3 FINANCIAL CONTROL: NON-REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1829–1838) 
 
The Swan River colonists had no self-elected representation in their governance for 
many years. This section examines the desire of the colonists to obtain an elected 
representative government as a means to obtain what they considered to be their 
constitutional right to control over government expenditure. The theme occurs 
repeatedly from the very first year of the colony's Parliamentary body (1832) and 
throughout the many decades before the first elections for representatives to the 
Legislative Council (in 1870). 
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It has long been acknowledged that colonial governors operated as virtual autocrats 
in exercising their powers, an almost inevitable outcome given "the responsibility of 
government was centred, absolutely and exclusively, in the governor" (Todd, 1880, 
p. 24). The original Swan River Settlement Bill provided for the governor to hold 
sole command, but concerns about the risk of vesting arbitrary powers in the hands 
of the governor alone were raised during the House of Commons debate on the Bill 
and it was amended to include a requirement for "an auxiliary council, composed of 
two or three respectable individuals, nominated by the government at home" (UK, 
HC, April 6, 1829. Retrieved from Hansard (1829, p. 465)). Even so, for the first 
eighteen months of the settlement, Lieutenant Governor Stirling had no choice but to 
govern autocratically until he received Imperial authorisation in February 1832 to 
appoint both an Executive and a Legislative Council.46  
 
After 1832, Western Australia's formal government was constituted by the Executive 
and the Legislative Councils, both composed of exactly the same four men (in 
addition to the governor): the Officer Commanding the Troops, the Colonial 
Secretary, the Surveyor General and the Advocate General. Each official member 
was chosen and appointed by the Imperial government. The function of the 
Executive Council, as stated in Stirling's Commission, was to advise and assist in the 
administration of the government. The Legislative Council was empowered by 10 
Geo. IV, c.22 (no. 63)—Government of Western Australia Act 1829 to make and 
establish laws for the colony but, under the terms of the Order-in-Council, laws or 
ordinances for their consideration had first to be proposed by the governor (or his 
deputy) and were subject to disallowance by the Secretary of State in Britain.  
 
Even though the Colonial Office acknowledged that a legislature without 
representation was an "invasion" upon the first principles of English law and 
necessitated direct Parliamentary sanction, this form of non-representative 
government in newly established colonies, wherein colonists had no direct 
representation on either Council, tended to be the "standard procedure" (Macphail, 
2008, p. 44). Transition to a more representative form of government could be 
                                                 
46 The Government of Western Australia Act 1829 was not passed until after Stirling's fleet had sailed 
from Britain. A copy of this legislation, Stirling's Commission, and the Order-in-Council providing 
the constitution of the Legislative Council, were not received in Western Australia until late 1831.  
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granted by the British Parliament when a colony was considered to be more 
"mature"—the definition of which was never clear but which implied a settlement 
that was populous and financially self-sustaining, particularly in terms of being able 
to pay for its own legislature (see, for example, the requirements contained in the Act 
for the better Government of Her Majesty’s Australian Colonies 1850 (Imp.), 
discussed further below).  
 
The financial operations of Executive government became, as they had been in 
seventeenth-century England, key motivating factors in popular agitation for 
representative government in Western Australia. Under the initial state of non-
representative government, the Swan River colony's settlers had almost no control 
over the government's imposition of taxes or expenditure of revenue—even the 
Legislative Council meetings were closed to the public until 25 August 1834, unlike 
the Imperial Parliament. Until colonists "won the right to elect representatives, they 
protested, remonstrated and petitioned almost continuously" (Macphail, 2008, p. 54). 
Many of the settlers arriving in the Swan River colony would have been eligible to 
vote for a Parliamentary representative back in England, especially after the Reform 
Act 1832 (Imp.) extended the franchise (see Chapter 4). It must have been frustrating 
for them to settle in the new colony, become large landowners and therefore persons 
of social importance, yet have very little say in how they were governed.  
 
The claim that obtaining Parliamentary "power of the purse" was an important 
objective for colonists in obtaining representative government is supported by 
historical evidence from both Western Australia and other Crown colonies. Colonists 
across the British Empire frequently called for increased Parliamentary 
representation via public meetings, petitions and memorials (the few means colonists 
had of "voicing their objections", apart from initiating civil revolution as per the 
events in Britain in 1688 (Battye, 1924, pp. 194-195).47 Between 1835 and 1846 the 
Colonial Office received no less than 22 separate petitions and memorials requesting 
representative government, from 10 separate British colonies—an average of more 
than two per year in this brief period alone (Colonial Office, 1846). The driving 
                                                 
47 Petitions and memorials to the Secretary of State could be presented to the Governor and had to be 
then submitted to the Colonial Office for consideration (almost inevitably, of course, accompanied by 
an explanation from the Governor). 
107 
motivation in almost every one of these requests was the desire for financial control. 
The following statement from the Mayor of Georgetown, British Guiana, is typical: 
 
We are no revolutionists, but only seek to obtain what has been 
found to be safe and beneficial elsewhere, a direct control in the 
enactment of the laws of the land, the levying of taxation and the 
appropriation of the public money. (Haynes to Gladstone, 17 March 
1846 (Colonial Office, 1846, p. 82)) [emphasis added] 
 
It was no different in Western Australia. In July 1832, less than six months after the 
formation of the Executive and Legislative Councils and their first meetings, a public 
call for representation on the Legislative Council was prompted by a government 
decision to impose certain taxes. The central argument of the settlers was the 
perceived abuse of the core constitutional principle that "no Englishman by British 
constitution should be taxed unless by his consent through representation" (Statham-
Drew, 2003, p. 217). The Swan River colonists submitted this petition and a 
memorial to the Secretary of State, plus a strongly-worded formal protest to Stirling, 
all of which called for the tax to be rescinded and requested their own representatives 
to be a part of the Legislative Council (Macphail, 2008).  
 
The subsequent discussions between Governor Stirling and the Colonial Office 
resulted in the Secretary of State deciding that enlarging the Legislative Council 
might have the advantages "of removing the irritation evinced by the Colonists, at the 
imposition of the Taxes…& with the view also of giving you the benefit of the 
efficient advice of experienced Settlers" (Goderich to Stirling, 8 March 1833, as cited 
in Macphail, 2008, p. 46). Stirling was asked to nominate two to four colonists, with 
experience and discretion on which he could rely, and he duly submitted names to 
the Colonial Office (Macphail, 2008). On his return to Western Australia in early 
1835, Stirling presented the Legislative Council with the new constitutional 
arrangements approved by the Colonial Office for increasing Legislative Council 
membership with non-official members (that is, men not holding a government 
appointment, also known as nominee members). The official despatch stated the 
rationale for providing this "intermediate control" was that "a material improvement 
may be effected…which is mainly to insure to the Inhabitants of the Colony the 
proper degree of influence over the measures of the Local Government, more 
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especially in matters relating to taxation and expenditure" ((1835, January 10). 
Legislative Council. January 5, 1835. The Perth Gazette and Western Australian 
Journal, p. 422) [emphasis in original]. Further, annual estimates of expenditure of 
colonial revenue were now required to be presented to the Legislative Council for 
their consideration and detailed statements of income and expenditure were to be 
annually published in the Colonial Gazette.  
 
The colonists were disappointed by the "intermediate control" granted in this 
arrangement and their dissatisfaction was expressed at a large public meeting held 16 
February 1835, where "the real source of the trouble" was described as 
"unquestionably" the expectation that non-official members "would be elected and 
not nominated" (Battye, 1924, p. 136). A second memorial was drawn up for the 
Secretary of State. Also published locally; it bluntly stated that the proposed system 
of nominated representatives was not "in accordance with the spirit of the British 
Constitution", did not provide the colonists with "their constitutional right of 
returning their own delegates" and would not assure "a satisfactory outlay of the 
public funds, which, hitherto, we have to lament have not been applied with that 
regard to utility and economy which the circumstances of the colony required" 
((1835, April 4). Memorial of the Colonists. The Perth Gazette and Western 
Australian Journal, pp. 471-472). This April 1835 memorial was sent to Britain in a 
despatch from Stirling to the Secretary of State dated 15 October 1835. The 
community frustration was so strong, in fact, "that the Governor was requested not to 
carry the provision for nominated members into effect" (Battye, 1924, p. 136). In 
consequence, a non-representative government without any non-official members 
continued to operate for almost a further four years until Governor Stirling's end of 
term. "Stirling’s replacement, John Hutt, had been authorised by an Order in Council 
dated 1 August 1838 to swear in four non-official legislative councillors—and he did 
so on 4 January 1839 only three days after arriving in the colony" (Macphail, 2008, 
pp. 50-51).  
 
The existing lack of transparency around the financial administration is indicated by 
the fact that some further extracts from the Secretary of State's response to the 
original petition were published in August 1835 to clarify the new procedures and to 
provide "a view of the line of policy the home government intend to pursue towards 
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us" ((1835, August 8). The Western Australian Journal. The Perth Gazette and 
Western Australian Journal, p. 542). The article included the new instructions for 
accounting procedures, the disbursement of money, and the requirement for 
providing quarterly accounts for local audit and then to Britain for final audit. 
Making such detail public was obviously considered newsworthy, compared to the 
response to similar new regulations in 1850 when the same newspaper reported that 
the Government Gazette had published "a long string of regulations respecting the 
method of keeping the Public Accounts, of no general interest" ((1850, August 14). 
The Government Gazette. The Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 2). 
 
The Legislative Council proceeded to make full use of the limited financial control it 
had received, despite the failure to achieve representative government. In March 
1835 the Legislative Council was presented for the first time with an Estimate of 
expenditure for the subsequent year and asked to approve them as an Appropriation 
Act. The Estimates were promptly amended—against Governor Stirling's wishes—
before being passed on 2 April 1835 (Macphail, 2008; Statham-Drew, 2003). The 
following year, in April 1836, the Legislative Council again disagreed with items in 
the Estimates for 1837-1838 and, as Stirling would not accept their proposed 
amendments, the matter was referred to the Secretary of State (Battye, 1924; 
Statham-Drew, 2003). Evidently a reply had not been received by June 1837, when 
the Estimates for the subsequent year were considered, as they were again disputed 
and referred to the Colonial Office (Battye, 1924; Statham-Drew, 2003). 
 
As a direct result of the colonists' protests, from the late 1830s onwards the financial 
status of the Swan River colony was reasonably available to those interested. Regular 
publication of revenue and expenditure, signed by the Commissioners on the 
Colonial Board of Audit, meant that colonists could now determine from where 
funds were arriving and on what they were being spent.48 The colony's financial 
information was also more readily available in Britain. For example, a despatch of 
Stirling's to the Colonial Office of 15 October 1837 included a detailed statistical 
report on the Swan River colony's financial status and extracts were published as 
                                                 
48 For an example of the detailed quarterly accounts of government revenue and expenditure, see the 
newspaper article published at (1838, February 3). Abstract of Sums Received…; Statements of 
Disbursements Made…. The Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 20. 
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returns to the House of Commons in 1838 and in Martin (1839) (Colonial Office, 
1838a, 1838b). Nevertheless, colonists continued to agitate for a representative 
government that they believed would provide proper control of government 
expenditure, particularly when the regular practice of excess expenditure began. 
 
7.3.1 The audit function in the 1840s 
 
The workload of local audit came under consideration in the Legislative Council in 
1843. Officially, the duty of auditing the public accounts was undertaken by a board 
of Council members—the Colonial Secretary and the Commander of the Troops 
(noted above). In reality, the majority of the work was undertaken by a senior clerk 
in the Colonial Secretary's office and, in discussion on the Estimates for 1844-1845, 
it was agreed to appoint this clerk as an Assistant Auditor (still reporting to the 
Colonial Secretary) ((1843, July 26). Legislative Council. 20th July, 1843. The 
Inquirer, p. 4; (1843, August 2). The Inquirer. The Inquirer, p. 2). In early 1844 it 
was announced that the Colonial Secretary, Peter Brown, was now also Colonial 
Auditor, thus confirming that audit responsibility was now on an individual rather 
than a Board—although that individual did hold a dual function as a member of 
Executive (Bowyer, 1966). Brown died in office in late 1846; soon afterwards the 
Assistant Auditor, William Knight, was appointed as Colonial Auditor (Colonial 
Secretary's Office. (1846, November 21). From the Government Gazette. The Perth 
Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 3). As the position remained within the 
Colonial Secretary's office it could in no way be considered as independent of 
Executive government, but from this point onwards in Western Australia the 
Colonial Auditor position was not held as a dual function of the Colonial Secretary.  
 
Knight had initially commenced employment in the Civil Service in June 1831 and 
he was to hold office as Colonial Auditor until 1872. In July 1847, just a few months 
after Knight's appointment in November 1846 to the role of Colonial Auditor, a 
salary increase was proposed by a non-official member during discussions on the 
Estimates for 1847-48; the motion was not carried although Knight's efficiency and 
long service were highly praised (WA, LC, July 8, 1847, p. 471; (1847, July 10). 
Legislative Council. The Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 3; (1847, 
July 14). Legislative Council. The Inquirer, pp. 3-4). The work of the Audit Office 
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continued to increase and in mid-1847 Edward Courthope was appointed as a clerk 
(Colonial Secretary's Office. (1847, July 10). From the Government Gazette. The 
Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 1; (1847, July 14). Government 
Gazette. The Inquirer, p. 2). Courthope's appointment as a clerk to the Audit Office 
was criticised as a "reckless disregard of the public interest" because he was the 
brother-in-law of Governor Irwin ((1847, July 14). The Inquirer. The Inquirer, p. 
2).49 Later in 1847, The Inquirer also queried Knight's appointment as chair of the 
newly created Central Board of Works, noting: "The Chairman is Auditor General, 
and, as such, will therefore have to audit his own accounts—rather an anomalous 
proceeding" ((1847, November 17). The Inquirer. The Inquirer, p. 3).  
 
These editorial comments are particularly interesting when it is remembered that the 
practice of having the Colonial Secretary also hold the position of Colonial Auditor 
had not long been separated, indicating that community understanding of the audit 
role (and acceptance of nepotism in government appointments) was shifting.  
 
7.4 EXCESS EXPENDITURE 
 
As noted above, the Executive was required, from 1835, to present the Legislative 
Council with its annual estimates of expenditure for approval. From the 1840s 
onwards, the Executive also began to present the Legislative Council with requests 
for approval of expenditure incurred in excess of the officially voted estimates. If this 
occurred prior to the expenditure actually being made, the request was in the form of 
a Supplementary Appropriation.  
 
To some extent the need for Supplementary Appropriations is acceptable practice, as 
even the most accurate forecasting of future needs cannot provide for unexpected 
events and this process still requires Legislative approval prior to the actual 
expenditure being incurred. Of more concern to colonists was the habit that began in 
Western Australia for the Executive to annually present the Legislative Council with 
bills for excess expenditure: seeking retrospective legislative approval for the 
expenditure of public funds over and above the pre-approved appropriation after the 
                                                 
49 Nevertheless Courthope's ability in the Audit Office was proved by time as in 1872 he replaced 
Knight as Auditor and served in that role until 1891. 
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actual expenditure. This practice occurred repeatedly in spite of the fact that colonial 
governors were expressly forbidden to spend funds without prior legislative approval 
except in an emergency—a policy based on the constitutional doctrine that one of the 
foundations of proper governance is that governments cannot spend money without 
Parliamentary approval.  
 
It is a counterpart to the principle, found in article 4 of the Bill of 
Rights 1689 (UK), that an act of parliament is needed to authorise 
taxation. Together, these doctrines enforce a measure of executive 
responsibility to parliament for government finance. Despite the 
constitutional importance of this principle, at times the government 
may prefer not to have to comply with it. (Waugh, 1998, p. 1) 
 
To understand the impact of this practice and its effect on both the financial 
administrative practices and constitutional reforms in colonial Western Australia, it is 
worth examining in some detail. To this end, the proportion of excess expenditure to 
estimated expenditure, approved in Appropriation Acts, was calculated as a 
percentage and compared for each financial year from 1835 to 1893 (see Appendix 7 
for further details). The results for all financial years 1840-1841 to 1889 are shown in 

















Figure 7.1: Percentage of excess to estimated expenditure, approved in 
appropriation acts, WA, per year 1840-1841 to 1889 
 
Note (i): Figure 7.1: Percentage of excess to estimated expenditure, WA, per year 
1841-1889. Data source: Annual appropriation acts (WA). Retrieved from 
https://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/statutes.nsf/default.html. Full data set in 
Appendix 7. 
Note (ii): three datum points above 25.0% removed as outliers (1851: 94.2%; 
1852: 26.3%; 1861: 42.5%). 
 
The trend line (a five-year moving average) indicates that the annual excess 
expenditure was approximately between 10% and 15% every single year from 1852 
to 1880. From 1881 the trend shows a sharp decrease to below five per cent each 
year. The only singular event that explains this dramatic and sustained diminution in 
Executive overspending is the attempted passage in 1880 of audit legislation that 
would provide an independent Auditor General reporting to Parliament (Audit Bill 
1880), and the actual passage in 1881 of the Audit Act 1881 (WA).  
 
Other possible explanations are readily dismissed by the consistency of the trend line 
in Figure 7.1. Firstly, the administrative expertise of the respective governors cannot 
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be considered as influential. A total of 11 men held the position between 1839 and 
1889 and plotting their terms of government across the time-frame displayed in 
Figure 7.1 (not shown) reveals no direct correlation, other than they all requested 
retrospective approval of government expenditure. For example, Governor Robinson 
had two terms of office in this period, both before and after the trend decrease, and 
presented large excess bills in each. In his first term, 1875-1877, he presented three 
excess bills for approval with an average annual overspend of 14.9%. In his second 
term, 1880-1883, he presented two excess bills (for the 1879 and 1880 financial 
years) that averaged 13.9%. The excess bill he presented for approval in 1882 (for 
the 1881 financial year) was not approved by the Legislative Council until being re-
presented several years later (discussed in detail later). 
 
Gaining nominee representation in the Legislative Council in 1839 did not prevent 
the Executive from over-spending the approved appropriations except in two years, 
1843-1844 and 1844-1845. Although there was no excess expenditure for either 
1847-1848 or 1848-1849, supplementary appropriations were required for both these 
financial years.  
 
The period of convict administration, 1850-1868, did not have any apparent effect on 
the annual proportion of excess expenditure. There was a small decrease in 1872, 
which could possibly be attributed to the implementation of representative 
government in 1870, but this decrease was not maintained and subsequently followed 
by sharp increases. 
 
The low levels of excess expenditure after the passage of the Audit Act 1881 (WA) 
quickly became accepted as standard. This is demonstrated by the fact that the excess 
expenditure for 1886 was described in the Registrar General's Western Australian 
Year Book as a "very large expenditure" that was "considerably over the original 
Estimates" for 1886 (Knight, 1887, p. 9). However, Figure 7.1 shows that this 
apparently extraordinary level of excess expenditure was just 1.6% of the estimated 
expenditure and a mere fraction of the excess expenditure incurred during the 
previous decades.  
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The remainder of this chapter discusses some of the efforts for control of government 
expenditure in the years prior to the introduction of the Audit Bill 1880 (WA), under 
both nominated and representative forms of government. 
 
7.5 FINANCIAL CONTROL: NOMINATED MEMBERSHIP (1839-1869)  
 
The continuing theme here is that poor financial management, combined with the 
constitutional expectation of "no taxation without representation", meant that the 
maturation of public audit requirements was an integral part of the development of 
responsible government in Western Australia. The following examples highlight the 
ongoing attempts of the settlers to obtain some control over Executive expenditure 
and their frustration over the ineffectiveness of nominated representatives in the 
Legislative Council to provide that. 
 
The inclusion of nominated, non-official representatives in the Legislative Council of 
Western Australia was approved by the Colonial Office in March 1833 and 
implemented after Governor Stirling's resignation in March 1838 (Statham-Drew, 
2003). Four men50 nominated by Stirling were sworn in as non-official members in 
March 1839, at the first meeting of the Legislative Council after Governor John 
Hutt's51 arrival, with a term of office for the duration of their residence in Western 
Australia, "notwithstanding the opposition of the colonists to any increase in that 
body except by means of an election" (Battye, 1924, p. 147; Macphail, 2008).  
 
This constitutional amendment meant equal numbers of the official and non-official 
members on the Legislative Council. However, the governor possessed a casting vote 
on any matter so the power to make and pass any law—including the Appropriation 
Acts approving financial expenditure—remained with Executive government. 
Executive control remained the status quo throughout various changes and 
amendments to the Council constitution during the 1840s (Macphail, 2008).  
 
                                                 
50 The first woman to be a member of Western Australia's Parliament was Edith Cowan, in March 
1921 (also the second female member of any Parliament in the British Empire) (Parliamentary Library 
WA, 2013b). 
51 Western Australia's second Governor (January 1839 to February 1846). 
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Nevertheless, the "augmented" Legislative Council was able to exert a measure of 
control over the Executive and "proved even more obstructive than the wholly 
official Council had been" (de Garis, 1981a, p. 318). The struggles between the 
official Executive and non-official (nominated) members over the control of finances 
and the role of the Colonial Auditor were particularly evident in Legislative Council 
debates on colonial estimates, as the Executive was required to present the 
Legislature with estimates for the expected expenditure and revenue of the following 
financial year. The Legislative Council hence had the opportunity for input into the 
proposed expenditure of public funds and, when satisfied, the power to approve the 
estimated expenditure via an Appropriation Act. This process of pre-approval for 
government expenditure fulfilled the constitutional requirement (in theory only, as 
the non-official members could not out-vote the Executive, as noted above) and the 
passage of appropriation became one of the primary purposes for which a 
Parliamentary session was called by the governor. In May 1839 the first formal 
Appropriation Act was passed by the Legislative Council, approving expenditure of 
£5,121 for the 1840-1841 financial year (2 Vic., No. 8—Appropriation Act 1839 
(WA)).  
 
The following year, in May 1840, Governor Hutt presented the Legislative Council 
with Estimates for the subsequent April 1841 to March 1842 financial year and 
advised that, although they were only six weeks into the current year, the expenditure 
had already exceeded the approved £5,121 by £1,620 (WA, LC, May 18, 1840). As a 
consequence, the Council would be required to consider a supplementary estimate of 
£3,046 to provide for the remainder of the current financial year (bringing the total 
amount required for expenditure in 1840-1841 to £8,167). Hutt noted he "should 
have much rather to have shown that the limits to the Expenditure had been 
maintained", but he trusted that the "transgression" would be "allowed" by the 
Council as having been required for "the good of the public service" (WA, LC, May 
18, 1840, p. 134).  
 
At least one non-official member, William Tanner, was not happy about this request 
to approve, so soon into the financial year, a sum that almost doubled the amount 
previously authorised and of which almost 20% had already been spent. Tanner 
promptly gave notice that he would move "for an enquiry into the power of the 
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Legislative Council over the Revenue of the Colony" (WA, LC, May 20, 1840, p. 
137). Governor Hutt explained that "he would not consider himself justified in 
incurring any expenditure without the sanction of the Legislative Council having 
been previously obtained except on an emergency where the good of the public 
service required it" (WA, LC, June 16, 1840, p. 139). Such regret was 
understandable, both because the items requiring the additional expenditure were 
difficult to explain as "an emergency"52 and because requesting additional 
appropriation except under those circumstances had been expressly forbidden in the 
March 1833 despatch from the Colonial Office ("No further Disbursements on 
account of the Services for that year must be applied for, unless under circumstances 
of unforeseen emergency" ((1835, January 10). Legislative Council. January 5, 1835. 
The Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal, p. 422). Governor Hutt and the 
Executive were, depending on the definition of "emergency", quite possibly 
breaching the colony's constitutional provisions. Nevertheless, Hutt's promise that 
the Legislative Council would have "an opportunity of recording their sentiments of 
the necessity for the expenditure" must have appeased Tanner, for he withdrew his 
motion for an inquiry (WA, LC, June 16, 1840, p. 139). The 4 Vic., No. 3—
Appropriation Act 1840 (WA) passed without any recorded comments.  
 
Governor Hutt presented pessimistic Estimates for 1845-1846 to the Legislative 
Council in 1844 and appointed a Select Committee to investigate the overall state of 
financial affairs and identify strategies for increasing colonial revenue (WA, LC, 
May 30, 1844, pp. 335-336).53 The Committee recommended reducing the proposed 
expenditure, primarily via cuts to the contingency list, and increasing revenue by 
additional duties on imports (WA, LC, July 4, 1844, pp. 346-347). These strategies 
were supported by the Legislative Council but not by Governor Hutt, who "made 
strenuous objections" but eventually assented when the Legislative Council held firm 
(Battye, 1924, p. 171). The Legislative Council's obstinacy in reducing Hutt's 
original Estimate for 1845-1846 was vindicated when the revenue did not reach even 
the amended Estimate and did not cover expenditure (Battye, 1924). This example 
                                                 
52 This "excess" expenditure had been spent on items such as Hutt's own recent tour of the settlement, 
furniture for public offices, various salaries and gratuities and an increase in the cost of mail 
conveyance (WA, LC, May 18, 1840, pp. 132-133). 
53 The mid-1840s in Western Australia were a period of economic depression, primarily due to a lack 
of circulating specie in the colony (see Butlin (1953)). 
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demonstrates that exercising their authority over the colony's financial status was 
important enough to Legislative Council members to justify their questioning of the 
governor's judgement.  
 
In July 1848, Governor Irwin presented a Supplementary Estimate of £1,422 for 
1848-1849 (12 Vic., No. 5—Appropriation Act 1848 (WA)). As the original 
Estimates bill for 1848-1849 had been passed only in March the same year (for 
£9,500), this additional request was met with "much discussion" and some 
incredulity: a non-official member stated outright that he "did not like the idea of 
Supplementary Estimates of expenditure, which pressed on the public. Why were 
they not embodied in the bill that had been already passed? The Council was taken 
by surprise" ((1848, July 29). Legislative Council, Thursday, July 27. The Perth 
Gazette and Independent Journal of Politics and News, p. 3). The attitude of 
Governor Irwin contrasted sharply to that of Governor Hutt in similar circumstances 
in 1840, perhaps reflecting a shift in Executive acceptance of the constitutional right 
of the people to have a voice in the expenditure. Yet there was little the non-official 
members of the Legislative Council could do but agree to the additional expenditure.  
 
In the same year (1848) a non-official member called for a committee to review the 
constitution of the Legislative Council and found the Council's membership was now 
distinctly skewed with seven salaried (official) Crown officers and three unsalaried 
non-official (nominee) colonists (Macphail, 2008). The Executive thus held 
"absolute power" in the Legislative Council and it was impossible for non-official 
members to achieve their "sole object…that a unanimous negative of the unsalaried 
colonists should have a similar effect to the veto of the Governor" ((1848, July 29). 
Legislative Council, Tuesday, July 25. The Perth Gazette and Independent Journal 
of Politics and News, p. 3) [emphasis in original]. For that reason, the Legislative 
Council resolved to request an additional three to four non-official members. This 
resolution and the Committee's report were forwarded to the Secretary of State with 
Governor Irwin's support; however, Governor Fitzgerald arrived only a few weeks 
later and criticised the proposal in one of his first despatches to Britain (Battye, 1924; 
Macphail, 2008). Not surprisingly, then, the Colonial Office did not support the 
increase and the Executive continued their control (Macphail, 2008).  
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Settlers protested again in July 1849 about their lack of representation in Parliament, 
in a large public meeting triggered by contentious government proposals for new 
land regulations. The meeting agreed to prepare a memorial to the Colonial Office 
expressing a lack of confidence in the government, but this did not eventuate as the 
Executive quickly responded to the public pressure by amending the planned 
regulations (Battye, 1924; Macphail, 2008). 
 
The practice of presenting supplementary estimates continued throughout the 1850s. 
However, the passage in 1850 of An Act for the better Government of Her Majesty’s 
Australian Colonies 1850 (Imp.) was to have an important, albeit long-delayed, 
impact on Western Australian governance. This 1850 legislation permitted the 
Crown colonies of South Australia, Van Diemen's Land and the Port Phillip district 
(Victoria) to establish their own Legislative Councils, partially elected by the 
colonists.54 It provided the Crown colony of Western Australia with a separate 
mechanism for establishing a representative government: obtaining approval from at 
least one-third of the householders and providing for all the expenses of government 
out of their own revenue, including those expenses covered by the Imperial 
government annual grant (Battye, 1924). The other three colonies were quick to 
implement the provisions, but Western Australia was not. The major obstacle was the 
cost, but others have also noted the newly-acquired status as a penal colony (see 
below), the limited population and the rudimentary transport and communication 
systems (see, for example, Macphail (2008)). Nevertheless, this legislation finally 
provided clear instructions on how Western Australia could gain representative 
government and this was to prove useful during the next two decades as settlers 
increasingly demanded a voice on the Legislative Council. 
 
In November 1849, it became public knowledge in Western Australia that the 
Imperial government had nominated it as a place to which convicts could be sent, 
with the entire expense to be defrayed by Britain (Battye, 1924). In the following 18 
years, almost 10,000 male convicts arrived in Western Australia from Britain (Shaw, 
                                                 
54 The New South Wales colony had already been granted a partially representative Parliament in 
1842, with the passage of 5 & 6 Vic., c.76—Australian Constitutions Act 1842 (Imp.). 
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1966).55 The effect on local government administrative structures was immediate. 
For example, the introduction of an Imperial Convict Establishment added 20 names 
within a year to the 79 people drawing a regular salary from the public purse in early 
1850 (Honnibal, 2001).56 In August 1850, amended regulations "for keeping and 
rendering the Public Accounts of Receipts and Expenditure in the Colony to be 
observed by the Heads of Departments etc" were implemented ((1850, August 14). 
The Government Gazette. The Inquirer, p. 2; (1850, August 16). The Government 
Gazette. The Perth Gazette and Independent Journal of Politics and News, p. 2). 
Financial administration was further amended in April 1851 by the formation of a 
Convict Finance Board "with strict injunctions to prevent anything in the way of 
extravagance", comprised of the Comptroller General, the Deputy Commissary 
General and the Colonial Secretary as chairperson (Battye, 1924, p. 210) (see also 
Honnibal (2001)).  
 
As noted above, Imperial Britain paid for the convict expenses, which meant convict 
accounts needed to be kept separately from the colonial and military expenses. 
Ultimate responsibility for convict accounts rested with the governor and, to protect 
himself, Governor Fitzgerald authorised the Auditor General to audit these additional 
accounts as a safeguard prior to providing his own approval. For this extra work, 
Fitzgerald granted the Auditor General a salary increase in May 1851 of £100, 
payable from the convict funds (WA, LC, May 14, 1851 p. 609).  
 
This was just one of several permanent salary increases to public officers that were 
approved in the discussion on the Estimates in May 1851 (WA, LC, May 15, 1851, p. 
615). The colonists were not impressed. Describing the pay rises as a "perversion of 
the Colonial Funds", some fifty or more people protested at the subsequent Council 
meeting where they were assured by Governor Fitzgerald of the need and financial 
sense of the arrangement ((1851, May 28). The Inquirer, p. 1S). Unconvinced, The 
Perth Gazette published in August 1851 a petition of complaint on the topic along 
with the names of those who signed it; the editorial noted that although they had little 
                                                 
55 No women or children were transported as convicts to Western Australia. As a comparison of 
numbers, between 1850 and 1853 the final 9,000 male and female convicts arrived in Van Diemen's 
Land (and another almost 300 male convicts in Moreton Bay, in New South Wales) (Shaw, 1966). 
56 The Convict Establishment oversaw not only the actual convicts but also their guards, who were 
accompanied by their families, and military engineers to oversee the construction of various civil 
works using convict labour (Honnibal, 2001). 
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doubt that Britain would confirm the Estimates as voted, "the introduction of a 
Representative Legislature is the only safeguard we can look to against the repetition 
of similar occurrences" ((1851, August 29). The Independent Journal. The Perth 
Gazette and Independent Journal of Politics and News, p. 2).  
 
Three Appropriation Acts were passed to cover expenditure in the 1852 financial 
year: the standard Appropriation Act in May 1851, a Supplementary Estimate in May 
1852 and another "Supplementary" Estimate in December 1852. The last two Acts 
more than doubled the original estimate of expenditure for 1852, and as the third was 
passed in the last few weeks of the financial year it was clearly post-expenditure. 
Worse was to come, however. The government's expenditure in 1853 had to be 
covered by four Appropriation Acts: the original Appropriation Act in May 1852, 
two Supplementary Estimates in April and May 1853, and in May 1854 (five months 
after the end of the 1853 financial year), an Excess Act for almost 18% of the total 
pre-expenditure amounts.57 Governor Fitzgerald's opening speech to the Legislative 
Council in May 1854 admitted that "circumstances beyond the control of 
Government have caused an excess of expenditure over the appropriation—
explanation of this matter will be afforded to you at the proper time…when the 
Supplementary Estimate [the Excess Bill for 1853] is under consideration" (WA, LC, 
May 4, 1854, p. 706). He did not consider this excess expenditure to be a problem, 
however, as the revenue had still exceeded expenditure, and promptly advised he 
would be proposing yet another Supplementary Estimate Bill to cover additional 
expenditure in the current year. The reaction to these events was not positive. 
Marshall Clifton, a non-official member and the effective leader of the opposition, 
was scathing in his response:  
 
Expenditure should be restricted to the amount voted, and not 
extended without the authority of this Council, because the Revenue 
had yielded more than had been estimated. Here, notwithstanding the 
liberal sum for the expenditure of this year, voted last, we were now, 
in the early part of the year, called upon to vote a supplementary 
estimate of upwards of £12,000, half of which…was for objects not 
                                                 
57 The Ordinance approving the excess expenditure in 1853 (17 Vic., No. 15—Appropriation 1854 
(WA)) was the first time this ongoing practice was formally called an Excess Bill. As described 
above, previous instances had been termed "Supplementary" appropriations even if the money had 
already been expended. It was not to be the last time. Thereafter Excess Bills were put forward during 
the annual Estimates procedure every year until late into the nineteenth century (see Appendix 8). 
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contemplated when the annual estimate was voted, and in fact 
included sums already expended, without the authority of the 
Council.…In fact, he was now determined to get the Constitution of 
the Council altered…so that we might be in a condition to regulate 
our own expenditure, and control the Executive. ((1854, May 24). 
Legislative Council, Monday, May 22nd. The Inquirer, p. 2S) 
 
Despite his fervour, Clifton was unable to take any further advantage and it seems he 
did not have much public support. The other newspaper in the colony at the time 
reported on his speech merely as: "Mr Clifton rose and made a lengthy comment 
upon the Estimate, which we are unable to follow him through" ((1854, May 26). 
Legislative Council. Monday, May, 22, 1854. The Perth Gazette and Independent 
Journal of Politics and News, p. 3). 
 
Governor Fitzgerald advised the Legislative Council the following year that "our 
fiscal resources have fallen considerably short of your Estimates" (WA, LC, March 
30, 1855, p. 741). It would, therefore, be necessary to pass a bill "to provide for an 
excess of Expenditure in 1854 over and above the Estimates", plus another bill "to 
provide for the payment of certain unforeseen expenses in the Year 1855, and also 
for the appropriation of the Revenue for the year 1856" (WA, LC, April 13, 1855, p. 
752; April 17, 1855, p. 756). The Inquirer newspaper was critical of the Colonial 
Secretary's financial capability, suggesting he should take the trouble to get a better 
briefing from the Colonial Auditor on the Supplementary Estimates than he had the 
previous year ((1855, April 4). The Inquirer. The Inquirer, p. 2). Governor 
Fitzgerald's final address to the Legislative Council, in April 1855, expressed a wish 
that he had been able, before his term of office expired, to provide a more 
satisfactory view of the colony's fiscal position because "it cannot be concealed that 
the Revenue of the past year has fallen short of your Estimate by £2,000, and that at 
the close of the year…we are in debt £1,800"—a minor inconvenience only (WA, 
LC, April 26, 1855, p. 766).  
 
The incoming Governor Kennedy, arriving in July 1855, informed the Legislative 
Council in September 1855 he had found massive debt, the current budget already 
overspent, and a consequent need for retrenchments in the public administration 
(Battye, 1924). The Colonial Office was also unimpressed and in January 1856 
censured Fitzgerald for submitting inaccurate Estimates for 1856 ((1856, June 18). 
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Saturday, June 14, 1856. The Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 3; (1856, June 20). 
The Perth Gazette and Independent Journal of Politics and News, p. 2). The Inquirer 
newspaper, nonetheless, was reluctant to blame Governor Fitzgerald, considering the 
real offender to be the Legislative Council for not having amended the accounts 
when brought before it. This, claimed the Editor was why settlers were dissatisfied 
and "demanding a Representative Assembly, as the only cure for existing evils" 
((1856, June 18). The Inquirer & Commercial News. The Inquirer and Commercial 
News, p. 2). 
 
The contrasting opinions of Governors Fitzgerald and Kennedy regarding the 
colony's finances (above) were the beginning of a definite pattern over the next 
decades, where incoming governors complained about their predecessor's financial 
management, made definite statements regarding their intention to manage more 
efficiently, and in their final address noted how much they had improved the colony 
during their term. In November 1859, Kennedy tabled a despatch from the Secretary 
of State praising him (Kennedy) for his good financial management (WA, LC, 
November 7, 1859, p. 921). Nevertheless, after Kennedy's term of office ended in 
early 1862, his replacement (Governor Hampton) found what Boyce (1966) 
described as an "acutely embarrassed treasury" and was "not only unable to authorise 
new works for 1862, but had to submit measures for legalising £25,375 unauthorised 
expenditure on the part of his predecessor" (Battye, 1924, p. 255).58  
 
Governor Hampton served from February 1862 to November 1868. In his opening 
address to the Western Australian Parliament, he expressed reluctance at being 
"forced to spend public money without legislative authority" on contracts made by 
Governor Kennedy for 1861, and that the "only constitutional remedy that could be 
adopted at present" was "to sanction the continuance of this irregularity until the 
exact amount of the excess can be ascertained, and a Supplementary Estimate thereof 
submitted to the Legislative Council" (WA, LC, May 23, 1862, pp. 1001-1002). The 
amount of excess expenditure in this instance was 42.5% above the Estimates 
approved in October. It included almost £11,000 for "Roads and Bridges" and almost 
£6,000 for "Works and Buildings" and it is difficult to believe this was unforeseen, 
                                                 
58 Battye cites Legislative Council 3 June 1862; Perth Gazette 6 June 1862. See also Kimberly (1897). 
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emergency expenditure. In the subsequent five years of Governor Hampton's term 
the Legislative Council was presented with annual excess bills averaging 14.9% 
above approved appropriations.59  
 
Colonists expressed serious concerns over government expenditure throughout 
Hampton's term and repeatedly called for a representative legislature as a solution 
that would give them financial control, particularly after it became known in 1864 
that transportation would cease in three years (de Garis, 1981a). Petitions requesting 
constitutional change were sent to Britain in 1865 and 1869, and Governor 
Hampton's despatches in July, August and December 1865 all included references to 
his concerns about the growing popular demand for a representative form of 
government (Battye, 1924; de Garis, 1981a; Macphail, 2008). Settlers finally 
received a partial granting of their desire in September 1867 when Governor 
Hampton agreed to match the number of official members in the Legislative Council 
by nominating six non-official representatives, who were chosen by the colonists via 
informal elections held later that year (Battye, 1924; de Garis, 1981a; Macphail, 
2008).  
 
Governor Hampton departed in November 1868 and, in the nine-month interval 
before Governor Weld's arrival, the Legislative Council prepared a draft plan for 
dividing the colony into electoral districts. The legislation formulating the 
constitution of a representative Legislative Council was debated in May 1870 and 
assented to in June (33 Vic., No. 13—Legislative Council Act 1870 (WA)). 
 
7.6 FINANCIAL CONTROL: REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
(1870-1878) 
 
The expectation that a representative government would enable the Legislative 
Council to implement a control over Executive expenditure was short-lived. Elected 
members sought throughout the 1870s for other mechanisms to gain the desired 
control including Select Committees, increases in the numbers of elected 
representatives and placing the Auditor General as an independent officer of 
Parliament. These various mechanisms are examined in this section. Underlying all 
                                                 
59 Source: Appropriation Acts (WA): see Appendix 8.  
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of these measures was an ongoing struggle for a fully responsible form of 
government, for if obtaining a representative government was not sufficient to 
provide them with an effective voice in their Parliament, colonists needed the next 
step (de Garis, 1981a; Kimberly, 1897).  
 
The first Parliamentary session of the newly representative government of Western 
Australia opened in December 1870, following elections for representatives. The 
governor was no longer a member, being represented in the Legislative Council by 
the Colonial Secretary, but still "retained the power to prorogue or dissolve the 
Council at will and to veto legislation. Only he could introduce bills for the 
appropriation of public money" (de Garis, 1981a, p. 327). The real shift, however, 
was that elected representatives now outnumbered the official government and 
nominee members and the "old methods of agitating by public meetings and 
memorials were now largely obviated by the power which colonists had in their 
Representative Chamber" (Kimberly, 1897, p. 225). There were now 18 members in 
total: 12 elected from 10 districts (two representatives each from Perth and 
Fremantle); three nominated by the governor (serving five-year terms); and three 
official members (the Colonial Secretary, Surveyor General, and the Attorney 
General) (de Garis, 1981a). The Colonial Treasurer and Collector of Revenue no 
longer held a seat, also being represented in the Legislative Council by the Colonial 
Secretary.  
 
Political power was now far more equally divided between the "two parties in the 
House" (Battye, 1924, p. 285). The Colonial Secretary acted as "the leader of the 
Government" and was supported by the official, nominee and conservative members. 
J. G. Lee Steere was the effective leader of the opposition, "determined to exercise to 
the full the legislative powers conferred upon it" (Battye, 1924, p. 285). Those 
"legislative powers" were perfectly understood to be about the control of government 
expenditure. Indeed, in the very first Parliamentary session with elected 
representatives, the Parliament called—for the first time in Western Australia—for 
an independent officer to provide a check on Executive expenditure. It is difficult to 
think that the timing could be a coincidence. The elected Speaker, Luke Leake, 
asserted the Opposition's intent to examine the Estimates in close detail and called 
for the appointment of 
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some officer…responsible to the House who should see that not one 
farthing was paid out of the colonial chest by the Colonial Treasurer, 
unless he could vouch that the sum was on the Estimates, and if it 
were done, to be his duty to bring it under the notice of the House. 
(WA, LC, December 8, 1870, p. 24) 
 
Leake's call was backed up by Lee Steere, who reiterated the constitutional point that 
excess expenditure should not have occurred without Legislative Council sanction 
and nominated the Auditor General as that independent officer. 
 
It was now their duty to put a stop to such unauthorized expenditure. 
In his opinion, the Auditor General should be independent of the 
Government and responsible to the House, and the Government 
should not be allowed to pay one single item without the sanction of 
the Council, and the Auditor General should not be allowed to pass 
any such account, and further should be made responsible to the 
House (WA, LC, December 9, 1870, p. 25) [emphasis added]. 
 
This proposition was met with spirited argument from government members, even 
though an independent Auditor General, reporting directly to the Legislature and 
operating to provide a check on Executive expenditure, already existed elsewhere at 
the time (late 1870). Audit legislation providing at least some independence 
provisions had been enacted years earlier in Victoria (in 1857 and 1859), Tasmania 
(1858), Queensland (1861) and in Britain (1866) (Di Francesco, 1999). As the 
Legislative Council was only partly representative in Western Australia, this colony 
did not have the apparent authority to appoint such an officer—a right reserved in the 
constitution for the governor. The actual arguments expressed by members were a 
mix of this specific constitutional principle, the immediately pragmatic, and the 
longer term political view. For example, the Attorney-General declared "it would 
simply be impossible" to make the Auditor General independent of the Governor, "it 
was simply the first step towards Responsible Government", and appointing "an 
officer who would be responsible to the House and irresponsible to the Governor 
would be an imperium in imperia. The Governor would be dethroned and his seat 
occupied by the Auditor General" (WA, LC, December 9, 1870, p. 30; 37). The 
Colonial Secretary agreed. "The Governor alone was responsible for the expenditure 
of the public funds. There could be no go-between...It would be impossible to have 
an officer of the Government responsible to the House and irresponsible to the 
Governor" (WA, LC, December 9, 1870, p. 32). To break the impasse, the Colonial 
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Secretary proposed a compromise via a resolution specifying the respective rights 
and responsibilities of the Legislative Council and the government regarding 
financial management. The first clause was readily accepted as it confirmed the 
already-existing constitutional power balance, that is:  
 
It is the undoubted right of this Council to appropriate all revenue 
appertaining to this Colony and to limit its expenditure, and that it is 
the duty of the Executive to adhere to such appropriation and 
limitation, when the Appropriation Act has become law. (WA, LC, 
January 2, 1871, p. 65) 
 
The second clause was also accepted, especially as it resolved the Colonial 
Secretary's somewhat disingenuous assertion that the governor had no choice except 
to authorise the excess expenditure currently in question, because the funds had been 
required immediately and the Council had not been in session so could not be 
consulted to obtain approval (WA, LC, December 9, 1870, p. 32). 
 
That, with a view to the exercise of a proper control over the Public 
Funds, and in order to allow as little latitude to the Executive as is 
consistent with the exigencies of the Public Service, …it will be the 
duty of the Government to summon this Council with the least 
possible delay at any time, should excess of expenditure become 
necessary, or even imminent. (WA, LC, January 2, 1871, p. 65) 
 
The remaining two clauses were more contentious. The Council was required to 
approve Executive government expenditure of up to £3,000 above the approved 
appropriation for "sudden emergencies", and the Executive was further authorised to 
use its discretion on expenditure in excess of that sum "provided, always, that an 
exact account of such expenditure be laid on the Table of the House within ten days 
of the opening of the ensuing Session" (WA, LC, January 2, 1871, p. 65). The 
Opposition moved an amendment to have these two clauses struck out, but were 
defeated and the resolution was eventually passed. 
 
There was no further discussion in this session on the idea of Parliament obtaining an 
independent officer to watch over expenditure. A question of audit procedure, 
however, remained. The new constitution meant that Western Australia was no 
longer classified as a Crown colony and it was no longer necessary for its accounts to 
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be audited in Britain. Governor Weld advised he was corresponding with Britain on 
"the conduct of the business of the Audit and Treasury in this Colony" and, in the 
meantime, he relieved the Auditor General of the Registrar General duties which had 
been transferred to the office in 1861 (WA, LC, January 16, 1871, p. 114; Kimberly, 
1897).60  
 
It is not altogether surprising that Weld sought clarification from Imperial Britain 
over the respective roles of colonial auditors and treasurers, as a similar lack of 
demarcation was evident in other Australian colonies. In 1881, the Controller and 
Auditor General of New Zealand tabled in Parliament a detailed Report reviewing 
the management, accounts and public revenue audit processes in six colonies, and 
concluded that "the relative functions of the Treasury and the administrative 
departments seem to be nowhere sufficiently defined", and he had been unable to 
find any useful "rule" regarding "the accounts which should be kept by the Audit 
Office" (Fitzgerald, 1881, pp. 154; 156).61  
 
In Western Australia, it is evident the transition to representative government made 
little difference to the Executive's firm control over the Colonial Auditor. William 
Knight, Colonial Auditor in Western Australia 1846-1872,62 expressed his opinion 
some years later that the constitutional change had not required him to question the 
legality of expenditure authorised by the governor. His role continued to be one of 
compliance with the governor’s warrant and he held no authority to identify or 
prevent excess expenditure:  
 
No fresh instructions were given as to the manner of keeping the 
accounts after the present constitution [representative government] 
was established.…The system of audit I worked under was merely to 
classify the revenue and expenditure under different heads, without 
                                                 
60 A new department was created, Registrar General and Register of Deeds, to be held by the 
Secretary of the Board of Education (WA, LC, January 2, 1871, p. 70). 
61 Western Australia was, unfortunately, excluded "owing to the distance" and time constraints 
(Fitzgerald, 1881, p. 1). 
62 William Knight resigned in October 1872 and Edward Courthope was appointed as Auditor 
General. Knight's retirement was noted in all three local newspapers with well-wishes. The fact that he 
would become one of the first people to qualify for an annual pension (of £300) under the relatively 
new 35 Vic., No. 7—Superannuation Act 1871 (WA) was considered to be well-deserved ((1872, 
October 5). Topics of the Week. The Herald, p. 3; (1872, October 9). Mr. Knight's Resignation. The 
Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 3; (1872, October 11). Omnium. The Perth Gazette and West 
Australian Times, p. 3). 
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reference to whether the expenditure was legally authorised. In the 
event of more money being required than was authorised, I simply 
obeyed the Governor's warrants.…If money was paid for any excess 
of expenditure, under any vote, I did not draw the attention of the 
Governor to the fact. It was no part of my duty to do so.…So far as I 
am aware there is no power in the regulations to restrain the 
Governor from spending as much money as he likes. ((1880, August 
25). The Select Committee's Report upon the Audit Bill. The 
Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 3) [emphasis added] 
 
The Excess Expenditure Bill for 1870 (equating to more than fifteen per cent of the 
approved Estimate) was reluctantly passed in August 1871, "in the full hope that 
such a Bill would never again be brought before the House" (WA, LC, July 14, 1871, 
pp. 12-13). Lee Steere again expressed his belief that "the disbursement of the public 
money should be entirely under the control of the representatives of that public, and 
that not a farthing should be expended by the Executive without their sanction" (WA, 
LC, July 14, 1871, p. 13). Nonetheless, the same situation arose during the following 
year and it became obvious that gaining a representative government system had not 
made any difference. In August 1872, Lee Steere protested, as he had every year 
since becoming a member of the Legislative Council, "against the expenditure of 
public money in excess of the grant voted by the Legislature. He thought that when 
we obtained the present form of Government there would have been an end to all 
that" (WA, LC, August 6, 1872, p. 30). To address this problem, and as the proposal 
made in late 1870 to control excess expenditure by having the Auditor General made 
"an official responsible to the House" had failed, Lee Steere moved that excess 
expenditure bills should be first referred to a Select Committee for examination (as in 
the Imperial House of Commons) instead of being considered in a Committee of the 
whole House (WA, LC, August 6, 1872, p. 30). The motion was passed. Western 
Australia had obtained its first Public Accounts Committee (PAC) (WA, LC, August 
8, 1872, p. 35). 
 
The Select Committee was not an effective mechanism for reducing excess 
expenditure as it did not query the constitutional principle, instead investigating only 
if the funds had been spent for the good of the public. As there was no hint of 
corruption or mismanagement in that sense, it reported its satisfaction with the 
reasonableness of the unauthorised expenditure and the Excess Bill for 1872 was 
then affirmed without further discussion in a committee of the whole House ((1872, 
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August 14). Confirmation of Expenditure. The Inquirer and Commercial News. p. 3). 
A similar Select Committee was appointed in July 1873 to consider and report "upon 
the necessity for reducing Governmental expenditure", but its report found little that 
could be reduced without affecting the efficiency of the public services (WA, LC, 
July 4, 1873, pp. 17-18). 
 
The growing public demand for responsible government prompted Governor Weld to 
send a confidential despatch seeking advice from the Secretary of State in August 
1873 (Weld to Secretary of State, 11 August 1873, Governor's confidential 
despatches to the Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 390 v.47). The response was 
vague, so Weld complied with a request from the Legislative Council in 1874 asking 
him to introduce a Constitution Bill supporting responsible government (de Garis, 
1981a). That draft bill, however, proposed introducing an upper house composed 
entirely of nominated (not elected) members—a highly unsatisfactory solution for 
the elected representatives. To stall debate on the bill, Lee Steere recommended 
postponing further discussion "until the country had been given an opportunity of 
expressing its opinion. This was negatived by the House, but acted upon by the 
Governor, who dissolved the Council" (Battye, 1924, p. 294). The subsequent 
election results demonstrated the public was undeniably and strongly in favour of a 
fully elected responsible government (Battye, 1924).  
 
In the meantime, Governor Weld had finally received decisive advice from the 
Colonial Office instructing him to leave the matter of a new constitution to his 
successor, Robinson, who was instructed "to head the movement off" (de Garis, 
1981a, p. 335). In fact, Robinson's entire "first term as Governor was marked…by 
his moves to restrain the political aspirations of the people" (Constitutional Centre of 
Western Australia, 2002, p. 10).63 Soon after his arrival in early 1875, Governor 
Robinson read the Legislative Council a despatch from the Secretary of State stating 
the Imperial government was not prepared to support the call for responsible 
government (Battye, 1924). The Legislative Council response expressed 
dissatisfaction with the delay to being granted responsible government, and was 
approved fifteen votes to three—an unusually large consensus which included six 
                                                 
63 William Robinson was appointed as Governor for three terms: January 1875 to September 1877; 
April 1880 to February 1883; October 1890 to March 1895. 
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official and nominee members (WA, LC, January 25, 1875, p. 48).64 One elected 
representative, Walter Padbury, specifically explained that he supported responsible 
government because the elected representatives "would then have some little control 
over the expenditure of public money, and those who spent it would be…responsible 
to that House" (WA, LC, January 25, 1875, p. 46).  
 
With the possibility of obtaining a fully responsible government now effectively 
blocked, elected representatives instead focussed on close scrutiny of Executive 
expenditure. Parliamentary papers reveal that elected members throughout this 
period frequently reminded the government that their sanction was required for all 
expenditure (for example, see Committee debates on expenditure bills, estimates and 
various construction works in August 1876 and July 1877). Further examples of the 
pressure against the government are shown in August 1877, when elected members 
queried and effectively reduced expenditure on the majority of items in the estimates 
debate. A Select Committee formed to inquire into excess expenditure for 1876 
found that the estimates had been too low in some cases but also that four 
departments were not operating economically (Medical; Gaols; Poor House; 
Rottnest) (WA, LC, August 2, 1877, p. 98).65  
 
Governor Robinson's term ended in September 1877 and, in November, Governor 
Harry Ord was sworn in. Ord's opening speech to the Legislative Council (in May 
1878) included his belief that "the finances of a Country are undoubtedly the most 
important matter with which its Administration has to deal" (WA, LC, May 29, 1878, 
p. 1).  
 
The Western Australian Times had been regularly highlighting its concerns regarding 
excess expenditure and explained the role of the PAC in Britain, in an editorial 
headed "Unauthorised Expenditure".66 The editorial referenced Gladstone's 
description of the PAC as providing "completeness to our system of Parliamentary 
control over the public moneys, and as affording to the House of Commons, through 
                                                 
64 The three elected members voting against were George Randell (Perth), Edward Hamersley 
(Toodyay) and Maitland Brown (Geraldton). 
65 The Excess Bill passed in the August 1877 session of Parliament (for excess expenditure in 1876: 
41 Vic., No. 5—Appropriation 1877 (WA)) amounted to £18,755, 11.8% of the approved estimate for 
that year (39 Vic., No. 18—Appropriation 1875 (WA)). 
66 This had commenced in April 1861 as a Select Committee and made a permanent fixture in 1862. 
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its investigations, the best security for the due, speedy, and effectual rendering and 
examining of the public accounts" ((1877, August 14). Unauthorised Expenditure. 
The Western Australian Times, p. 2). In contrast, the Select Committee appointed as 
a type of PAC in Western Australia in August 1872 had not queried the principle of 
excess expenditure and had only been concerned that the funds had been spent for 
the good of the public (as noted earlier). It had become a customary practice, 
nevertheless, to refer the annual excess bill to a Select Committee for consideration. 
This practice was brought to an abrupt halt in 1878 when an elected member, Carey, 
cited Standing Orders and Imperial precedents indicating that matters connected with 
finance could only be discussed in a Committee of the whole House (WA, LC, June 
12, 1878, p. 38). Given the evidence, the Speaker (Luke Leake) ruled that debate on 
the Excess Bill, which equated to almost twelve per cent above the approved 
estimate for 1877, must be held in Committee of the whole House (WA, LC, June 14, 
1878, pp. 42-43). The minutes show there was close attention given to most items. 
For example: 
 
Item: Harbor Master, £408 10s. 2d:  
MR. SHENTON complained of the overdraft under this head....A 
sum of £500 was voted for this purpose…which ought to have been 
ample to cover the expenditure under this head. Instead of that they 
were confronted with an overdraft of over £400. 
 
Item: Police Department, £1,596 9s. 11d:  
MR. PARKER…was astonished to see an over-expenditure of 
sixteen hundred pounds, which he understood to consist of 
items…"insufficiently provided for." He thought ample provision 
had been made for these items in the Estimates for 1877, and he 
would like to know why there should be all this excess. 
 
Item: Rottnest Native Penal Establishment, £574 4s. 1d.:  
MR. S. H. PARKER considered it very strange there should be such 
an overdraft in connection with this establishment, especially 
bearing in mind the very liberal allowance made on the Estimates for 
the past year as compared with the previous year. 
 
Item: Miscellaneous, £8071 13s. 4d.: 
MR. CAREY believed there was a resolution of the House limiting 
the overdrafts in any, one year to £5,00067, yet in the face of that he 
found that during the past seven years the aggregate amount of 
excess bills passed by the House was over £100,000. It appeared to 
                                                 
67 It had actually been for £3,000, as noted earlier. 
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him that discussion upon these items of overdraft was perfectly 
useless. Whatever the Government thought proper to spend, they did 
so, and then asked the House to confirm the expenditure, which the 
House invariably did. (WA, LC, June 19, 1878, pp. 69-72) 
 
The Western Australian Times took the opportunity to publish its condemnation of 
the ongoing practice of presenting annual excess bills, similar to an article published 
in August 1877 ((1878, June 18). Laxity of Control. The Western Australian Times, 
p. 2).  
 
The Commission appointed by Governor Ord to investigate those government 
departments found in the previous year to have been operating inefficiently reported 
that "the heads of those departments are not liable to any charge of administering 
them without regard to economy" ((1878, August 6). The Commission Appointed to 
Enquire into Departmental Administration. The Western Australian Times, p. 2). 
However, the Commission did recommend adopting a suggestion from the Auditor 
General that an Examiner of Public Accounts be appointed to make surprise 
periodical visits to regional outposts to examine the various accounts of the Sub-
Collectors of Revenue. Governor Ord agreed with the suggestion but, rather acidly, 
noted this task was something the Auditor General should already be doing: 
 
The Auditor General is clearly unaware that this is one of the 
paramount duties of his office.…It will be necessary to investigate 
the arrangements of the Audit office and to decide how this duty 
shall be performed in the future ((1878, August 23). Report of the 
Commission on Departmental Administration (concluded). The 
Western Australian Times, p. 4). 
 
It is not clear if Governor Ord is implying a threat to the operational resources of the 
office. There certainly appeared to be no intention of funding a new appointment. 
The Western Australian Times also agreed with the Auditor General's idea and 
suggested the role be made independent of official control, "to guard against any 
reckless extravagance or direct malfeasance" ((1878, September 6). The 
Guardianship of the Public Purse. The Western Australian Times, p. 2). Nevertheless, 
the editor thought appointing such an Examiner was only secondary to the really 
important issue of bringing public expenditure under Parliamentary control. That 
outcome could only be achieved by adopting responsible government, especially as 
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the Legislative Council was "supinely content to abnegate its functions of control in 
regard to public expenditure" and the general public remained "too ready to accept 
with good natured alacrity official declarations that such and such outlay has been 
inevitable" ((1878, September 6). The Guardianship of the Public Purse. The Western 
Australian Times, p. 2).  
 
In late July 1878 another attempt was made at introducing a Constitution Bill to 
establish responsible government in Western Australia. It was defeated on a 
procedural technicality (to the immense frustration of its proponent, Stephen. H. 
Parker) and the Parliamentary session was prorogued soon after, effectively ending 
the attempt (WA, LC, July 12, 1878, p. 213; see also Macphail (2008)). At the 
opening of the next Parliamentary session, in July 1879, Governor Ord forestalled 
any further moves to reintroduce responsible government by advising the Legislative 
Council he had been informed by the Secretary of State that the cost to Western 
Australia would be prohibitive (Macphail, 2008). 
 
7.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
Obtaining representative government in 1870 failed to provide the expected 
Legislative control of Executive expenditure, which continued throughout the 
decade. Several attempts were made to increase Legislative power but failed, 
notably, a short-lived attempt to have the Auditor General made an independent 
officer of Parliament, and implementing a PAC which did not address the 
constitutional principle of Executive expenditure without Legislative authorization. 
Colonial audit remained under the authority of the Colonial Secretary. Increasing 
pressure from colonists and the elected representatives in the Legislative Council for 
control over Executive government expenditure is demonstrated to be connected with 
demands for further constitutional change, yet attempts to obtain a responsible 
government were unsuccessful.  
 
In 1880, the ongoing Executive practice of presenting annual excess bills for 
retrospective Legislative approval resulted in a much stronger, coordinated attempt to 
obtain an independent Auditor General via the Audit Bill 1880. The next chapter 
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closely examines the Parliamentary struggle over this Bill and its constitutional 




CHAPTER 8  




This chapter examines the introduction of the Audit Bill 1880 which provided for the 
appointment of the Auditor General as an independent officer of the Parliament. It 
demonstrates that the Bill was intended to provide a real restriction on the ongoing 
Executive practice of presenting annual excess bills for retrospective Legislative 
approval. The passage of the Audit Bill 1880 generated intense political and public 
debate because it was understood as a diminution of Executive power and of major 
constitutional significance to Western Australia. It provides an outstanding example 
of how public sector audit "is an aspect of government which touches closely upon 
the mechanics of central power"; indeed, how public sector audit sits at the very 
heart of government accountability and the control of power (Normanton, 1966, p. 
xviii).  
 
However, this issue is generally absent from existing studies on the politics of the 
period (late 1870s to early 1880s) or even in discussions on the two-decade era of 
representative government (1870-1890). No direct references were made by Phillips 
(1985) or Macphail (2008) in their otherwise detailed analyses. Battye (1924) 
described the period 1875-1883 as "not particularly prolific" in terms of legislation, 
and "the only matters of importance…were a reform in the method of issuing land-
titles, and various revisions of the land regulations" (Battye, 1924, pp. 313-314). The 
period was described by de Garis (1981b, p. 333) as "calmer political waters": even 
though the "governor and Council were frequently at loggerheads…the issues were 
of less general interest and seldom evoked sustained public involvement". That 
conflict is here explored in detail and shown to be of great general interest. 
 
8.2 A PARLIAMENTARY "EMERGENCY" (1879) 
 
Governor Ord's announcement of the unreasonable cost to Western Australia of 
adopting responsible government, in his opening address to Parliament in July 1879, 
may well have also been intended as a defense against his subsequent news of the 
colony's poor financial situation. Ord admitted his investigation into the previous 
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year's Estimates had made "erroneous" assumptions about the existence of surplus 
revenue, compounded by the fact that the short annual Parliamentary session meant 
he had been unable to obtain "the opinion of the Legislature upon, or their assent to 
any measure, no matter how serious may be the interest at stake" (WA, LC, July 29, 
1879, pp. 5-8). Ord concluded his speech with an assurance that the current statement 
of revenue and expenditure for 1878 had been prepared "with a minuteness not 
hitherto attempted" and would "assist you in coming to a conclusion as to the 
measures to be adopted for meeting the emergency, and for preventing a recurrence 
of it" (WA, LC, July 29, 1879, p. 5).  
 
No real complaints were made by the Legislative Council about the Executive's 
"erroneous" financial management which had created the "emergency". Members 
readily agreed the earlier financial statements had not "wilfully misrepresented" the 
situation (Shenton), that Ord had been acting in the best interests of the colony (S. H. 
Parker), and that perhaps the blame should be placed on "the Auditor General, or 
someone" (Carey) (WA, LC, July 30, 1879, pp. 12, 14, 17). It was The Western 
Australian Times which blasted the "monstrous" news of "a false statement of 
accounts" and severely criticised the "indifferent" response from "the chosen 
guardians of the public purse", revealing that the Legislature was "beyond the control 
of the public whom they serve" and asking "where is the controlling power of the 
Auditor General over the public accounts" (Weazel. (1879, August 2). The Latest 
Development of Irresponsible Government. The Western Australian Times, p. 2). 
 
Two weeks later, the Editor of the same newspaper republished the article 
condemning the ongoing practice of presenting annual excess bills (printed in August 
1877 and in June 1878—referenced above) and called again for the Auditor General 
to be made responsible solely to the Parliament and thus independent of the 
Executive, in order to both protect the public purse and provide adequate information 
on expenditure. The Auditor General's current situation was conflicted, as he was 
"required to render to the Colonial Secretary absolute official obedience" and was 
consequently a "slave of the Government", but he was also required to report 
annually to Parliament and, as a result,  
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must also—if he does his duty—be the accuser of the Government in 
the event of any negligence, extravagance, or direct malfeasance. 
This condition of things can hardly be said to be compatible with an 
honest and independent audit of public accounts. ((1879, August 12). 
The Public Accounts. The Western Australian Times, p. 2) 
 
Although this call for an independent auditor was not taken up in the 1879 session, 
elected members did begin to respond more critically to the Executive's financial 
proposals. In the Legislative Council throughout August, September and October, 
members closely questioned items presented to them in the Estimates Bill, Over-
Expenditure Bill and Appropriation Bill, called for detailed financial information to 
be provided and made pointed statements about their right to do so and the past 
failures of the Executive government to restrain expenditure within the votes (see, for 
example, WA LC minutes for 4, 11, 27, 28 August; 3 September; and 7 October 
1879).  
 
It was revealed in this session that the Imperial Parliament had confirmed that 
financial matters could be referred to a Select Committee for consideration, contrary 
to the Speaker's ruling the previous year, and this process was subsequently followed 
(WA, LC, August 4, 1879, p. 25). Nevertheless, the appointed Committee again 
focussed on investigating the nature of each item of over-expenditure rather than the 
principle of expenditure without authorisation. It concluded with a cautious statement 
that "due regard as to economy was, on the whole, observed by the Government in 
the expenditure under consideration" (WA, LC, September 26, 1879, p. 215). This 
statement was to be quoted by the Executive on several future occasions as proof that 
its excess expenditure had been acceptable to the Legislative Council.  
 
Given that Governor Ord's opening address had called the colony's financial situation 
an "emergency", members must have been astonished to hear in his speech upon 
prorogation that the length of the session had "not arisen from there being any special 
matter of magnitude or importance" but, rather, from the Council's decision to make 
an independent investigation "into the circumstances which led to so large an excess 
of expenditure during the previous year" (the Select Committee referred to above) 
(WA, LC, October 8, 1879, p. 280). That investigation, said Ord, had been "a most 
useful measure", for "it is no doubt satisfactory to the public to learn how completely 
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Your Honorable Body exonerate the Government from any extravagance in the 
management of the finances you entrust to its charge" (WA, LC, October 8, 1879, p. 
280).  
 
Little public comment was made apart from general relief that the long Parliamentary 
session had finally ended. The following year, 1880, would prove different. 
 
8.3 ELECTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS (JANUARY-JULY 1880) 
 
Elections to the Legislative Council were held in early 1880. The key issue expressed 
in many of the candidates' speeches was the necessity of providing Parliament with 
direct control over public expenditure in order to prevent future excess expenditure. 
As it was now unlikely that Western Australia would obtain responsible government 
in the near future, the next best option was the introduction of an Audit Act with an 
independent Auditor General. Candidates Stephen H. Parker, Edward Hooley, 
Septimus Burt, Edward Hamersley and Lee Steere each promoted an independent 
Auditor General as part of their policy platforms and they were enthusiastically 
supported by The West Australian (see, for example: (1880, February 10). 
Candidates on the Platform. The West Australian, p. 2).68 One of Lee Steere's 
speeches is here quoted in detail as it illustrates the principles of independent audit 
found in modern legislation:  
 
I will now remark upon…the necessity of some legislative measure 
to check the present uncontrolled and illegal expenditure of the 
Government. I say illegal advisedly, because the second clause of 
the Appropriation Act specifies that the Colonial Treasurer shall 
issue such sums of money not exceeding in the whole the amount 
voted by the Council, as the Governor shall direct; and yet we find 
the Executive systematically evading this provision.…The only 
remedy that can be instituted…for putting it beyond the power of the 
Governor to expend money not voted by the Legislature, is to enact a 
bill for the auditing of the public accounts, such as exists in all the 
other colonies. This Act should make the Auditor General 
responsible to the Council, and irremovable from his office except by 
an address from the Council, and no money should be issued by 
                                                 
68 Thomas Cockburn-Campbell, elected representative and Chairman of Committees on the 
Legislative Council since 1875, was a frequent contributor to The Western Australian Times. In 1879 
he became Managing Editor of the newspaper, which was renamed The West Australian, and also 
continued in his Parliamentary role (Battye, 1969).  
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warrant of the Governor unless such warrant was countersigned by 
the Auditor General, with a certificate that the money about to be 
issued…had been sanctioned by the Legislature. (A Correspondent. 
(1880, February 6). Mr. Steere at Bunbury. The West Australian, p. 
2) [emphasis added in italics] 
 
Other local newspapers were not as supportive. The Herald argued it was 
impracticable to have an Auditor General "responsible to the Legislative Council for 
any unauthorised expenditure on the part of the Government" as the government had 
to be able to pay whatever was necessary for the public service, and appealing to the 
Secretary of State (a tactic suggested by Lee Steere as a last resort for the Legislative 
Council) was pointless as the money would be spent before a reply could be received 
((1880, February 14). The Herald, pp. 2-3). 
 
The political shift reflected in these pre-election speeches, away from a focus on 
responsible government and towards implementing an independent audit, did not 
appear to be noticed by Governor Ord. In a confidential despatch to the Secretary of 
State, Ord merely expressed relief that the election outcome meant that calls for 
responsible government were not likely to arise in the forthcoming Parliamentary 
session. Yet in local newspapers it was not the introduction of responsible 
government but the deficiencies and benefits of an independent Auditor General that 
were discussed throughout the first months of 1880. Governor Ord only briefly 
acknowledged the "unfortunate" discovery of the Executive's poor financial 
management as a motivating factor and blamed the public agitation on the press, 
which he believed "was almost entirely in the hands" of the "criminal class": 
 
11.…although it was fully recognized by the Legislature that they 
were as much responsible for the result as the Government…the 
press suppressed these facts, and openly proclaimed that all that had 
happened was due to the reckless extravagance, miserable 
incompetency, and utter disregard of the wishes of the people, 
shown by the administration; and instigated by the Governor. (Ord to 
Secretary of State, 21 February 1880, Governor's confidential 
despatches to Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 390) 
 
The Herald argued that an independent Auditor General would do little except 
provide clearer accounts. Making that officer responsible to the Legislative Council 
141 
was "incompatible with the first principle of the constitution" (that is, representative 
government), as the Auditor General "could not be independent of the Governor":  
 
The Governor would sign what orders he thought fit and the 
Treasurer would pay them, whether the Auditor General certified to 
their propriety or not. What could the Legislative Council do? They 
could not turn out the Governor and the Treasurer as they would turn 
out a ministry, for these officers are not responsible to them—and 
they would have to do as they have always done—vote the money. 
((1880, February 21). The Herald, pp. 2-3) 
 
The West Australian agreed that audit legislation would not prevent excess 
expenditure but that the provision of clearer accounts alone would be an important 
improvement. Better financial records would ensure "a protection to the Government 
and a satisfaction to the House; and that is all that an Audit Act can prove 
anywhere", under either responsible or representative government ((1880, March 12) 
Occasional Notes. The West Australian, p. 2).  
 
Governor Ord departed in April 1880 and Robinson returned for a second term as 
governor. The Herald anticipated a "stormy" session for the new Parliament ((1880, 
July 17). The Herald, p. 3). In The Argus, a Victorian newspaper, it was predicted 
that "the bill of the session will be an Audit Act, brought in probably by some elected 
member" in order to "fetter the Government in their expenditure" (Our Own 
Correspondent. (1880, July 17). Western Australia. The Argus, p. 5). The Western 
Australian writer of this article (quite possibly Cockburn-Campbell or Lee Steere) 
also forecast that the Audit bill would be opposed because, under the colony's 
representative government constitution, Executive authority was derived directly 
from the Crown. Limiting Executive powers of expenditure via an Audit Act would 
thus be "a direct slap in the face" to the Colonial Office (Our Own Correspondent. 
(1880, July 17). Western Australia. The Argus, p. 5). Nevertheless, the author was 
optimistic that the Secretary of State would "back up the country in a just demand, 
and allow a measure which will give people a control over expenditure which is real, 
instead of one which is only nominal", especially given the manifest failure of 
representative government to provide that control (Our Own Correspondent. (1880, 
July 17). Western Australia. The Argus, p. 5). This same correspondent provided a 
similar report, dated 25 July 1880, to another Victorian newspaper, noting that 
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elected members were "determined to put a curb upon Government extravagance by 
the passing of an Audit Act" and would be "well marshalled and well combined, 
more so than on any former occasion" ((1880, August 14). Western Australian 
Affairs. The Australasian Sketcher with Pen and Pencil (Melbourne), p. 206). 
 
It is evident that incoming Governor Robinson had paid attention to the newspaper 
debates. In his opening address to the Parliament on 19 July 1880 he advised that the 
colony's financial situation was, once again, "considerably worse than was 
anticipated" (WA, LC, July 19, 1880, p. 2). However, he also admitted that the 
practice of authorising expenditure beyond the Estimates was "to some extent to 
blame for our difficulties; and I would strongly urge on you to sanction…no items of 
Expenditure but such as are included in the Estimates. The Government…should 
adhere strictly to the Appropriation Act" (WA, LC, July 19, 1880, p. 2). Robinson 
then noted he would be proposing staffing increases in the Audit Department to 
improve future audits, as he had found the work to be in arrears—for which the 
Auditor General did "not appear to be to blame" (WA, LC, July 19, 1880, p. 5). In 
the formal address in reply to the Governor's speech, elected member Harry Venn 
noted that on previous occasions they had also been told they could rely on the 
financial figures provided, only to find subsequent "disheartening" discrepancies, and 
implied that the Audit Office was the source of past problems:  
 
Reference to the "strength" of the staff of that department, in the face 
of the recent disclosures made with respect to the public accounts 
was suggestive of a very grim joke…the House would readily assent 
to the proposed steps for increasing the "promptitude and the 
efficiency"…of the department. (WA, LC, July 19, 1880, p. 9) 
 
The formal opening of Parliament over, elected members moved quickly to bring 
pressure on the Executive. On 22 July, Lee Steere obtained leave to introduce the 
expected Audit Bill "to regulate the receipt, custody, and issue of the public moneys, 
and to provide for the audit of the public accounts", based upon 22 Vic., No. 6—The 
Audit Act 1858 (Tas.) (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 20).69 
                                                 
69 The passage of this legislation in Tasmania had encountered considerable opposition, based both on 
the operating costs of the Audit Office and on provisions that gave aspects of judicial authority to the 
Auditor General (resolved by an amendment allowing the Auditor General to refer such matters to the 
Supreme Court) (Di Francesco, 1999, p. 50). 
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8.4 THE AUDIT BILL 1880: SECOND READING (2 AUGUST 1880) 
 
Lee Steere opened the second reading debate on the Audit Bill 1880 on 2 August by 
outlining its scope and provisions, the usual practice when considering new 
legislation. The intensity of what followed was certainly not usual. The debate lasted 
for almost four hours, the House finally adjourning at 11 p.m., and Hansard records 
for this one item of discussion take up almost 25 pages (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, pp. 
64-89). These facts alone are evidence that members understood the Audit Bill had 
implications of critical importance to the constitution of Western Australia and that 
the outcome would be key to the balance of political power. Most of the ensuing 
debate was around the first two clauses of the Audit Bill, reproduced here in full, 
which provided the Auditor General with independence:  
 
1. The Auditor General for the time being shall hold his office 
during good behaviour, and shall not be removed therefrom unless 
upon the address of the Legislative Council. 
 
2. At any time when the Legislative Council is not sitting it shall be 
lawful for the Governor, with the advice of the Executive Council, to 
suspend the Auditor from his office for inability or misbehavior, and 
to appoint some fit person to perform the duties of such Auditor 
during his suspension; and in any such case the Governor shall, 
within seven days after the commencement of the next session of the 
Legislative Council, cause a full statement of the cause of such 
suspension to be laid before the Legislative Council; and if an 
address at any time during that session is presented to the Governor 
by the Legislative Council praying for the restoration of such 
Auditor to his office, such Auditor shall be restored accordingly; but 
if no such address is so presented, it shall be lawful for the 
Governor, with the advice aforesaid, to confirm such suspension, 
and to declare the office of such Auditor to be, and the same shall 
thereupon become and be, vacant. (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 64) 
 
Lee Steere clarified that the first clause did not remove or interfere with the 
governor's right to make appointments to the public administration (known as the 
Royal prerogative). Neither did it provide any power to the Legislature to appoint or 
dismiss the Auditor General. It did provide for the Auditor General to retain office 
during good behaviour and not to be removed from that role unless requested by the 
Legislative Council.  
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The provisions of the second clause provided "a check upon any arbitrary conduct" 
of the governor towards the Auditor General (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 64). Lee 
Steere claimed such provisions were regarded as "very proper…in connection with 
the expenditure of public funds by any public bodies…calculated to assist rather than 
to hamper or embarrass those entrusted with such expenditure" (WA, LC, July 22, 
1880, p. 66). Lee Steere explained that similar provisions also applied to the British 
Prime Minister, under the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866, to bank 
directors and to other major authorities. In fact, the "same provision was introduced 
into every other Audit Act throughout the world, and the principle was also adopted 
in the appointment of Judges", the object being "to ensure on the part of those 
functionaries a fearless discharge of their duties, and to free them from any dread of 
arbitrary dismissal from office" (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 65). In conclusion, Lee 
Steere argued the Audit Bill was not "unconstitutional" because section 15 of the 
Australian Constitutions Act 1850 (Imp.) "expressly empowered us to do what the 
present bill aimed at": that is, for appropriations to be regulated and audited as 
directed by laws enacted by local legislatures (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 68).  
 
The arguments made against the first clause were primarily based on the principle 
that making the Auditor General responsible to the Legislative Council—"an 
irresponsible body" in its current status—did, in fact, cast doubt on the governor's 
power to make appointments and therefore did interfere with the governor's Royal 
prerogative (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 79). Nominee members George Randell and 
Edward Stone believed that the "very essence and principle" of the Bill "violated" 
constitutional principles (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, pp. 70, 80).  
 
The Audit Bill's defenders maintained there was no desire for the legislature to 
control the Auditor General's appointment, only for a protection against Executive 
pressure and arbitrary dismissal. The legislature would be unlikely to support an 
Auditor General who had been suspended by the governor and, ultimately, if these 
clauses were truly unconstitutional, the Audit Bill would be rejected by the Imperial 
government. The sole object was "to ensure for the people of the colony, through 
their representatives in that House, that control over the public expenditure which 
they ought to possess, and which the Constitution Act contemplated they should 
possess" (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 68). By providing that control, Lee Steere 
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suggested the Audit Bill would also provide a means of warding off the adoption of 
responsible government (now generally considered to be undesirable), but at least 
four members explicitly disagreed on this point. For example, both the 
Commissioner of Crown Lands and the Colonial Secretary argued the Audit Bill was 
fully intended to provide the "thin end of the wedge" for introducing responsible 
government, and nominee member George Randell described it as "a side wind to 
attain that end" (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, pp. 69, 71, 82).  
 
The third clause of the Audit Bill provided for the appointment of a Deputy Auditor, 
and the fourth prohibited the Auditor General from membership of the Executive 
and/or Legislative Councils while holding office. Neither clause attracted much 
attention in the Parliamentary debate (although later the fourth clause was identified 
by Governor Robinson as contradicting his Royal prerogative to appoint Council 
members). 
 
The fifth and sixth clauses, and Schedule A, regulated the procedure for issuing 
public money. In short, the Treasurer would determine the sums due and the Auditor 
General would check to ensure the expenditure was within the approved 
appropriations (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 65). If satisfied, the Auditor General 
would prepare a warrant authorizing the issue and submit both the warrant and the 
Treasurer's statement to the governor for final approval. Only then could the 
Treasurer issue the money. The supporting regulations also included provisions for 
contingency expenditure over the approved estimates. In such cases, the authority of 
the Governor in Council to make the payment was to be immediately intimated to the 
Auditor General, who would report to the Treasurer that it was lawful for the 
expenditure to take place. "It would thus be seen that, although the votes of the 
Legislature might, in certain cases, be exceeded, still every possible check was 
placed upon such excess of expenditure" (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 66). 
 
Members both for and against the Audit Bill agreed these provisions would not make 
any change to the governor's supreme authority in financial administration, nor to the 
ability to incur excess expenditure in case of emergency. The differences were that 
the House would be provided with the full details and the audit would take place 
prior to expenditure being incurred, rather than afterwards (alleged to be a principal 
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reason why excess expenditure had continued in other colonies after their adoption of 
audit legislation) (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 78). Members opposed to the Audit Bill 
identified these provisions as unnecessary, arguing the existing Treasury regulations 
already provided a sufficient check upon excess expenditure and that past instances 
had been proven by the recent Select Committee to have been of actual benefit to the 
colony. George Leake, Acting Attorney General, pointed out it "was not contended, 
it was not even hinted, that one single penny of the public funds had ever been 
misapplied or misappropriated" (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 76). Thomas Cockburn-
Campbell contended there was no doubt that implementing an Audit Act would, in 
fact, act as a restraint upon Executive expenditure: 
 
Why, otherwise, was it that they found such an opposition to the 
measure on the part of the Government—and they were quite well 
aware that the opposition to the measure was most bitter—why, 
indeed, except that the Government themselves believed that it 
would place a curb upon unauthorised expenditure? (WA, LC, July 
22, 1880, p. 78) 
 
The Commissioner of Crown Lands suggested Lee Steere's real motive in presenting 
this "new sensation" was to improve his political reputation; further, that the 
measures were superfluous because the governor had already stated his intention to 
maintain strict economy and improve the current system by providing additional 
Audit Office staff (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, pp. 69-71). Elected representatives 
responded that the Audit Bill was not sensational but practical, as it would facilitate 
accurate account keeping and provide the Legislative Council with the exact details 
of expenditure. The existing regulations had not, for example, prevented departments 
from including items under "miscellaneous" instead of under their correct heads of 
service, so they either did not provide an adequate check or the Executive was not 
adhering to them. (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, p. 86). Elected members Charles 
Crowther and Thomas Carey noted that the government had previously promised to 
restrain expenditure, yet excess bills had continued and even increased over the past 
seven years.  
 
The Colonial Secretary moved to have the Audit Bill "read a second time that day six 
months", effectively a proposal to have it thrown out, but the motion was easily 
defeated (ten votes to seven) (WA, LC, July 22, 1880, pp. 82-83). The House agreed 
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instead to refer it to a Select Committee consisting of five elected members 
(including Lee Steere) and two nominee members. 
 
8.5 THE AUDIT BILL 1880: PUBLIC REACTION 
 
Articles published in newspapers both within and outside of Western Australia 
provide evidence of widespread interest in the Audit Bill 1880 and the constitutional 
questions it provoked over control of public money. Transcripts of the Parliamentary 
debate were published in the three major local newspapers, as was usual, along with 
a copious amount of editorial comment ((1880, August 4). Legislative Council. 
Monday August 2. The Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 3; (1880, August 6). 
Legislative Council. Monday, August 2. The West Australian, pp. 2-3; (1880, August 
7). Legislative Council, Monday, August 2nd, 1880. Audit Bill. The Herald, p. 2S).  
 
The Inquirer supported the Audit Bill and hinted that the Auditor General had 
"incurred the displeasure of the late Governor and the Colonial Secretary, through his 
endeavours to resist interference with the independent exercise of his functions"—
although also admitting this allegation could not be verified ((1880, August 4). The 
Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 2). The West Australian also supported placing 
the Auditor General "in a position which will enable him to do his duty without fear 
of falling under the displeasure of his superiors for so doing" ((1880, August 6). The 
Debate on the Audit Act. The West Australian, p. 2). A regional newspaper noted 
that three regional representatives had been absent from the debate and, had they all 
been present, "we fancy that the Government would have sustained a greater defeat 
than they did" ((1880, August 13). Local Districts' and General Topics. Eastern 
Districts Chronicle (York), p. 2). Such implied support from regional electorates is 
particularly interesting as they were usually quite politically conservative. 
 
In contrast, The Herald argued the Audit Bill was unconstitutional because "making 
the keeper of the public accounts independent of the responsible administrator of 
affairs, and constituting him the servant of an irresponsible popular assembly" was 
an absurd and audacious notion ((1880, August 7). The Herald, pp. 2-3). It also 
described the actions of the elected members, "supported by the West Australian", as 
"a silly attempt" (An Idle Man. (1880, August 7). Occasional Paragraphs. The 
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Herald, p. 3). A special supplement of The Herald predicted the Select Committee 
considering the Audit Bill would substitute clauses "for the two first sections which 
will be equally effectual in securing the object of the bill without incurring the 
danger of its being opposed as unconstitutional" ((1880, August 9). Herald Office. 
The Herald, p. 1S). Yet a few days later The Herald ran an editorial stating that, 
although they did not expect the Audit Bill to succeed, the "time seems certainly to 
have come when it should be decided beyond doubt whether the Legislative Council 
has or has not any real power, as against the fiat of the Governor" and hoped the 
matter would be a means "of settling the powers of the people under the present 
constitution one way or the other" ((1880, August 14). The Herald, p. 2). 
 
A letter to the editor of The West Australian criticised the attitude taken by The 
Herald in discussing the Audit Bill provisions, accusing its editors of "bitterness" 
because achieving control over public expenditure would remove their "stock 
argument" for the introduction of responsible government (Anon. (1880, August 10). 
The "Herald" and the Audit Bill. The West Australian, p. 3). A letter to The Inquirer 
described the Parliamentary division on the Audit Bill as a "burlesque" that "afforded 
considerable amusement to the Gallery" (The Gallery. (1880, August 11). Official 
Members in the House. The Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 2S). In that same 
edition, another letter criticised the government's proposal to increase staffing levels 
in the Audit Office as unnecessary expense (M. Logue (1880, August 11). 
Departmental Expenditure. The Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 2S).70 
 
Updates on the topic appeared in at least five South Australian, Victorian and New 
South Wales newspapers, with the comment: "It is believed that the Audit Act 
recently passed by the Legislature will be vetoed by the Governor" ((1880, August 
16). Western Australia. The South Australian Advertiser (Adelaide), p. 5; (1880, 
August 17). Western Australia. The Age (Melbourne), p. 3; (1880, August 18). 
Miscellaneous Items. Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate (NSW), p. 2; 
(1880, August 21). Leader (Melbourne), p. 20; (1880, August 21). South Australian 
Chronicle and Weekly Mail (Adelaide), p. 6). A more detailed article describing the 
political situation had been published earlier in South Australia, explaining: 
                                                 
70 The writer of this letter, Major Logue, had previously been the elected representative for the 
regional town of Geraldton (Battye, 1912). 
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The constitution [in Western Australia] is partially representative, 
but the Government is far from responsible in form or act. Taxation 
is no doubt practically controlled by the Legislature, but…this is 
seriously emasculated by the want of restraint on expenditure. Under 
the circumstances it is not surprising that one of the first Bills 
proposed by elected members will be to provide an Audit Act. It is 
notorious that mismanagement and misappropriation of funds…have 
been going on....On the other hand, it is argued that an Audit Act 
would interfere with Ministers, who are in reality the servants of the 
Imperial Government. That such an argument should have any 
weight is reason enough to stimulate the demand for real responsible 
government.…It is surely not too much to encourage a hope that the 
Home Government…will throw no obstacles in the way of an 
enactment which…will concede to the people an actual control over 
expenditure. ((1880, August 14). The Advertiser, Saturday, August 
14, 1880. The South Australian Advertiser (Adelaide), p. 4) 
 
8.6 THE AUDIT BILL 1880: REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE 
(20 AUGUST 1880) 
 
The Report of the Select Committee appointed to consider the provisions of the Audit 
Bill was read and received in the Legislative Council on 20 August 1880 (Report 
WAPP 1880 no. A6). The Report included, as evidence, a statement from each of the 
four persons examined by the Committee and which reveal some of the political 
struggle for power over financial control.71 These statements were not read to the 
Legislative Council but were included in the printed Report and published in full in 
The Inquirer with the comment that they would "be perused by our readers with 
considerable interest" ((1880, August 25). The Select Committee's Report upon the 
Audit Bill. The Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 3). Both the previous and current 
Auditor General explicitly stated that independence was essential for their role but 
did not exist. They both gave examples of having been pressured by the Colonial 
Secretary to make alterations in their accounts. Knight was particularly blunt, stating: 
 
I have always expressed an opinion, both publicly and privately, that 
the Auditor General should be responsible to the Council. I once 
resisted pressure being brought to bear upon me by the Colonial 
Secretary to alter my books in a manner which I did not think was 
right, but I resisted at considerable risk to myself.…I have always 
been of opinion, from the experience which I had whilst in the Audit 
Office, that the Auditor General was not in a sufficiently 
                                                 
71 William Knight, former Auditor General; Edward Courthope, Auditor General; Anthony Lefroy, 
Colonial Treasurer; Roger Goldsworthy, Colonial Secretary. 
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independent position, as he ought not to be subject to have pressure 
brought to bear upon him by any other officer of the Government. I 
look upon an Audit Act as one of the most important measures 
which the Legislature could carry out (Report WAPP 1880 no. A6, 
p. 6).72 
 
Auditor General Courthope referred to a specific instance in 1878 when the Colonial 
Secretary had ordered him to alter the classification of an item for extra clerical 
assistance from the Colonial Secretary's department to "Miscellaneous Services", 
thereby reducing expenditure in the department. Courthope stated: "I made the 
alteration under protest" (Report WAPP 1880 no. A6, p. 7). He admitted he had 
found it necessary "on several occasions" to consult the Colonial Secretary over the 
classification of accounts, which he would "never" have done if he "had been in a 
perfectly independent position" (Report WAPP 1880 no. A6, p. 7). He felt "bound to 
obey the order of the Colonial Secretary" even though he did not believe that any 
officer had any right to "interfere" with his decisions except the governor, but had 
not referred their differences of opinion to the governor, perhaps because "I consider 
the Colonial Secretary to be the mouth-piece of the Governor" (Report WAPP 1880 
no. A6, p. 7).  
 
The Colonial Treasurer, Lefroy, made no comment in his statement of evidence 
regarding the Auditor General's independence, being only concerned with the 
proposed administrative changes to the financial management system. Lefroy was 
adamant that compelling department heads to comply with the existing regulations 
would ensure a "better audit…of the Public Accounts…than under the Regulations 
proposed in the Audit Act" (Report WAPP 1880 no. A6, p. 7).  
 
The Colonial Secretary's statement was a response to Courthope's allegations 
regarding the altered account classifications. Goldsworthy freely admitted directing 
Courthope to change the item in question to "the proper head of service", but he also 
pointed out that the "Auditor General had no orders from me not to make an 
explanation of this expenditure in the Comparative Statement" (Report WAPP 1880 
no. A6, p. 7). 
 
                                                 
72 More of Knight's evidence to this Committee, relative to the procedure for checking the 
authorisation of expenditure, was referred to earlier in the discussion on excess expenditure. 
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The Select Committee was "unanimous" that the majority of the Audit Bill, "with a 
few trifling alterations…would secure an efficient audit of the public accounts, and 
would enable the real financial position of the Colony to be at any time readily 
ascertained" (Report WAPP 1880 no. A6, p. 3). They reported only one major 
difference of opinion, over the retention of the first two clauses. A majority of the 
Committee (four elected Council members) wanted to keep them, in order to provide 
the Auditor General with sufficient security "to enable him to carry out his duties 
without interference from officers unconnected with his department. The evidence of 
both the late and the present Auditor General being strongly confirmatory of this 
view" (Report WAPP 1880 no. A6, p. 3).  
 
The other three Committee members disagreed (nominee Council members George 
Randell and Edward Stone, and elected representative William Marmion). Their 
reasons for dissension were included in the Report. Marmion concurred "in the 
desirability (if it were possible under this Constitution) of rendering the Auditor 
perfectly independent, and only liable to dismissal with the sanction of the 
Legislative Council", but this would be "entirely at variance with the spirit of the 
Colonial Office Regulations" and "the retention of clauses 1 and 2 in their present 
shape would hazard the loss of the Bill" (Report WAPP 1880 no. A6, p. 6). Randell 
and Stone reiterated the arguments expressed in the second reading debate, namely, 
the two clauses were "out of harmony with our present Constitution", would "create 
distrust and friction between the Governor and the Legislature", would "interfere 
with the prerogative of the Crown", and were unnecessary as the current regulations 
were "sufficient to secure the Auditor General in his Office, [and] enable him to 
carry out his duties without interference" (Report WAPP 1880 no. A6, p. 6). 
 
The West Australian reported that the Committee's differences of opinion were 
unsatisfactory but that "the reasoning of the minority is sound, so far as it goes" 
((1880, August 24). The West Australian, p. 2). Nevertheless, argued the Editor, it 
was important to provide the Auditor General with genuine protection to ensure 
"really effectual" work and "a fearlessness which he probably would be quite ready 
to show were he assured that those in whose interests he was working had the power 
as well as the will to protect him" ((1880, August 24). The West Australian, p. 2). A 
contributor to The Inquirer reminded readers about the ongoing excess expenditure 
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and pointed out the Audit Bill was not unusual in its provisions and would result in 
"the safe expenditure of the public funds" (Scrutator. (1880, August 25). The Audit 
Bill. The Inquirer and Commercial News (Perth), p. 1S). 
 
8.7 THE AUDIT BILL 1880: COUNCIL CONSIDERATION (25 AUGUST 
1880) 
 
The Audit Bill 1880 and the recommendations of the Select Committee were 
considered in the Legislative Council on 25 August 1880. It was another lengthy and 
frequently heated session, filling 10 pages of Hansard, with almost the entire session 
taken up by debate on the first clause (concerning the removal of the Auditor 
General) (WA, LC, August 25, 1880, pp. 223-233).  
 
Elected representative George Shenton opened the debate by immediately moving 
for the first clause to be struck out, on the grounds that its provisions were 
unworkable under the current constitution (representative government). He had been 
unconvinced by the evidence provided by the two Auditors General. Knight had 
admitted just one instance of being pressured, which he had resisted, and Courthope 
had not thought it necessary to appeal to the governor. Shenton argued that "a great 
many of the complaints…recently made about the inefficiency of our audit system 
[were] due rather to the officer in charge of the department than to the system of 
audit" (WA, LC, August 25, 1880, p. 224).73 One of the dissenting Select Committee 
members, Stone, agreed that Knight's evidence "was a mere matter of individual 
opinion" and that Knight had not been able to explain to the Select Committee the 
exact nature of the risk he felt he had taken in resisting the pressure on him (WA, 
LC, August 25, 1880, p. 227). Marmion, another of the dissenting Select Committee 
members, highlighted that only two instances of attempts to influence the Auditor 
General had occurred in the 10 years Western Australia had possessed representative 
government. He thought the Colonial Secretary's response to the Select Committee 
regarding the more recent attempt was "perfectly satisfactory", and if members were 
to examine the first attempt, "possibly they would find that…was as great a myth as 
the latter one had turned out to be" (WA, LC, August 25, 1880, p. 229). Lee Steere, 
                                                 
73 Interestingly, no defence was made regarding this attack on Courthope's professional reputation. 
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who had chaired the Select Committee, immediately responded to the allegation that 
Knight's evidence of interference was a "myth", declaring:  
 
That officer was directed by the then-Colonial Secretary to alter a 
certain item in his books, and because he declined to do so, and 
resisted the interference of the Colonial Secretary, the consequence 
was he was virtually driven from his office, which (to use a 
colloquial expression) was made "too hot" for him. (WA, LC, 
August 25, 1880, p. 229) 
 
Lee Steere admitted this information about Knight's resignation from office had been 
received outside of the Select Committee's hearings, but reminded the Legislative 
Council that Knight, "a gentleman whose opinion everyone respected" had 
considered it "indispensable" for the Auditor General to be made responsible to the 
legislature (WA, LC, August 25, 1880, p. 224). 74  
 
The Colonial Secretary then explained the circumstances around Courthope's 
"disingenuous" evidence (WA, LC, August 25, 1880, p. 230). The Auditor General 
had frequently "come to him for advice as to what heads certain items should be 
classified under, and that on this particular occasion the Auditor and himself had 
differed in opinion" (WA, LC, August 25, 1880, p. 230). The Colonial Secretary 
"had no idea" what the alleged protest had been. In fact, he had "often assisted the 
Auditor, and by doing so saved him from placing incorrect returns before the House" 
(WA, LC, August 25, 1880, p. 230). The third dissenting member of the Select 
Committee, Randell, pointed out that Courthope had not recorded a protest in his 
annual report to Parliament. 
 
In response to the argument that the first clause conflicted with Colonial Office 
Regulations, Lee Steere pointed out that these did not have the force of legislative 
measures and could be easily amended by the Secretary of State. Elected 
representative and the Speaker of the House, Luke Leake, advised that although he 
generally refrained from participating in political discussions (given his dual role), 
on this occasion "he intended to vote.…He thought that, in a Colony like this, the 
                                                 
74 This is the only reference found that attributed Knight's resignation as having occurred under 
pressure, although The Herald's report of this debate records that Lee Steere's statement was received 
with a supporting chorus of "hear, hear" ((1880, August 26). Legislative Council, 25 August 1880. 
The Herald, p. 1S). 
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Auditor General could not possibly be too independent" (WA, LC, August 25, 1880, 
p. 232). The House, he believed, had to do something to prevent the extravagant 
expenditure of the past years and the Secretary of State would refuse assent if the 
Audit Bill was unconstitutional. If that should be the outcome, said Leake,  
 
the representatives of the people in that House would at any rate 
have the satisfaction of knowing that they had done their duty, and 
that it was not their fault if an improved system of checking the 
public expenditure did not come into operation. (WA, LC, August 
25, 1880, p. 232) 
 
Dramatically, the result of the vote for retaining Clause 1 was even, with 10 votes 
supporting and 10 against. The Chairman of Committees, Cockburn-Campbell, then 
"gave his casting vote with the Ayes" (WA, LC, August 25, 1880, p. 233). The 
remainder of the Audit Bill then passed with the relatively minor amendments 
proposed by the Select Committee.  
 
Newspaper editorial reporting on this second reading debate provide context of the 
underlying political struggles, compared to the more restrained official Hansard 
record. It was variously described as "a real honest parliamentary battle", a "fight in 
regard to a matter of more than usual importance", "exciting and enjoyable": 
 
The effort made on the 25th was strenuous, and narrowly missed 
being successful. As will be seen by the division list, three elected 
members ranged themselves beside the occupants of the Treasury 
and Nominee benches, the twenty members in committee being then 
equally divided. And when the CHAIRMAN gave his casting vote in 
favor of the clauses as they stood, the hearty cheers which burst from 
the representatives of the people showed how deep was the interest 
they took in the fate of the measure. ((1880, August 31). The Audit 
Bill. The West Australian, p. 2) 
 
THE Audit Bill…passed its second reading by a majority of 
one.…the victory was all the more delicious from its having been in 
peril, and while the face of the Chairman of Committees beamed 
with satisfaction as he gave his casting vote with the "Ayes" the 
victorious ten received the announcement…with cheers of delight. 
((1880, August 28). The Herald, p. 2) 
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The Audit Bill was read in the Legislative Council a third time on 30 August 1880 
and passed. This "battle" had been won. However, the actual war for an independent 
Auditor General and Legislative control over public expenditure was far from over.  
 
8.8 THE AUDIT BILL 1880: ASSENT WITHHELD (3 SEPTEMBER 
1880) 
 
Governor Robinson's response to the Audit Bill 1880 was provided in a lengthy 
Message (No. 22 of the session) on 3 September (Message No. 22: The Audit Bill, 2 
September 1880. WA, LC, September 3, 1880, pp. 324-327). In short, he considered 
that the Audit Bill contained provisions both inconsistent with his own instructions 
and unnecessary, therefore it was his duty to withhold assent.75 He provided three 
reasons for choosing this course of action. The first reason was that he found no 
necessity to protect the Auditor General from "being compelled to yield to improper 
instructions" because the "danger…is far too remote to call for serious attention" and 
even if "a Governor could be found who would be guilty of so grave an irregularity", 
under Colonial Office regulations all senior officers had the option of appealing 
against their dismissal to the Secretary of State (WA, LC, September 3, 1880, p. 
324). The evidence of exactly such pressure that had been presented to the Select 
Committee by Knight and Courthope was understood by Robinson as proof that the 
Auditor General actually did possess adequate independence, as per this extract: 
 
The solitary instance which Mr. Courthope cites of the Colonial 
Secretary having required him to alter the classification of a 
particular amount is proof, not that the present system is bad, but 
that the Auditor gravely neglected his duty in carrying out what he 
considered an improper "order" as to classification instead of 
applying to the Governor (as is usual in all such cases) to decide the 
point in dispute. His predecessor states that he once resisted pressure 
being brought to bear upon him by the Colonial Secretary to alter his 
books in a manner which he did not think right, and though he adds 
that he resisted at considerable risk, he does not state what that risk 
was, nor does he appear to have suffered in any way for honestly 
                                                 
75 Under the representative government constitution provided by the Australian Constitutions Act 
1850 (Imp.), any legislation passed by the Legislative Council still had to receive assent from the 
governor and final approval from the Crown. The governor could choose from several options when 
presented by the Parliament with an approved bill. Gubernatorial assent could be provided 
immediately (although subject to final approval from Britain); the bill could be either vetoed in its 
entirety by the governor or sent back to the Legislative Council for re-consideration; or the governor 
could defer a decision to the Secretary of State—the usual wording being that the bill had been 
"reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure thereon". 
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doing his duty. (WA, LC, September 3, 1880, p. 325) [emphasis 
added] 
 
Governor Robinson's second reason for withholding assent was that he identified the 
clause prohibiting the Auditor General from membership of the Executive or 
Legislative Councils to be in direct conflict with his own powers of nomination to 
both Councils and so impossible to approve (as noted earlier). Thirdly, Robinson did 
not believe there was anything to be gained from the Audit Bill in terms of restraining 
excessive expenditure. The governor's direct responsibility to the Secretary of State 
provided "as full and ample security for the proper and economical expenditure of 
public money as would be provided by the bill under consideration", because it 
enabled the Legislature to appeal to the Secretary of State if it considered the 
governor to be acting extravagantly or with impropriety (WA, LC, September 3, 
1880, p. 325).  
 
Governor Robinson concluded his Message by reiterating his support of an efficient 
audit process and reminding the Legislative Council of his references to the topic in 
his opening address. He would, naturally, be willing to consider the subject again and 
in fact intended to present the next Parliamentary session with "a measure 
which…will at all events satisfy the wish of your Council to see the regulations of 
the Treasury and Audit Departments embodied in legal form" (WA, LC, September 
3, 1880, p. 327). For now, he intended to appoint a Commission to identify potential 
improvements for account keeping by comparing the existing regulations with those 
proposed in the Audit Bill 1880. The outcome would be what they all ultimately 
desired—"the perfecting of the working condition of all Government 
Departments"—and he had already implemented some improvement measures. (WA, 
LC, September 3, 1880, p. 326). As the Legislative Council had "wisely" agreed to 
his proposal for providing "a competent book-keeper in the Treasury", accounts 
could now be classified there as well in the Audit Office, thereby relieving "the 
Auditor of some of the great labor now thrown upon him in the preparation of 
Financial Returns, and allow him more time for the primary duties of his department" 
(WA, LC, September 3, 1880, p. 327).  
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Nevertheless, Governor Robinson expressed regret that he had not been directly 
addressed by the Legislative Council about seeking this outcome in the first place, as 
it would have been a far quicker and more effective process. Although he "in no 
way" questioned "the undoubted right of the Legislative Council to pass and send up 
for his consideration such bills as they think proper", Robinson added: 
 
At the same time, constitutional authorities are agreed that measures 
for redressing grievances or improving the condition of the service 
can most conveniently be approached in the first instance by means 
of an Address to the Crown, and had your House adopted this course 
on the present occasion the Governor would have had great pleasure 
in immediately meeting your wishes, and the matter might then have 
been disposed of during the present session of Council. (WA, LC, 
September 3, 1880, pp. 326-327) 
 
Public reaction to the Governor's Message varied. The West Australian considered 
that "the real grievance of the Council is completely ignored" (the "contempt of that 
constitutional provision which makes expenditure in excess of the Appropriation 
Acts of the Legislature illegal" and that "nothing has done more to foster the feeling 
in favor of Responsible Government than this" ((1880, September 7). The West 
Australian, p. 2). The Inquirer newspaper, conversely, agreed with Robinson's 
reasoning and saw his refusal to give assent to the Audit Bill as "the natural, we 
might say the necessary, consequence of the ignorance and want of tact shown by its 
proposer and his supporters in the Legislative Council" ((1880, September 8). The 
Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 2).  
 
8.9 THE AUDIT BILL 1880: PARLIAMENTARY MEMORIAL (6-8 
SEPTEMBER 1880) 
 
The Opposition's response to the Governor's Message was to propose sending a 
Memorial to the Secretary of State seeking support for the Audit Bill 1880, a strategy 
enabling them to argue their case directly to the Colonial Office (WA, LC, 
September 6, 1880, p. 339). Presented by Lee Steere on the very next sitting day, the 
Memorial argued that gaining representative government had not achieved its 
primary object of providing a voice to the people to "control the expenditure of the 
public revenue" (WA, LC, September 6, 1880, p. 339). As a direct result, the Audit 
Bill was introduced in order to provide a means by which "the theoretical 
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responsibility of the Government to the Council in regard to expenditure might be 
practically enforced" (WA, LC, September 6, 1880, p. 340). Governor Robinson's 
three primary objections to the Audit Bill were then countered. Firstly, Auditor 
General independence was essential because public sector audit 
 
is supposed to be carried out not so much for the satisfaction of the 
Government, which spends, as of the Council whose money is spent. 
Obviously, therefore, the Auditor General should not be the mere 
servant of the Government which he has been hitherto. (WA, LC, 
September 6, 1880, p. 340) 
 
Secondly, the perceived conflict with the governor's Royal prerogative to appoint 
Council members was not considered a serious objection. Thirdly, the existing 
regulations for keeping and auditing the public accounts, "however perfect they may 
be, have produced the most imperfect results" (WA, LC, September 6, 1880, p. 340). 
Either the existing system was defective, or it had been "very badly" implemented 
and, of the two possibilities, "your memorialists prefer to adopt the first" (WA, LC, 
September 6, 1880, p. 341). 
 
The Parliamentary debate on the motion for adopting the Memorial was held in 
Committee and endorsed by nine votes to seven, although nominee members did 
raise a point of order which was promptly dismissed by the Chairman of Committees 
(who added that he thought those who had raised the query "were catching at a 
straw") (WA, LC, September 6, 1880, p. 341). Procedurally, then, a formal motion 
was made for the House to adopt the decision just made in Committee but this was 
immediately opposed by government members. There was no need for such a 
Memorial, they argued, and it was unlikely that the electors would support the action. 
Eventually the Memorial was adopted by ten votes to seven (the additional 
supporting vote coming from Cockburn-Campbell who, as Chairman of Committees, 
had not taken part in the previous vote).  
 
In Parliament the next day (7 September 1880), Lee Steere moved for a formal 
Address in reply to the Governor's Message. The proposed Address thanked the 
Governor for his courteous message and countered some of the statements. Once 
again there was lengthy debate (almost 10 pages of Hansard reporting), with 
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nominee and official government members vigorously protesting and moving to have 
all the wording struck out except for a brief acknowledgement of receipt (WA, LC, 
September 7, 1880, pp. 353-362). When it came to the vote, the Address as originally 
proposed was accepted by nine votes to seven. It was received by Governor 
Robinson the next morning, which was also the final sitting day of the 1880 
Parliamentary session. Robinson immediately sent another Message (no. 26) to the 
Legislative Council which acknowledged its receipt and countered the arguments 
made in the Address using much the same reasoning as expressed previously (WA, 
LC, September 8, 1880, pp. 366-367).  
 
Soon after, Robinson made his prorogation speech and expressed his gratification for 
the close attention that had been given to financial affairs as it "will have satisfied 
you that the Government have been mindful of economy, and of the necessity of 
replacing our finances on a sound and satisfactory basis" (WA, LC, September 8, 
1880, p. 368). In regard to the Memorial, Robinson assured the Legislative Council 
he would "cheerfully acquiesce" if the Secretary of State responded with 
authorisation to assent to the Audit Bill (WA, LC, September 8, 1880, p. 369). 
However, he also noted his personal deep regret that he had not been made aware 
that the Memorial was to be brought forward (it had not "been published in the usual 
way in the Notice Paper"): if he had known, he would "for obvious reasons" have 
requested government members not to oppose it (WA, LC, September 8, 1880, p. 
369). Therefore, there was "no need for departing, either in the spirit or in the letter, 
from the rules which are wisely laid down by Parliament for the purpose of guarding 
against surprise" (WA, LC, September 8, 1880, p. 369). This final comment appears 
to have been intended as "a parting blow" to the elected members—a tactic which, 
ironically, is exactly what nominee member Randell had alleged the Opposition was 
endeavouring to do the day before with their Message to the Governor (WA, LC, 
September 7, 1880, p. 357). Certainly The Herald interpreted the Governor's 
statement as "a direct and severe rebuke", and one which the elected members 





8.10 OTHER PARLIAMENTARY BUSINESS IN 1880 SESSION 
 
The introduction of, and progress on, the Audit Bill 1880 discussed above, was of 
course not the only business conducted in this 1880 Parliamentary session. The usual 
annual financial business, including the appropriation process, had to be conducted 
and there was other fiscal activity such as a proposed loan of £310,000 to extend a 
railway line to the eastern settlement of York. Some of this business is referred to 
here as it provides evidence that elected members continued at every opportunity to 
pressure the Executive on financial issues. It was even reported in Victoria (via a 
local correspondent) that members were "taking things a good deal more into their 
own hands than they have done hitherto, more especially in regard to the public 
accounts,…greatly to the annoyance of the unfortunate and much-badgered 
Government" ((1880, September 2). Intercolonial: Western Australia. The Argus 
(Melbourne), p. 1). 
 
8.10.1 Provision of financial returns 
 
Elected members experienced "exasperating delay and difficulty" in obtaining 
financial information during the session and this developed into what was described 
in The West Australian as a "passage of arms between the Colonial Secretary and the 
member for Perth" ((1880, August 20). The West Australian, p. 2). Lee Steere and 
Stephen Parker called for several financial returns on 26 and 27 July 1880, asked for 
a progress update on 13 August, and on 16 August Parker moved that the Governor 
be asked directly for the various returns (WA, LC, July 26, 1880, p. 30; July 27, 
1880, p. 34; August 13, 1880, p. 144; August 16, 1880, pp. 157-160). Parker also 
suggested that the Colonial Secretary "actively resented the interference of members 
in thus daring to ask for information, his idea apparently being that they ought to take 
on trust whatever figures the hon. gentleman liked to lay before them" and was 
criticised for making this personal attack (WA, LC, August 16, 1880, p. 157). 
Governor Robinson's response, on 20 August, agreed to provide the returns and 
confirmed the delay resulted from the "unusually heavy work on the Departments 
concerned" and certainly "not to any disinclination on the part of the Colonial 
Secretary to meet the wishes of the House" (WA, LC, August 20, 1880, p. 167). 
Governor Robinson later also claimed that part of the reason for the delay was "the 
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want of a competent Book-keeper in the Treasury" (part of the Colonial Secretary's 
department) (WA, LC, September 8, 1880, p. 367). 
 
The Herald expressed annoyance that the five weeks of the Parliamentary session to 
date had been "occupied almost exclusively by motions for returns on one side of the 
House, and by reasons for withholding or delaying them on the other side" ((1880, 
August 21). The Herald, p. 2). Lee Steere prepared an Address to Governor 
Robinson citing the delays in obtaining returns "as a proof of the inefficiency of the 
present system of keeping the accounts" and giving the following examples:  
 
The return which you ordered to be made, on the 6th of May, 1880, 
showing the true financial position of the Colony on the 31st 
December, 1879, was not completed by the Treasurer and forwarded 
to you until the 2nd of July, 1880.…A return of the financial 
condition of the Colony on the 1st of July, moved for by the House 
on the 27th of July, has never yet been furnished. (WA, LC, 
September 7, 1880, p. 354) 
 
The second return referred to above was actually tabled on the same date this 
Address was read (the penultimate sitting date prior to prorogation). Even then, noted 
Stephen Parker, it "was not the sort of return he had asked for at all—although the 
Government had taken about six weeks to prepare it" (WA, LC, September 7, 1880, 
p. 362). 
 
8.10.2 Excess Bill for 1879 
 
An Excess Bill for 1879, presented on 28 July 1880 by the Colonial Secretary, was 
for an amount ("an excess of a trifle over £18,000") significantly less than that 
expected from the comparative financial statements presented on the opening day 
(less than two weeks earlier) (WA, LC, July 28, 1880, p. 46). Although this reduction 
was presented to the Legislative Council as a positive event, it did not engender 
confidence in the accounts. When even more "discrepancies between the figures 
embodied in the Bill and the comparative statement of revenue, and expenditure 
furnished by the Auditor General" were immediately found, the Excess Bill was 
referred to a Select Committee for closer examination (WA, LC, July 28, 1880, p. 
49). The Committee's work was held up by delays in obtaining various necessary 
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returns and its Report was not presented until 7 September, the day before 
prorogation. The Legislative Council then refused to adopt the Report as they had no 
time left "to wade through the elaborate returns upon which the report was based" 
((1880, September 14). Excess Bill—Report of the Select Committee; The Excess 
Bill, for 1879. The West Australian, p. 3). Given that, it was pointless to consider the 
actual Excess Bill itself. The scheduled second reading did not proceed and the 
Excess Bill was effectively dismissed for the present. 
 
8.10.3 Supplementary votes for 1880 
 
The Colonial Secretary moved on 9 August 1880 for the House to consider and 
approve a Supplementary Vote of £3,775 for the current year, above the £176,256 
approved the previous October (in 43 Vic., No. 27—Appropriation 1879 (WA)). 
This was a "somewhat unusual" course, he admitted, 
 
but he felt sure that the feelings of the House would be with him 
when he explained the reason for its adoption. That reason simply 
was, that the votes appropriated by the House for the services in 
question had proved inadequate, the actual expenditure having 
exceeded the estimated expenditure. (WA, LC, August 9, 1880, p. 
111) 
 
Perhaps predictably, the "feelings of the House" were not with him and the matter 
was referred to the Select Committee then considering the Excess Bill. That 
Committee found the approved appropriations for some items had been under-
estimated and there had been unexpected demands on other departments. There had 
also been some unauthorised expenditure in the Minor Works item, in addition to 
heavy expenditure, and "the Committee were apprehensive that unless a considerable 
reduction was effected under this head, the Supplementary Vote now asked 
for…would be insufficient to meet the expenditure for the remainder of the year" 
(WA, LC, September 3, 1880, p. 318). The Report was adopted and the 
Supplementary Bill was passed on 8 September 1880, the final sitting day of the 




8.10.4 Appropriation for 1881 
 
The Appropriation Bill for 1881 was introduced by Colonial Secretary Goldsworthy, 
who then moved for a suspension of the Standing Orders "with a view to the Bill 
being passed through all its stages that evening" (WA, LC, September 3, 1880, p. 
330). Goldsworthy wished to have the Bill finalised urgently as it was his last 
appearance in the Parliament. However, the Opposition made it very clear they were 
not at all prepared to rush the discussion. Lee Steere stated he could not consent to 
the motion for suspension "under any such circumstances. In fact, it is a matter for 
serious consideration whether the House will be prepared to pass the Bill at all" 
(WA, LC, September 3, 1880, p. 330). The House then adjourned for the evening, at 
the relatively early time of 9.45 p.m. The second reading, as it turned out, went 
through Committee without discussion and the Appropriation Bill was passed 7 
September 1880.  
 
The Legislative Council did request Governor Robinson to appoint a Commission 
during the Parliamentary recess "into the whole question of Departmental 
Expenditure" in order to identify potential reductions (WA, LC, September 7, 1880, 
p. 352). The Report of the Departmental Commission was tabled the following year, 
on 27 July 1881 and its findings were used to inform the Estimate process in 1882. 
The Herald was expressed scepticism about its effectiveness: "No serious reductions 
are contemplated, and departments are left almost untouched. No such mutilations as 
proposed by the Departmental Commission appear to be entertained by the 
Government" ((1881, August 20). The Herald, p. 3). 
 
8.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
This chapter provided a detailed study of the difficulties experienced by the 
Legislative Council in passing the Audit Bill 1880. The vigorous opposition from the 
Executive at every stage of progress to the Audit Bill, the subsequent Address to the 
Governor and Memorial to the Secretary of State, are all evidence that establishing 
the Auditor General as independent officer of Parliament was clearly recognised as 
providing an effective restraint on Executive expenditure. The amount of press 
coverage also indicates there was genuine public interest in the outcome. Western 
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Australian colonists had elected representatives who had made introducing an Audit 
Bill a key part of their policy platform, and they wanted genuine enforcement of their 
constitutional rights. The ultimate outcome is examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 9  




This chapter focuses on the Parliamentary events in Western Australia following the 
Audit Bill 1880 (WA) and the continuing efforts, and effects, of increasing 
Legislative control over public expenditure. Governor Robinson prorogued the 
Legislative Council on 8 September 1880 for three months (to 8 December 1880), 
then again to 8 February 1881, and the new session finally began 21 March 1881. 
Western Australia had to wait several months for the Secretary of State's response 
with a final decision on the Audit Bill, and Governor Robinson had to explain the 
events of the 1880 session to the Colonial Office and satisfy the colonists that the 
Executive was administering in their best interests. 
 
9.2 A WAITING GAME 
 
In the six-month interim between the Parliamentary sessions of 1880 and 1881, and 
while awaiting the Secretary of State's response regarding the Audit Bill 1880, the 
local press continued to dissect past events and predict possible outcomes for 
Western Australia's constitution, the Audit Bill and the government's financial 
management arrangements. Newspapers in the eastern Australian colonies also 
published synopses of the events which included the history of excess expenditure 
resulting in the introduction of the Audit Bill, the necessity for an independent 
Auditor General, the Memorial to the Secretary of State and the refusal to pass the 
Excess Bill.76 The West Australian editorial immediately after prorogation expressed 
satisfaction that, as a direct effect of the Audit Bill "peg", expenditure of public 
money was now likely to be restrained within the estimates: 
 
the Governor in messages addressed to the Council has clearly 
intimated that it is his intention in the future to adhere strictly to the 
law, and from past experience of His Excellency's action, we have 
every reason to believe that his intention will be conscientiously 
carried out. ((1880, September 10). The West Australian, p. 2) 
                                                 
76 See, for example, Our Own Correspondent. (1880, September 27). Western Australia. The Argus 
(Melbourne), p. 7; (1880, September 30). Intercolonial. The Argus (Melbourne), pp. 1S; (1880, 
October 7). Western Australia. South Australian Register (Adelaide), p. 6. 
166 
The Herald stated its own certainty that Governor Robinson's decision to withhold 
his assent from the Audit Bill was considered and inevitable, but simultaneously 
critiqued two of the Governor's comments about the Auditor General in his closing 
speech. The Governor's assertion that the Auditor General had "nothing to fear so 
long as he does his duty" was held to be incorrect, as the Auditor General was 
"nothing more than a mere clerk and…, though independent in theory, must in 
practice do as he is told. In a conflict with the Governor he has everything to lose and 
nothing to gain.…He therefore obeys orders" ((1880, September 11). The Herald, p. 
3). Secondly, Robinson's claim that no governor would apply pressure to, or attempt 
to interfere in, the Auditor General's work could not be sustained "in the face of the 
deceptive accounts which have been presented to the House for years past": that, in 
fact, this deception proved "the Auditor has for some time past had to make up his 
returns to order and not as they would have been made up if he had been left to 
himself" ((1880, September 11). The Herald, p. 3). The Herald also returned to the 
promotion of responsible government. The Audit Bill, to its proponents, "was a test 
measure to decide whether the constitution could be so altered in principle as to be 
made acceptable" and the Secretary of State might decide to either grant responsible 
government or make an unexpected constitutional decision and remove even "that 
semblance of a parliament" currently in place ((1880, September 18). The Herald, p. 
2). In either case,  
 
it will be quite clear to the Secretary of State that the Governor 
cannot be exposed to be again bullied and insulted as he has been, or 
that a legislative assembly which has no responsibility, should be 
constantly appealing to the Home Government about its rights. 
((1880, September 18). The Herald, p. 2) 
 
The third major newspaper in Western Australia at the time, The Inquirer, wrote that 
no one could look back on the Parliamentary session "with any feeling of 
satisfaction" ((1880, September 15). Review of the Session. The Inquirer and 
Commercial News, p. 2). The Editor agreed it was the passage of the Audit Bill which 
had been the "measure that caused the greatest interest outside the House" and 
expressed disapproval of "the regrettable delay of the Government in submitting their 
annual Financial Statement" ((1880, September 15). Review of the Session. The 
Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 2).  
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A regular contributor to The Inquirer criticised The West Australian for being the 
"organ" of the pro-Audit Bill supporters and for having "threatened us with four 
years' continuance of the present abortive state of legislation unless the Government 
concede the unreasonable demand for a 'legislative' Auditor" (Verus. (1880, 
September 22). Our Open Column. The Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 3). The 
West Australian responded vigorously to this criticism, pointing out that however 
sincere Governor Robinson might be in his own assurances about the 
"unconstitutional proceedings" which had resulted in the many excess bills, he 
"might at any moment be succeeded by a Governor whose views in regard to the 
exercise of power would be of a different kind" ((1880, September 24). Occasional 
Notes, Local and General. The West Australian, p. 3). Three further letters to the 
Editor of The West Australian about the Audit Bill were published in this same issue 
(A Chip off the Old Block, A Plea for Cricket; York Colonist, Our Boys; MLC, An 
Insult Resented. (1880, September 24). Correspondence. The West Australian, p. 3).  
 
9.2.1 The Audit Bill 1880: official follow-up  
 
Governor Robinson's own actions following the Parliamentary session took some 
weeks to complete. His immediate concern appeared to be how to prevent the 
introduction of responsible government. In a confidential despatch to the Secretary of 
State regarding a Parliamentary request for a major railway loan, Robinson advised 
that Britain's approval of the loan would "probably have the effect of deferring the 
introduction of Responsible Government for a few years longer" and noting that in 
"each Session the Legislative Council becomes more and more unmanageable" 
(Robinson to Kimberley, 22 October 1880, Governor's confidential despatches to 
Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 390 v.47). The Colonial Office responded that 
they were well aware "a refusal to comply with the wishes of the Legislative Council 
may lead to a revival of the demand in the Colony for Responsible Government", but 
such agitation was only to be expected on any occasion that the British government 
"may deem it their duty to reject or modify proposals by the Colonial Legislature for 
expenditure which, in their judgement, are not warranted by the financial condition 
of the Colony" (Kimberley to Robinson, 9 January 1881, Confidential despatches 
received from Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 391 v.259). Robinson was advised 
that the best arguments to use against any renewal of the calls for responsible 
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government were the small population of Western Australia and the possible removal 
from the colony of "a considerable part" of the northern territory (Kimberley to 
Robinson, 17 June 1881, Confidential despatches received from Secretary of State, 
SROWA, Cons 391 v.259). 
 
Governor Robinson did not transmit the Parliamentary Memorial on the Audit Bill 
and the accompanying documents to England until 12 November 1880, two months 
after Parliament had been prorogued.77 His covering letter indicated that there was 
one principal question "which calls for Your Lordship's decision, namely, the 
proposal to make the Auditor General responsible to the Legislative Council by 
enacting that he shall not be removed from office unless upon the Address of that 
body" (Robinson to Kimberley, 12 November 1880. WA, LC, April 4, 1881, p. 127). 
Robinson pointed out that the relevant clause in the Bill regarding Auditor General 
independence had only been carried by the casting vote of the Chairman, and that his 
own refusal to grant "assent to this principle has been supported by the leading 
Journals of the place (the Inquirer and Herald), and I believe by public opinion 
generally" (WA, LC, April 4, 1881, p. 127). In the meantime, Governor Robinson 
advised, he intended to "bring in a Bill next Session to embody revised regulations 
for the Treasury and Audit Departments" based on the findings of a Commission he 
was about to appoint to compare the existing finance regulations with those in the 
Audit Bill (Robinson to Kimberley, 12 November 1880. WA, LC, April 4, 1881, p. 
128). Robinson would be glad to know if His Lordship wished him to include a 
provision in the new Bill "to make the Auditor General independent of the 
Government, as desired by certain members of the Legislative Council, or whether 
Your Lordship concurs in the views which I have expressed on this subject" (WA, 
LC, April 4, 1881, p. 128). 
 
In reference to the "alleged extravagance of former Administrations, as showing the 
necessity for placing the Auditor in a position independent of the Government, and 
of enabling him to exercise a check on expenditure not sanctioned by the 
Legislature", Robinson assured the Secretary of State of his commitment to financial 
                                                 
77 A transcript of this and other correspondence relevant to the Audit Bill 1881 is in Appendix 9. A 
copy was provided to the Legislative Council in April 1881, some weeks after the response was 
received from the Secretary of State. 
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economy and the prompt, efficient audit of public accounts, observing that the 
Estimates Bill for 1881 had been passed with very little alteration—"which is, in 
itself, an admission on the part of the Legislative Council that the Government have 
been mindful of economy" (WA, LC, April 4, 1881, pp. 127-128). However, 
Robinson conveniently omitted any mention of the Supplementary Bill for 1880 (also 
passed in that session) or of the Excess Bill for 1879 (which had not been passed). 
 
Accompanying this official correspondence was a confidential despatch, dated 13 
November, that revealed a very different thinking on the Governor's part regarding 
the Audit Bill to the one expressed in in his public speeches, responses to Parliament 
and official correspondence (Appendix 9). This private correspondence began by 
explaining how the Legislative Council's Memorial to the Secretary of State had been 
privately printed and hurried through Parliament, allegedly because its promoters 
believed that he (Robinson) would have prevented its adoption if he had known 
about it beforehand (Robinson noted that Lee Steere had admitted this to him, 
privately). Robinson criticised "this sharp practice" and assured the Secretary of State 
that his censure in his closing speech had "been endorsed by the press and by public 
opinion generally" (Robinson to Kimberley, 13 November 1880, Governor's 
confidential despatches to Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 390 v.47). Robinson 
had privately advised Lee Steere "how sorry I was that my duty obliged me to take a 
course which I feared would be displeasing to him" (the rejection of the Audit Bill), 
and had explained to him "the mistake made by the Council…in claiming a right 
which could only be demanded as a concession" (Robinson to Kimberley, 13 
November 1880, Governor's confidential despatches to Secretary of State, SROWA, 
Cons 390 v.47). More tellingly, Robinson concluded with the admission that the "key 
note" to the local politics was the "political necessity with the elected Members to 
harass and attack the Government" (Robinson to Kimberley, 13 November 1880, 
Governor's confidential despatches to Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 390 v.47). 
The Secretary of State responded (in February 1881) to this lengthy private letter 
from Governor Robinson with a simple, one-sentence letter merely acknowledging 
its receipt (Appendix 8: Kimberley to Robinson, 19 February 1881, Confidential 
despatches received from Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 391 v.259). The lack of 
attention to Robinson's complaints indicates the Colonial Office was not particularly 
interested in these minutiae of personal colonial politics. 
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9.2.2 Finance Commission inquiry 
 
The appointment of the investigative Finance Commission, promised by Governor 
Robinson in his Message advising his decision to withhold assent from the Audit Bill 
(3 September 1880, noted above), was announced in the Government Gazette on 7 
December 1880. Its objective was to consider "the Regulations in force in the 
Financial Departments of the Government; and to report whether any, and if so what, 
improvements could be introduced in the mode of keeping and auditing the Public 
Accounts" (Report WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 3). The four members appointed to this 
Commission were not elected representatives—a fact noted as significant by The 
West Australian ((1880, December 10). Occasional Notes, Local and General. The 
West Australian, p. 2). Six of the major Audit Bill proponents were simultaneously 
appointed by Robinson to a Board inquiring into scab disease in sheep (Lee Steere, 
Lefroy, S. Burges, T. Burges, C. Harper and Hooley). The Herald also understood 
these appointments as highly political, arguing that the Audit Bill supporters were too 
biased against the existing financial regulations to serve impartially on the Finance 
Commission and predicting that the existing financial regulations would be 
"approved as a whole and as sufficient for the purpose for which they are intended—
as, in fact, they probably are" ((1880, December 18). The Herald, p. 2).  
 
The Herald's prediction was incorrect, because the Finance Commission's Report, 
presented to Governor Robinson on 5 February 1881, concluded with the damning 
opinion "that, so far as the existing mode of keeping and auditing the Public 
Accounts is concerned, one more incomplete or less calculated to ensure correctness 
could not be adopted" (Report WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 3). One of the Commission's 
major concerns was that the Treasury books "appear to be audited, if ever, at very 
long intervals, nor does the Auditor appear ever to check the Bank balances" (Report 
WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 4). Further, the Report also noted: 
 
15. The Auditor General's Department is instituted, we conceive, in 
order to provide a check on the Treasury Accounts. 
 
16. This does not appear to be so understood by the Auditor General. 
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17. Indeed, as the Colonial Accounts are now kept, the Treasurer is 
merely a cashier, and the Auditor General fills, to a certain extent, 
only the position of book-keeper. (Report WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 11) 
 
Consequently, among the Commission's 16 recommendations for improvement were 
that the Auditor General should complete monthly audits of all the Treasury books 
and report the completion of that task directly to the governor, particularly noting 
any irregularities. Further recommendations were that, prior to publication in the 
Government Gazette, the Auditor General should audit the Treasurer's regular 
quarterly returns of loan accounts, revenue and expenditure, plus a new half-yearly 
balance sheet showing the financial position of the colony. The Commission agreed 
that public accounts should be "kept in accordance, as far as practicable, with the 
Treasury Regulations of 1847-49"; unless that was done then "it will always be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to arrive at a knowledge of the actual state of the Colonial 
Finances" (Report WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 11).78 Governor Robinson authorised the 
Treasurer and Auditor General in mid-March 1881 to adopt these recommendations 
"at once, in their entirety" (Report WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 11). 
 
Questions regarding the expected tabling date of the Commission's Report were 
asked early in the first Parliamentary session of 1881 (WA, LC, March 23, 1881, p. 
25).79 Governor Robinson clarified that, although he had received the Report and had 
directed the provisional implementation of the recommendations, it would be 
publicly presented in the next session along with a Bill to enforce the recommended 
financial regulations. "In the meanwhile,…the Governor has no doubt that the 
changes proposed will be highly beneficial to the Service" (WA, LC, April 4, 1881, 
p. 126). The Commission's Report was not officially released until 11 June 1881, in 
the interim period between the two Parliamentary sessions of 1881. 
                                                 
78 The Treasurer (Lefroy) had explained to the Commission that the current mode of account keeping 
had arisen in 1871, when the workload had increased substantially following the implementation of 
representative government and public accounts were no longer sent to Britain for audit. Until that 
point, the public accounts had been kept in accordance with the Treasury Instructions of 1847-1849. 
Lefroy had requested additional assistance in 1871, but was refused and "told that it was not 
considered necessary to keep the accounts as formerly" (Report WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 6). In early 
1880 Lefroy had written to the Governor regarding "the unsatisfactory manner in which I considered 
the Public Accounts were kept" (Report WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 7). Lefroy again applied for the 
assistance of a book-keeper and, although this had been granted, no suitable person had been found.  
79 This first Parliamentary session of 1881 (21 March to 7 April 1881) was intended principally to 
consider a railway loan. New members included the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Gifford, and the 
new Attorney General, A. C. Onslow. The second, longer session was 25 July to 16 September 1881. 
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9.3 THE AUDIT BILL 1880: OFFICIAL REFUSAL FROM BRITAIN 
 
In the final week of the first Parliamentary session in 1881, on 4 April, Governor 
Robinson advised the Speaker and the Legislative Council that the Secretary of State 
had approved his decision to withhold assent to the Audit Bill (WA, LC, April 4, 
1881, p. 126). Copies of the public correspondence were provided, including the 
Secretary of State's letter of 19 February regarding the Audit Bill, the Memorial and 
the other supporting documents (Appendix 9: Kimberley to Robinson, 19 February 
1881. WA, LC, April 4, 1881, pp. 128-129). These made it very clear that Governor 
Robinson's views on the matter were supported by Britain. The Secretary of State 
confirmed that appointing the Auditor General as an independent officer of 
Parliament in a representative government would conflict with the governor's 
constitutional power to appoint and remove all public officers. An independent 
Auditor General could not be permitted as it "would not be in accordance with 
constitutional precedents"; the Secretary of State was, consequently, "unable to 
accede to the Memorial forwarded to me by the Legislative Council" (Kimberley to 
Robinson, 19 February 1881. WA, LC, April 4, 1881, pp. 128-129).  
 
There was no time remaining in this Parliamentary session for members to discuss 
the failure of the Audit Bill to pass into law. However, there was intense and ongoing 
analysis in the local and wider press, indicating how seriously the matter was 
considered by the general public. The Inquirer recognised the Secretary of State's 
decision as fully confirming and justifying its own assessment ((1881, April 6). The 
Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 2). The advice that the Secretary of State 
approved of Governor Robinson's conduct regarding the independence of the Auditor 
General was reported in early April 1881 in at least seven separate newspapers in 
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania ((1881, April 6): The 
Argus (Melbourne), p. 6; The Sydney Morning Herald (NSW) p. 6; South Australian 
Register (Adelaide) p. 5. (1881, April 9): The Sydney Mail and New South Wales 
Advertiser (NSW), p. 591; The Australasian (Melbourne), p. 23; Adelaide Observer 
(SA), p. 30; The Mercury (Hobart), p. 3).  
 
Public attention also focussed on the fact that the Secretary of State had not referred 
to the concerns expressed in the Legislative Council's Memorial regarding the 
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government's ongoing practice of excess expenditure. The West Australian, in 
particular, expressed disappointment that the Secretary had not provided redress for 
the "serious grievance" of the people:  
 
that successive Governments had for years past spent thousands in 
excess of appropriation, and thousands in excess of revenue, and had 
practically assumed a position of perfect independence in regard to 
all control of the Council over their disbursements, which had 
resulted in serious financial embarrassment to the colony ((1881, 
April 8). The Governor's Despatch on the Audit Bill. The West 
Australian, p. 2). 
 
The omission, stated The West Australian, was the outcome of the "unfair and 
partizan [sic] manner of stating the case" adopted throughout Governor Robinson's 
correspondence, which had given the impression "that in reality no grievance exists" 
((1881, April 8). The Governor's Despatch on the Audit Bill. The West Australian, p. 
2). This allegation was refuted by The Herald, which declared the only people who 
considered the matter to be a grievance were those in the "extremely limited circle" 
of "the Audit party" and that everyone else found "the cry of the Audit party about 
the Legislative Council not having the powers possessed by legislative assemblies 
under responsible government as simply unreasonable" ((1881, April 16). The 
Herald, p. 2).  
 
The three major newspapers in Western Australia continued to criticise each other 
and promote their own viewpoints regarding the related topics of Executive 
expenditure, legislative control (or lack thereof), and the arguments for and against 
representative and responsible forms of government throughout April, May and June 
(in the interim before the second Parliamentary session of 1881 commenced). May 
1881 was particularly prolific, with literally pages of articles and letters in all 
newspapers with claims and counter-claims regarding the manner in which the public 
accounts and the annual estimates had been prepared over the past few years. Copies 
of correspondence discussing the matter between the Governor, Colonial Treasurer 
and Colonial Secretary were printed, along with the contents of despatches between 
the Governor and the Secretary of State, and between the Governor and Cockburn-
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Campbell, Editor of The West Australian (and also Chairman of Committees in the 
Legislative Council).80 
 
The public was also reminded of the necessity of Parliamentary control over 
government expenditure, described in The Argus as "Checks on Expenditure" 
essential to a satisfactory state of financial affairs: "In every constitution based upon 
the British model, the exercise by the representatives of the people of what is called 
the 'power of the purse' is regarded as a fundamental principle" ((1881, April 9). 
Scientific Finance. No. V. Checks on Expenditure. The Argus (Melbourne), p. 13). 
This article explained the history and roles of the British Exchequer, Treasury, House 
of Commons, PAC, and public sector audit. A synopsis was published by The West 
Australian a few weeks later, noting how "party considerations" meant "the control 
over expenditure is very imperfect" in Australian colonies, compared to the 
"jealous…and rigidly maintain[ed]…authority over expenditure" exercised in the 
House of Commons ((1881, April 26). The West Australian, p. 2). 
 
9.4 A QUESTION IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
 
At the end of May 1881, public attention again focussed on Western Australia's 
constitution and financial management processes with the news that a question had 
been asked about the alleged unconstitutional expenditure in the British House of 
Commons on 27 May 1881 (see Appendix 10). Such attention to a specific British 
colony in the House of Commons was unusual and telegraphic summaries of the 
event were published in Victoria and Queensland, as well as in The West Australian 
(Reuter's Telegrams. (1881, May 30). Unauthorised Expenditures by Western 
Australia. The Argus (Melbourne), p. 5; (1881, June 3). The Brisbane Courier (Qld.), 
p. 2); Associated Press. (1881, June 3). The Finances of Western Australia. The West 
Australian, p. 3). The complete text of the question and answer were published in 
Western Australia on 12 June, after receipt of the relevant issue of the London Times 
                                                 
80 The fracas became so heated that Cockburn-Campbell issued a summons against the proprietors of 
The Inquirer for publishing an alleged libel against him in connection with an article on public 
account keeping and audit: this too became a topic of great interest and reported widely across 
Australia (see, for example, (1881, June 6). The Age (Melbourne), p. 3; (1881, June 11). Adelaide 
Observer (SA), p. 39). When the case was heard, the jury found the defendants guilty and they were 
fined £50 in lieu of imprisonment. The entire proceedings were, naturally, published in The West 
Australian ((1881, July 12). Supreme Court—Criminal Sittings. The West Australian, p. 2). 
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((1881, June 12). The West Australian, p. 2). In short, the Under Secretary of State 
for the Colonies was asked if the Colonial Office had received "remonstrances" about 
unconstitutional expenditure in Western Australia. The response was that the 
Colonial Office had indeed received a Memorial regarding the Audit Bill 1880 from 
the Legislative Council of Western Australia in September 1880:  
 
in which Address the Council represented that the control of the 
Legislature over the public purse has been merely nominal, and not 
real, as the present constitution of the Colony contemplates. They 
further stated that during the past 10 years some £160,000 has, in 
fact, been expended over and above the sums submitted to vote in 
the annual Estimates.…The Secretary of State is now considering 
this matter, and proposes to issue such instructions as may remove, 
as far as practicable, the irregularity of spending money without the 
previously obtained authority of the Legislature. Her Majesty's 
Government are confident that they will have the full co-operation of 
the Governor in securing the legitimate control of the Legislature 
over the Public Expenditure. (UK, HC, May 27, 1881, vol. 261. cc. 
1453-4) [emphasis added] 
 
The South Australian Advertiser described the matter as "a little triumph" for the 
Western Australian Legislative Council, as the "efficacy of Parliamentary pressure in 
such matters is well known, and a little such has been brought to bear upon the 
Colonial Office with a very good result" (Our Own Correspondent. (1881, June 16). 
Our West Australian Letter. The South Australian Advertiser (Adelaide), p. 6).  
 
It is not clear who or what prompted the question to be asked in the British 
Parliament but there were many people in London socially connected with members 
of the Legislative Council in Western Australia. Locally, The West Australian 
suggested the political lobbying in Britain had been prompted by the "apparently 
complete indifference" of the original reply from the Secretary of State to the 
Memorial of the Legislative Council ((1881, June 3). Occasional Notes. The West 
Australian, p. 2). The Herald certainly believed it was the work of "the Audit party", 
mischievously attempting to throw "odium on the present administration and 
obliging the Colonial Office at home to act where it might be otherwise indisposed to 
do anything" ((1881, July 30). The Herald, p. 2). The Herald's Editor was 
particularly indignant because the news had negatively affected the interest charged 
upon the colony's current loan. Had the question not been asked, "the financial 
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difficulties of the colony, such as they are, would have attracted no notice outside the 
colony nor would any enquiry have been made about them" ((1881, July 30). The 
Herald, p. 2).81  
 
Perhaps in light of this British attention on Western Australian finances, and perhaps 
also in an attempt to reduce public criticism of the government's financial 
management processes, Governor Robinson requested the Finance Commission in 
early June to inspect the Treasury Department and advise him if the new system was 
operating effectively. The Commission's response, dated 11 June 1881, reported that 
it was. "We think that it is now possible, from the books at present kept in the 
Treasury, to arrive without difficulty or delay at a clear perception of the Financial 
position of the Colony" (Report WAPP 1881 no. 15, p. 12). Governor Robinson 
wrote to the Secretary of State on 22 June 1881 providing information on Western 
Australia's overdrafts, the Report of the Finance Commission and a draft Bill based 
on the Commission's recommendations (see Appendix 11). Robinson advised that he 
had already introduced the new system into the Treasury and Audit departments 
where it appeared to be operating well. He then authorised this letter, and the 
Commission's Report, to be published in the Government Gazette—thus openly 
declaring his firm control of the situation.  
 
Governor Robinson's decision to publish the Report was judged by The West 
Australian as "somewhat surprising", as the Commission's finding that it was "now 
possible" to obtain "a clear position of the Financial position" was "extremely 
suggestive"; that "nothing could—in polite terms—be more condemnatory of the 
past" ((1881, June 24). Occasional Notes. The West Australian, p. 3). In a subsequent 
article, The West Australian argued the Commission's Report in fact justified the 
actions taken in 1880 in regard to the expenditure of public money and account 
keeping (((1881, August 2). The West Australian, p. 2). A similar case was made in 
The South Australian, adding that the "decided action" of the Legislative Council 
"may lead to a stoppage of the lax system which has hitherto prevailed":  
 
                                                 
81 The Editor appears to have missed the point that there should not have been any "financial 
difficulties" in the first place, let alone the fact that the loan lender was also quite entitled to know the 
potential risk of their own investment in the colony. 
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The Government has at last become thoroughly alive to the scandal 
of this state of things, and has obtained a competent accountant from 
the National Bank, a new set of books have been opened, and the 
accounts of the colony will probably in the future be kept in a very 
different way from what they have been in the past. (Our Own 
Correspondent. (1881, August 18). Our West Australian Letter. The 
South Australian Advertiser (Adelaide), p. 5) 
 
9.4.1 Second Legislative Council session (25 July-16 September 1881) 
 
Governor Robinson's opening speech on 25 July 1881 for the second Parliamentary 
session of 1881 included official notification of his receipt of the Finance 
Commission's Report and the advice that he would be submitting a Bill to the 
Legislative Council based on its recommendations. He was certain the Bill would 
"satisfy the wish of Your Honorable Council to see the Regulations of the Treasury 
and Audit Department [sic] embodied in legal form", and that the new system had 
"already been brought into successful operation" (WA, LC, July 25, 1881, p. 137).  
 
Robinson also provided the letter he had received from the Secretary of State 
responding to the Legislative Council's Memorial. Dated 3 June 1881, just a few 
days after the question about Western Australia's finances had been asked in the 
House of Commons, this letter confirms that it was the question being asked in the 
British Parliament that had led the Secretary of State and Colonial Office to revisit 
their first official response (that they were "unable to accede" to the request in the 
Legislative Council's Memorial). This correspondence and the proposed new 
instructions were revealed to the Legislative Council and published a few days later 
in The West Australian (key extracts only) and in The Herald (in full) ((1881, July 
29). The West Australian, p. 2; (1881, July 30). Correspondence upon the Questions 
of Over-Expenditure and the Control of the Legislature over the Public Finances. The 
Herald, p. 1S) (see Appendix 11).  
 
The Secretary of State noted he had not commented on the complaint by the 
Legislative Council "that practically there is no restraint on unauthorized 
expenditure; in support of which they adduced figures showing the expenditure in 
excess of the appropriations during the years 1877, 1878, and 1879" ((1881, July 30). 
The Herald, p. 1S). Although he did not doubt Robinson's endeavours to prevent 
178 
unauthorised expenditure, he found it "impossible to deny that the procedure of the 
Colonial Government during past years has been open to exception in this respect" 
((1881, July 30). The Herald, p. 1S). Further, he disagreed completely with 
Robinson's claim that "the Governor's sense of right, and his responsibility to the 
Secretary of State, furnish as ample security against excessive or improper 
expenditure as would…an Audit Act", stating: 
 
It would be a dereliction of duty on their part [the Legislative 
Council's] to relax their vigilance in discharging this important 
function in reliance upon such supervision as the Secretary of State 
may be able to give, which, from the distance and the impossibility 
of thoroughly understanding local details, must necessarily be 
imperfect. ((1881, July 30). The Herald, p. 1S) 
 
Governor Robinson was requested to report on the steps that could be taken "for the 
purpose of regulating and extending the control of the Legislature over the Public 
Finance" and was prompted with three "desirable" suggestions: providing greater 
details in the annual estimates; having the Legislative Council appoint a Committee 
of Public Accounts (a PAC) to examine all questions of expenditure; and providing 
prompt information to the Legislative Council "on the Financial Proposals of the 
Government and the details of the Revenue and Expenditure of the Colony" ((1881, 
July 30). The Herald, p. 1S). 
 
Governor Robinson's response to the Secretary of State (dated 15 July; also 
published in the local press) agreed that the Legislative Council held "both the right 
and the responsibility of controlling the public expenditure" and to all three 
recommendations (Appendix 11; (1881, July 30). The Herald, p. 1S). Robinson 
advised that future estimates would include more details, that the Legislative Council 
already did appoint an annual Select Committee to examine over-expenditure but he 
would now provide for a formal committee in the new Audit Bill and, finally, his 
belief that the government did keep "the Council well supplied with information on 
financial subjects…and certainly the members themselves have not failed to make 
use of their undoubted right and privilege to demand it" ((1881, July 30). The 
Herald, p. 1S). 
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The West Australian reported that the Secretary of State's directions supported the 
Legislature's actions in 1880 "to promote such measures as would ensure that the 
control of the people's representatives over the expenditure of public money should 
be real, and not merely nominal" ((1881, July 29). The West Australian, p. 2). The 
governor was criticised for not admitting the justness of the ongoing complaints over 
excess expenditure earlier, and for not cooperating with the Legislative Council  
 
in securing for it that "effectual control over the public finance" 
which the SECRETARY OF STATE declares it is both the right and 
the duty of the representatives of the people to insist upon. As it is, 
an expression of readiness to meet the wishes of the Council, penned 
after the receipt of definite instructions to that effect, is not a matter 
for very much gratitude. ((1881, July 29). The West Australian, p. 2) 
 
Conversely, The Herald agreed with Governor Robinson that the right of controlling 
the expenditure of public money had "never been disputed by any administration nor 
ever been denied by himself"; and argued the Secretary of State had not changed his 
views regarding the unconstitutional strategy of the Audit party ((1881, July 30). The 
Herald, p. 2). The Inquirer criticised The West Australian for omitting to publish the 
sections of Governor Robinson's correspondence that justified his actions, calling it 
an "ingenious, though contemptible attempt to misrepresent the action of the 
Governor" ((1881, August 3). The Inquirer, p. 2). In South Australia, the despatch 
was reported as having been received with "great satisfaction" and as "rather a 
triumph for the Council, because the Governor had in all his despatches to the 
Secretary of State given His Lordship distinctly to understand that the Government 
had in reality not been in any way to blame" (Our Own Correspondent. (1881, 
August 18). Our West Australian Letter. The South Australian Advertiser (Adelaide), 
p. 5). 
 
9.5 THE AUDIT BILL 1881 
 
Referring to Governor Robinson's opening speech and the announcement that he 
would be presenting a Bill containing new Treasury and Audit regulations, Lee 
Steere observed in the Legislative Council that if the Bill did not contain a "means 
for enabling the Legislature to exercise an efficient control over the issuing of public 
money out of the Treasury, [it] will be utterly worthless" (WA, LC, July 26, 1881, p. 
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149). He intended to bring forward another Audit Bill himself, identical to the one 
presented in 1880 but "with those clauses struck out which the Secretary of State 
says he cannot permit to be enforced under the present constitution"—that is, the 
clauses related to the independence of the Auditor General (WA, LC, July 26, 1881, 
p. 149). If this amended Audit Bill was not sufficient to obtain Legislative Council 
control over the public expenditure, then "the only course open for us will be to 
introduce certain clauses into the Appropriation Act…, for the Appropriation Act, at 
any rate, is a, measure which is not likely to be vetoed" (WA, LC, July 26, 1881, p. 
150).82 The Herald interpreted Lee Steere's comments as a threat to the government 
but also contended he had "greatly reduced his demands" and his supporters would 
agree to an Audit Bill "with anything the Governor likes to concede to them. They 
have failed…with the Secretary of State and they will now gladly accept what they 
can get ((1881, July 30). The Herald, p. 2). 
 
The first reading of Governor Robinson's new Audit Bill 1881 occurred on 8 August 
1881; the second on 12 August. The Colonial Secretary noted that although the topic 
had "convulsed political circles in this Colony for a considerable period", he hoped 
the present Bill would allay any ill-feeling and place "the system of keeping and 
auditing the public accounts on a safe, efficient, and unassailable basis" (WA, LC, 
August 12, 1881, p. 236). The Audit Bill 1881 mandated the use of double-entry 
accounting and, in an important change to the Auditor General's role, transferred the 
responsibility for account keeping and preparing financial statements from the 
Auditor General to the Treasurer. Although the Audit Bill 1881 did not contain any 
measures for making the Auditor General independent of the Executive or 
responsible to the Parliament, Clause 12 did empower the Legislative Council:  
 
from time to time to nominate four of its unofficial members as a 
Committee, whose duty it would be to advise the Governor, when 
required, during the recess, on questions of public expenditure, and 
no vote of money was to be exceeded, or unauthorised expenditure 
incurred, until the Government had invited the opinion of this 
Committee in respect of such expenditure….More power was given 
to the Legislature, through its Committee, under this clause, than 
was really given to assemblies under Responsible Government. 
(WA, LC, August 12, 1881, p. 236) 
                                                 
82 Lee Steere did not bring forward another Audit Bill, instead supporting the legislation proposed by 
Governor Robinson (after amendments made in the Legislative Council). 
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In emergencies, the governor could incur unauthorised expenditure contrary to the 
Committee's advice but he would be required to advise the Legislative Council of the 
full circumstances at the first opportunity. Lee Steere was not impressed, describing 
the Bill as "nothing more than a mere skeleton" and the inclusion of Clause 12 as a 
weak mechanism "for preventing the unauthorised expenditure of the public money" 
(WA, LC, August 12, 1881, p. 237). Clause 12 required strengthening if it was to 
provide the Committee with "that power which it ought to have":  
 
they should be consulted before the votes have been expended, and 
be informed whenever any vote was being spent faster than it ought 
to be, so as to enable them to assist the Governor in putting a check 
upon it, in time. The clause should also provide that this Committee 
should be elected at the commencement of each Session, and not 
"from time to time". (WA, LC, August 12, 1881, p. 238)  
 
The Audit Bill 1881 was referred to a Select Committee, chaired by Lee Steere, for 
consideration. Several newspapers outside Western Australia reported the next day 
from their local correspondent that "the Audit Bill introduced by the Government is 
likely to give general satisfaction in the House" ((1881, August 13). The Argus 
(Melbourne), p. 8; Adelaide Observer (SA), p. 29; The Australasian (Melbourne), p. 
21; Evening Journal (Adelaide), p. 2; South Australian Register (Adelaide), p. 5). 
More detail published a few days later reported that while the Audit Bill 1881 had 
"found popular favour generally", the government opponents showed resistance and 
contended that the Finance Committee's "appointment and existence…should be 
directed by the Council absolutely" ((1881, August 19). Evening Journal (Adelaide), 
p. 3; South Australian Register (Adelaide), p. 5. (1881, August 20). The Australasian 
(Melbourne), p. 15; Adelaide Observer (SA), p. 28. (1881, August 25). Launceston 
Examiner (Tas.), p. 3. (1881, August 27). The Tasmanian (Tas.), p. 815. (1881, 
August 29). The Mercury (Hobart), p. 3). The West Australian favourably compared 
the functions of the proposed Committee with the Standing PAC in the House of 
Commons. However, it considered the regulations defining the Auditor General's 
duties and responsibilities to be "very sketchy" and that they should be 
 
strictly defined by law, so that he may be placed in a position of 
independence. It is clear that when he is acting simply under 
instructions, emanating from the Executive power, he is not in an 
independent position. But if he is acting under statute law, so long as 
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he keeps within that law, he is entirely protected against any 
interferences. ((1881, August 12). The West Australian, p. 2) 
 
The Herald argued that the proposed Committee provided nothing "to satisfy the 
ambition of the Audit party or keep down expenditure", that it would be "useless for 
checking Governors of the dangerous type…[and], under Governors of the ordinary 
type, might as well not exist" ((1881, August 20). The Herald, p. 2). The Inquirer 
considered the Audit Bill to be a "shadowy, undefined piece of nonsense" (W.A. 
Punch. (1881, August 17). Our Corner for Punch. The Inquirer, p. 2S).  
 
The Report of the Select Committee reviewing the Audit Bill 1881, printed on 5 
September 1881, made several amendments and recommended six new clauses 
providing more detailed definitions of the duties of the Auditor General and 
Treasurer (Report WAPP 1881 no. A9). There had been a difference of opinion 
regarding the retention of Clause 12 (the Committee of Advice). The Colonial 
Secretary, the Attorney General and elected members Lee Steere and Septimus Burt 
were in favour of retention whereas elected members Maitland Brown and William 
Marmion were against. The reasons for and against retention were not included in the 
Report but evidently a compromise had been reached, for the Committee was 
"unanimously of opinion that the clause, if retained, should be amended as hereafter 
mentioned" (Report WAPP 1881 no. A9, p. 3). These recommended amendments 
provided for the Committee members to be elected by ballot, to continue after the 
dissolution of the Legislative Council until a fresh Committee was elected, and to 
give their opinion in writing (including any dissent).  
 
The amended Audit Bill 1881 was considered by the Legislative Council on 8 
September 1881. The first 11 clauses, concerning the way public accounts were to be 
kept and audited and the preparation of financial returns, were agreed to without 
discussion. Then, despite the Report's alleged consensus, Brown moved for the 
amended Clause 12 to be struck out and was seconded by Marmion. Brown and 
Marmion argued that "there was a greater guarantee, as regards economy in the 
public expenditure, in the responsibility of the Governor to the Secretary of State, 
than would be ensured by the appointment of this board of advice", and that it would 
be awkward for the Legislative Council to oppose any excess expenditure if it had 
183 
been previously sanctioned by the Committee (WA, LC, September 8, 1881, pp. 
430–431).  
 
Support for retaining Clause 12 was expressed by elected member Stephen Parker 
because it appeared to be the first step towards responsible government and therefore 
"the first step towards making the Governor of the Colony, who, under the present 
Constitution, was also its prime minister, responsible to that House and to the 
country as regards the expenditure of public money" (WA, LC, September 8, 1881, 
p. 433). Lee Steere also supported retention, describing the amended Clause 12 as an 
important step "that would give them as great a control over the public finance as 
they could possibly expect under the present constitution" (WA, LC, September 8, 
1881, p. 435). While it would not prevent future excess bills, these would be much 
smaller. Lee Steere further believed the Committee members would feel a deep sense 
of their responsibility to guard the privileges of the Legislative Council and that the 
country would look to them "to protect it from any unnecessary expenditure of the 
public funds" (WA, LC, September 8, 1881, p. 435). 
 
The vote for retaining Clause 12 was easily won (11 votes to five) and the remainder 
of the Audit Bill 1881 agreed to with only minor amendments and little discussion 
(WA, LC, September 8, 1881, p. 436). The Audit Bill 1881 was passed on 14 
September 1881. In his speech proroguing the Parliamentary session two days later, 
Governor Robinson noted his pleasure that the Audit Bill 1881 had been approved, 
nevertheless he had reserved it for the Secretary of State to make the final decision 
due to his "considerable interest in this matter" (WA, LC, September 16, 1881, pp. 
495-496). 
 
The West Australian expressed surprise that Governor Robinson had reserved a 
decision, arguing that the Secretary of State would not be overly concerned now the 
matter had been agreed by both the Governor and the Legislative Council. However, 
the Editor also pointed out the reservation would have the effect of freeing "the 
Government from the intervention of the new Committee of Finance for another 
year" ((1880, September 21). The West Australian, p. 3). Such a suggestion was 
"contemptible", according to The Inquirer ((1880, September 21). The Inquirer, p. 
2). The Herald noted the Audit Bill 1881 had "little or nothing in common with Mr. 
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Steere's bill of last year" and did not give the Legislative Council "a tittle of the 
power which the Audit party sought for it" as it did not contain any measure for 
Auditor General independence ((1881, September 24). The Herald, p. 2). 
 
The one element of this original Audit bill, without which only a 
year ago Mr. Steere and his supporters affirmed that it would be 
worthless, is wholly absent from the present bill, nor has the 
Legislature one atom of power to control expenditure which it has 
not always possessed. The Governor is merely receiving a council of 
advice whom he can consult if he likes and whose advice he may 
take or reject as he pleases. ((1881, September 24). The Herald, p. 3)  
 
Crown assent was provided on 29 June 1882 and notified to the Legislative Council 
on 24 August 1882, when the provisions came into effect. Finally, Western Australia 
had its own public sector audit legislation: 46 Vic., No. 1—Audit Act 1881 (WA). An 
Act to provide for the more effectual Keeping and Auditing of the Public Accounts). 
The Audit Act 1881 did not include provisions for an independent Auditor General. 
That was not to occur until Western Australia was finally granted responsible 
government, with the passage of 54 Vic., No. 12—The Audit Act 1891 (WA). 
However, the new regulations for keeping accounts do appear to have made it 
quicker and easier to determine the financial state of the colony. The Appropriation 
Bill for 1882 was presented with a slight change to the preamble. The usual wording 
that the sum appropriated was to be issued and applied "for the service of the year" 
had been amended to state that the money was authorised to be expended "for such 
services as shall come in course of payment during the year" (WA, LC, September 
13, 1881, p. 458). The Colonial Secretary explained that this amendment had been 
made "in order to secure a simplification of the public accounts, and to afford a 
greater check upon the expenditure made in the course of the year", and the Bill was 
passed (WA, LC, September 13, 1881, p. 458). Only a few weeks later, The Herald 
commended the Treasury and Audit departments for providing the quarterly return of 
revenue and expenditure within three weeks, compared to almost seven weeks taken 





9.6 THE AUDIT ACT 1881 (WA): IMMEDIATE EFFECTS  
 
9.6.1 Excess expenditure and the Committee of Advice 
 
Excess bills continued to be presented to the Legislative Council each year but the 
size significantly decreased (see Figure 7.1, Chapter 7, and Appendix 8). In the nine 
years following the introduction of the Audit Act 1881 (1881-1889), the proportion of 
excess expenditure to estimated expenditure equated to a very low average of just 
1.5% per year. In comparison, the preceding decade (1871-1880, following the 
introduction of representative government) had an annual average of 12.4% which 
was only marginally less that the 12.7% annual average of the prior six years (1865-
1870).  
 
This extraordinary reduction was primarily due to the recommencement, in 1880, of 
the Executive presenting the Legislative Council with annual Supplementary 
Estimate bills.83 These bills enabled the Legislative Council to consider the 
appropriateness and necessity of the proposed expenditure prior to it actually 
occurring. Excess bills, of course, were presented after the expenditure had occurred 
and, as pointed out in so many Parliamentary speeches and newspaper articles, there 
was little the Legislative Council could do except provide their retrospective 
approval and trust the Executive's assurances that such expenditure without their 
approval would not happen again. There can be little doubt that recommencing this 
process for gaining Parliamentary approval of expenditure resulted from the 
measures taken by the Legislative Council in 1880 and 1881 and its increasing 
pressure on the Executive regarding control over expenditure, even though the 
debates around the Supplementary Estimate bills did not include specific references 
to the Audit Act 1881. The Executive's stronger efforts to comply with the Legislative 
right to control expenditure is shown by the striking difference in its approach when 
presenting these Supplementary Estimate bills in 1880 and 1881, as described below. 
 
                                                 
83 The practice of presenting a Supplementary Estimate bill, approximately two-thirds of the way 
through each financial year, enabled a better estimation of expected expenditure prior to it being 
incurred and so minimised the amount needing to be authorised via retrospective excess bills. They 
had not been used in Western Australia since 1856, a few years after excess bills had begun to be 
regularly presented to the Legislative Council. 
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The Colonial Secretary reinstated the practice in September 1880 and, rather bluntly, 
informed the Legislative Council that the Supplementary Estimate Bill was presented 
because the original estimate had been inadequate and the government needed more 
funds to get through the financial year. The Bill was eventually passed, but the 
Colonial Secretary's apparently arrogant attitude in seeking approval for the 
additional expenditure certainly contributed to the antagonistic debate over the Audit 
Bill 1880 and to the Parliamentary decision to refuse consideration of the Excess Bill 
also presented in that session (discussed earlier). The following year, in contrast, the 
introduction of a Supplementary Estimate Bill in 1882 was accompanied by the 
Colonial Secretary's very careful explanation that 
 
this Supplementary Estimate must not be regarded in the light of an 
Excess Bill, for it was nothing of the kind. The Government had not 
actually expended the votes which they now asked the House to 
sanction; but it was found that the sums appropriated last Session for 
certain departments would be inadequate to meet the expenditure 
which it would be necessary to incur in connection with these 
departments before the end of the financial year; and, the 
Government foreseeing this, came frankly before the House and 
asked it to sanction the increased expenditure which had become 
necessary. (WA, LC, August 1, 1882, p. 49) 
 
The Excess Bill 1879 was a matter of unfinished business from the 1880 
Parliamentary session, when the Legislative Council had refused to pass it. It was 
brought forward again in August 1881 and passed with the inclusion of a statement 
protesting against expenditure of public money without Legislative Council sanction. 
Similarly, the Excess Bill 1880 was passed after noting the incorrectness of 
expenditure without reference to the Legislative Council. Supplementary Estimates 
for 1881 were also passed.  
 
It is also evident that after 1880 the Legislative Council scrutinised all finance bills 
very closely to ensure their compliance with the Audit Act 1881 and members were 
quite willing to use their newly acquired constitutional power to question and amend 
them. It was also necessary, as it became evident that the Audit Act 1881 provisions 
were taking some time to filter through into new procedures. Evidence of both this 
close scrutiny and slow implementation is found in the passage of the Excess Bill 
1881 presented to the Legislative Council in August 1882 (WA, LC, August 15, 
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1882, p. 141). The Report of the Select Committee appointed to consider the Excess 
Bill 1881 identified serious concerns, including that the Auditor General himself did 
not fully understand that the requirement in the Audit Act 1881 for his audit to 
ascertain the legitimacy of expenditure meant he now had to determine if expenditure 
authorised by the Governor or Colonial Secretary had also been approved by 
Parliament. The Committee had found "certain amounts" which it thought should 
have been queried by the Auditor General but he had "informed them, to their 
surprise, and without any beating about the bush, that if he saw the Governor's and 
the Colonial Secretary's names to a warrant, he considered he was relieved from all 
responsibility in the matter" (WA, LC, August 31, 1882, p. 253). The Select 
Committee reported it believed that 
 
the Auditor General is primarily responsible for each charge covered 
by a warrant being a legitimate one, and that he cannot be held 
excused for any improper expenditure, unless he makes a special 
report to the Governor and Colonial Secretary in accordance with the 
provisions of the Audit Act. (WA, LC, August 31, 1882, p. 253) 
 
The Colonial Secretary readily agreed with Select Committee's conclusions in 
regards to "the Auditor General, and his duty to examine into all charges of 
expenditure" and advised that "he should certainly bring the matter under the notice 
of that officer" (WA, LC, August 31, 1882, p. 253). Even though the Auditor General 
was still subordinate to the Colonial Secretary, this event demonstrates that the 
Legislative Council was now able to provide some direction and control. 
 
In the Parliamentary session of 1883, the Excess Bill 1882 came under close scrutiny 
and it became apparent that neither the Treasurer nor the Auditor General had 
provided the full details regarding Excess expenditure as required under the Audit 
Act 1881. The Treasurer had provided the annual statement of revenue and 
expenditure, showing whether such expenditure was under or in excess of the 
amounts authorised by the Legislative Council, but the Audit Act 1881 s. 13 also 
required "that if the expenditure should be in excess of the amount appropriated, the 
Treasurer shall state the authority under which such excess was disbursed. This had 
not been done" (WA, LC, July 30, 1883, p. 100). Further, the Auditor General, in his 
annual report, "had omitted to do almost everything he was required by law to do 
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under the Audit Act" (WA, LC, July 30, 1883, p. 100). Both returns were promptly 
submitted after the omission was pointed out in the Legislative Council (WA, LC, 
August 8, 1883, p. 188). 
 
The first Committee of Advice was appointed by ballot on 4 September 1882, just 
over two weeks after the Audit Act 1881 officially came into operation (on 24 August 
1882) (WA, LC, September 4, 1882, p. 278). In 1883, it became apparent that Excess 
expenditure had occurred without the legislatively required reference to the 
Committee (WA, LC, July 30, 1883, p. 100). S. H. Parker expressed his frustration 
that Western Australia was still being denied its proper constitutional control of 
expenditure despite possessing both a representative government and the Audit Act 
1881. This failure "to put an end to illegal expenditure", he claimed, was clear proof 
of the need for responsible government and he moved for the entire Excess Bill 1882 
to be rejected (WA, LC, July 30, 1883, p. 100). The Colonial Secretary explained 
that the expenditure in question had been incurred in the three months prior to the 
Audit Act 1881 coming into force and the subsequent appointment of the Committee 
of Advice. There was considerable debate on the motion for rejecting the Excess Bill 
1882 but it was ultimately defeated. Parker then moved for the Excess Bill 1882 to be 
amended by excising the specific items that had been spent without consultation, and 
spoke at length regarding the necessity of the government adhering strictly to the 
provisions of the Audit Act 1881 (WA, LC, August 1, 1883, pp. 118-126). Having 
made the constitutional point, Parker then withdrew this second motion and the 
Excess Bill 1882 was passed.  
 
By 1884, matters regarding excess expenditure appeared to be operating much more 
effectively. The Excess Bill 1883 presented to the Legislative Council in mid-1884 
equated to just one per cent of the total appropriations for 1883 (see Figure 7.1, 
Chapter 7, and Appendix 8). Indeed, the Colonial Secretary advised the Legislative 
Council that the sum involved was equivalent to less than one per cent of the 
revenue, that every item had been before the Committee of Advice appointed under 
the Audit Act 1881 and that the Committee's minute book was "on the table, and 
subject to the scrutiny of any hon. member" (WA, LC, July 21, 1884, p. 28). Given 
the evident care and attention that had been provided to ensuring the proper 
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procedures were followed, the subsequent passage of the Excess Bill 1883 progressed 
smoothly. 
 
9.6.2 Control of loan money 
 
The Legislative Council sought to gain the same control over the expenditure of loan 
funds as it possessed in respect to appropriations. The Loan Bill 1881 was presented 
to the Legislative Council in March 1881 and an attempt was made to insert an 
additional clause requiring funds raised under the loan to "be annually submitted to 
the Council for their approval and confirmation" (WA, LC, March 30, 1881, p. 111). 
There was lengthy argument over its inclusion. Eventually the Legislative Council 
agreed to omit the clause when Governor Robinson promised to implement a 
separate Bill to provide "that control over loan expenditure which you desire, without 
at the same time paralysing the action of the Government, and causing public 
inconvenience and delay" (WA, LC, April 5, 1881, p. 130). In August 1881, 
Governor Robinson recommended implementing a process of annually tabling loan 
estimates, as practised in South Australia. Lee Steere provided additional information 
regarding the practice undertaken in the other colonies, sourced from the recently 
tabled Report of the Controller and Auditor General in New Zealand (Fitzgerald, 
1881).84 The Legislative Council readily agreed to the proposal and requested 
Robinson to introduce legislation that would ensure the practice continued (WA, LC, 
August 31, 1881, p. 361-363).  
 
In late September 1882, another Loan Bill was presented to the Legislative Council 
and Lee Steere moved to include a clause almost identical to that of the previous 
year. He reminded the Legislative Council of the events in 1881 and pointed out the 
promised separate measure providing Legislative control over loan funds had not yet 
been introduced (WA, LC, September 19, 1882, p. 413). The amendment was 
defeated. Lee Steere promptly introduced a Loan Control Bill 1882 and an Address 
to the Governor, requesting him to inform the Secretary of State that the Legislative 
Council had found it necessary to pass the new legislation as "it possesses no control 
                                                 
84 The Report did strongly criticise the practice of excess spending with retrospective legislative 
approval, considering it diminished Parliamentary control over public finances as "a Ministry must but 
be exceptionally weak which fails to obtain the necessary sanction to past expenditures" (Fitzgerald, 
1881, p. 156).  
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over the expenditure of Public Monies raised by Loan" (WA, LC, September 23, 
1882, pp. 467-468). Further, the Address sought clarification from the Secretary of 
State that "all monies paid into the Treasury, whether the proceeds of loans or 
otherwise, should be considered as public monies" and, thus, should  
 
be issued and applied in accordance with, and subject to the 
provisions of The Audit Act, 1881, that being the only statutory 
enactment which at present gives the Legislature any control over 
the expenditure of Public Moneys; there being some doubt whether 
the Act in question is applicable to moneys raised by Loan. (WA, 
LC, September 23, 1882, pp. 467-468) 
 
This Loan Control Bill passed quickly through Parliament and was reserved by 
Governor Robinson for the Secretary of State, becoming 46 Vic., No. 25—Loan 
Control Act 1882 (WA). The relatively smooth passage of this new legislation was 
quite different to the turmoil produced with the audit legislation, demonstrating the 
new power of the Legislative Council over Executive expenditure. Loan Estimates 
bills were presented to the Legislative Council in subsequent years. 
 
A further example of the increased Legislative control over expenditure post-1880 
occurred in August 1883. Elected representative Thomas Carey noticed that three 
clerks in the Survey Department had been placed "under the head of 'wages and 
expenses', instead of appearing upon the clerical staff; and the same incongruities 
were apparent in other portions of the Estimates" (WA, LC, September 23, 1882, pp. 
467-468). Carey then moved a resolution that "the Estimates for each department of 
the public service, for 1884, and in future years, shall be so framed that each item 
will appear under its proper heading" (WA, LC, September 23, 1882, pp. 467-468). 
The Colonial Secretary assured Carey that the problem would be resolved in this and 
in future Estimates, and suggested that Carey might, therefore, withdraw the motion. 
Carey's refusal was simply: "It's a very innocent little motion, and I see no necessity 
for withdrawing it. I think we ought to know what we are voting money for" (WA, 
LC, September 23, 1882, pp. 467-468). The message was clear. Elected members did 
not intend to cede any of their hard fought-for right to the "power of the purse" and 
the motion passed without further comment. 
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9.7 THE AUDIT ACT 1891 (WA): RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 
 
Western Australia finally gained responsible government in October 1890, following 
a successful motion brought in the Legislative Council in July 1887, a draft 
constitution bill considered in 1888 and a public election in January 1889 (de Garis, 
1981b). The provisions of the enabling legislation, 52 Vic., no. 23—Constitution Act 
1889 (WA), implemented the requirements of the Australian Constitutions Act 1850 
(Imp.) and established a bicameral Parliament (Lumb, 1991). Sections 64 and 65 
empowered the Legislature to appropriate funds from the consolidated revenue for 
the public service, subject to review and audit as per the Audit Act 1881. Further, 
sections 71 and 74 vested the appointment to almost all public offices in the 
Governor in Council, and of officers liable to retire on political grounds in the 
governor alone, thereby "implicitly" recognising the "doctrine of responsible 
government" (Lumb, 1991, p. 38).  
 
The first Western Australian Parliamentary session with two Houses met on 30 
December 1890 and one of the very first actions was to implement new audit 
legislation that significantly strengthened the independence of the Auditor General. 
In his opening speech, on the second sitting day of the session, Governor Robinson 
advised both Houses that an Audit Bill would "be submitted to you for approval, 
based on similar Acts in force elsewhere, which will place the Auditor General in a 
position responsible to the Government and Legislature" (WA, LC, January 20, 
1891, p. 7). It is unlikely that this topic would have received such urgency and focus 
had it not been for the events of 1880 and 1881.  
 
The audit legislation (54 Vic., No. 12—The Audit Act 1891 (WA): An Act to amend 
the Law relating to the Receipt, Custody, and Issue of the Public Moneys, the Audit 
of the Public Accounts, and the Protection and Recovery of the Public Property) was 
modelled on legislation enacted in other Australian colonies and, in all respects 
except the salary provisions for the Auditor General, adhered to "the general colonial 
model for audit legislation" (Di Francesco, 1999, p. 54). The Auditor General of 
Western Australia held office during good behaviour and removal was only possible 
on the request of both Houses of Parliament, although the governor could suspend 
the Auditor General for inability or misbehaviour and remove from office with the 
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agreement of the Legislature. The Auditor General was excluded from membership 
of the Parliament and the Executive Council, provided an annual report to Parliament 
directly, not via the Treasurer, and could make recommendations in that annual 
report "upon all matters relating to the Public Accounts" (Audit Act 1891, s. 41). The 
new legislation also repealed both the original Audit Act 1881 and the Loan Control 
Act 1882. It abolished the Finance Committee implemented under the Audit Act 
1881, thereby placing "all the responsibility connected with the expenditure of the 
public moneys on the shoulders of the Ministry, or the Government of the day" (WA, 
LA, February 6, 1891, p. 168).  
 
In regards to expenditure above the agreed appropriations, the Bill originally did not 
provide for the Auditor General to consider if the moneys payable were legally 
available and applicable to the proposed purposes. When that omission was pointed 
out during the second reading, and justified as being included in Audit Acts of other 
jurisdictions, new clauses providing that check (sections 10 and 11) were added in 
during the Select Committee stage (Report WAPP 1890/91 no. A2). The 
commitment of the Executive and the Parliament to legislative control of public 
expenditure is again evident in the lack of comment made on the Bill or the 
amendments in either House, and in the prompt assent by Governor Robinson on 26 
February 1891 (WA, LC, February 6, 1891, p. 442).  
 
The local press was pleased about the inclusion in the Audit Act 1891 of "a really 
valuable clause" ensuring that "all proposals for large public works should be open to 
the unfettered consideration of both Houses of Parliament…in the shape of special 
estimates" ((1891, February 21). The West Australian, p. 3). This clause was 
recognised as a clear "victory" for the Legislative Council as it created a precedent 
ensuring "that no loan monies shall be expended, except in works of very minor 
importance, without the sanction of the Council first being obtained" ((1891, 
February 28). The Loan. Victorian Express (Geraldton), p. 4). Otherwise there was 
little newspaper coverage beyond noting that it was one of four "highly important 
bills" passed in the session (the others being the Loan Bill, Scab Act Amendment Bill 
and the South Western Railway Bill), "whilst the Estimates were got through with 
wonderful celerity" (Le Flaneur. (1891, February 28). Men and Things. The Daily 
News, p. 3).  
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Later articles indicate the new Audit Act 1891 operated effectively. For example, in 
April 1891 the government was congratulated on the prompt publication of the 
quarterly returns of revenue and expenditure, proving that "a good system is in force 
and that it is well carried out" (although it was the Treasury that received the credit) 
((1891, April 17). General News. The Inquirer and Commercial News, p. 5). The 
legislation also operated effectively in preventing excess expenditure. In August 
1891 it was reported that the government had been prevented from agreeing to a 
request for substantial funding from the City Council because of the Audit Act 1891, 
even if it had been willing "to take the responsibility of anticipating a vote of 
Parliament" ((1891, August 11). The Perth Municipality. The Daily News, p. 3). 
Similarly, in October 1891, an editorial in The West Australian commented that 
although large sums appeared to be accumulating in the Treasury, the government 
could no longer spend in "advance what money it may please them, and afterwards 
as a matter of course to make it straight with Parliament":  
 
The Ministry has no more power to expend this money than has any 
one of their anonymous assailants. For what they receive from the 
country they must account to Parliament, and before they spend it 
they must first apply for and obtain legislative sanction. ((1891, 
October 30). The West Australian, p. 4) 
 
A further effect of implementing the Audit Act 1891 was that it provided an 
opportunity for the government to remove the current Auditor General, Courthope, 
arguing that they wished him to "be relieved from the onerous duties—more onerous 
than under the former Government—which would devolve upon the Auditor General 
under the Audit Act" (WA, LA, February 20, 1891, p. 347). Courthope was able to 
turn this pressure to his advantage by negotiating for an increased pension in return 
for tendering his resignation.85 The decision about providing the pension was put to 
the Legislative Assembly during the debate on Supplementary Estimates for 1891: 
 
However, members had it entirely in their own hands. If they did not 
sanction this increase of pension, this officer would be appointed to 
the new position; but, if they were prepared to vote this amount, then 
the office would be reorganised and placed under the control of 
another officer. (WA, LA, February 20, 1891, p. 347) 
                                                 
85 It was noted earlier that Courthope had commenced in the Audit Office as a clerk in mid-1847, and 
appointed Auditor General in 1872. 
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The item was agreed to and on 1 August 1891 Frederick Spencer commenced as 
Auditor General. There was little press comment on the manner of Courthope's 
retirement after over four decades in the Audit Office, or concerning the appointment 
of Spencer, indicating a general public and political acceptance of the transition. 
 
As noted above, the Audit Act 1891 empowered the Auditor General to report 
directly to Parliament. This provision was one of the most powerful tools for the 
Parliament in their oversight of public finances and an opportunity to use that tool 
was not long in arriving. The second annual report of the Auditor General, submitted 
to Parliament on 23 May 1893, contained allegations about the way that government 
stores and goods were being managed in the Railways and Works Department. The 
Legislative Assembly reacted to this advice by appointing a Select Committee to 
inquire into the charges (WA, LA, July 13, 1893, pp. 68-72). This Committee's 
Report was extensive and ultimately agreed that the Auditor General's 
recommendations for improving management processes should be implemented 
(Report WAPP 1893 no. A27).  
 
In April the following year, Governor Robinson appointed a Royal Commission to 
inquire into the organisation of the entire public service. The First Progress Report 
of the Civil Service Commission, tabled 2 October 1894, included the results of the 
attention paid to the Auditor General's Department which was identified as being 
"under the immediate control of the Colonial Secretary" (Report WAPP 1894 no. 21, 
p. iii). The Commission found that "the Auditor General was a conscientious, 
zealous, and painstaking officer, and that he had a fairly efficient staff of 
subordinates" (Report WAPP 1894 no. 21, p. iv). Despite the Audit Department 
being under the Colonial Secretary's control, the extensive evidence provided by the 
Auditor General demonstrated a very clear understanding of the independence 
provided by the Audit Act 1891 (WA), with statements such as the following: 
 
 "I am a Parliamentary officer, and my duty lies in administering the law as I 
find it....If Parliament is not satisfied with the way things are done, it does not 
matter whether I am satisfied or not" (Report WAPP 1894 no. 21, p. 8). 
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 "So long as I have the honour to be Auditor General, I shall strive to protect 
the interest of the colonial chest, which is also the interest of the public" 
(Report WAPP 1894 no. 21, p. 14). 
 
 "The Estimates are the basis of accounts, and as soon as the Estimates are 
passed by Parliament they are law, and no expenditure can take place unless 
covered by specific votes of the Legislature or special Executive Council 
approval, to be subsequently ratified by Parliament" (Report WAPP 1894 no. 
21, p. 14).  
 
 "The law provides that what is sanctioned by the Governor-in-Council must 
be sanctioned by the Auditor General" (Report WAPP 1894 no. 21, p. 41). 
 
9.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
 
The Audit Act 1891 remained in operation until the federation of the Australian 
colonies, when the creation of the State of Western Australia in 1901 required new 
financial management legislation. The Audit Act 1904 (WA) repealed the Audit Act 
1891 and remained in operation, with various amendments, for over 80 years.86 The 
second reading debates for this legislation clearly expressed the intent to further 
strengthen Parliamentary control of finances and increase Auditor General 
independence from the Executive. The Colonial Treasurer declared that in drafting 
the new legislation he had "striven to lose sight of the fact" that "it is generally 
supposed that the object of the Treasurer is to hoodwink the Auditor General", 
instead acknowledging "the Audit Act…should be made so that it will be a 
protection to the citizens for all time" and that it should include protection from 
"interference on the part of Ministers": 
 
I have striven to give to Parliament a greater degree of control than it 
has had under the existing Act…to give Parliament as far as possible 
every power in the control of the public purse.  
 
We have taken away no jot or tittle of the Auditor General's power. 
On the contrary, we have given him the fullest powers, so that he 
                                                 
86 The Audit Act 1904 was amended by subsequent Audit Act Amendment Acts in 1927, 1957, 1965, 
1966, 1978 and 1984.  
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may carry out his duties absolutely to the best of his ability. He is 
still a servant of Parliament; he is still responsible to Parliament; he 
still has the right, which he has frequently exercised, to report to 
Parliament any differences of opinion which may arise between him 
and the Treasurer, who is practically responsible after all for the 
custody and the expenditure of the moneys of the State (WA, LA, 
August 6, 1903, pp. 396-400).  
 
Eventually the Audit Act 1904 was repealed by the Financial Administration and 
Audit Act 1985 (WA), which was itself replaced by the Auditor General Act 2006 
(WA) and which continued to strengthen the independence of the Auditor General. 
Today, the Parliament of Western Australia has declared: 
 
The Auditor General Act 2006 is ranked second out of the legislation 
in 10 jurisdictions—the Australian states and territories, the 
Commonwealth and New Zealand—for safeguarding the 
independence of the Auditor General due to its wide mandate and 
discretion. (WA, LC, August 25, 2016, p. 5238) 
 
This chapter has examined the evidence demonstrating the ongoing Parliamentary 
struggles in Western Australia for increased Legislative control over public 
expenditure from 1881 to 1904. The immediate political actions following the Audit 
Bill 1880, in both Western Australia and in Britain, were shown to have confirmed 
the Legislature's constitutional authority over public finance and the importance of 
Auditor General independence in maintaining that control. The effectiveness in 
reducing Excess expenditure, and the relative ease with which subsequent controls 
were achieved, was argued as being at least partly the result of the Parliamentary 
efforts in 1880. The passage of subsequent audit legislation in Western Australia 
shows that efforts to strengthen these controls continued into the twenty-first century. 
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Nineteenth-century British and colonial Australian Parliaments were able to 
introduce legislation transforming public sector audit from an administrative function 
of Executive government to an independent officer of Parliament. Public sector audit 
became a primary mechanism for strengthening the constitutional powers of 
Parliaments over Executive government expenditure.  
 
Focusing on the transition of the Auditor General's role in the nineteenth century 
British colony of Western Australia (the Swan River colony), this thesis contributes 
to the understanding of Auditor General independence by identifying why and how 
the Parliamentary struggle to gain an independent Auditor General was so hard 
fought and took so long. It was understood as a transfer of political power that 
increased government accountability requirements. How and why this transition 
occurred provides precedent—an essential guide in Australia's partially written 
constitution—firmly locating independent public sector audit as a core principle in 
Westminster-based constitutional arrangements.   
 
Through the analysis of new data identified in archival material, this thesis also 
provides what appears to be the first comprehensive research regarding the 
development of the Auditor General’s place in Western Australian government and 
its importance in relation to democratic accountability and public sector audit.  
 
10.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS 
 
The function and significance of the modern role of the Auditor General in 
Westminster-based democracies, as discussed in Chapter 1, provides the starting 
point of the research scope and generated the following questions of this thesis.  
 
1. Why did the principles of independent public sector audit 
come to be understood in the nineteenth century as a key 
accountability mechanism for democratic government?  
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2. How were those principles implemented in regard to the 
Auditor General’s role in Western Australia between 1829 and 
1891?  
 
The core purpose in raising these questions is to assist in understanding the 
importance of, and thereby strengthening, Auditor General independence. Yet these 
questions about how and why the role of the Auditor General came to be 
acknowledged as a significant accountability mechanism in democratic governance 
are identified in Chapter 2 as under-researched areas in the existing literature on 
public sector audit history, despite their value in providing constitutional precedent. 
 
A research paradigm and theoretical framework for addressing this oversight in the 
literature (discussed in Chapter 3) justify the adoption of a qualitative and inductive 
intellectual history in the theoretical tradition of the Sussex School, under-pinned by 
Westminster constitutional theory. A narrative approach is used to reconstruct the 
socio-political context of historical events. This effectively positions the historical 
narrative of the transformation of the Auditor General role in its own time and also 
enables the incorporation of a range of contextual prisms—economic, social, cultural 
and political factors—to increase understanding. The initial data collection phase 
uses archival research methods to create an extensive database preserving 
chronological connections; the second phase analyses the data to verify, triangulate 
and generate the findings that are synthesised as the historical narrative in the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 provide the contextual background for answering the question: 
why the concept of Auditor General independence became understood as a 
fundamental accountability mechanism. The evidence demonstrates the increasing 
understanding of the British Parliament that independent audit was an effective tool 
for controlling Executive government expenditure and, thereby, for strengthening the 
historical constitutional Parliamentary "power of the purse". In Chapter 4, the data 
are synthesised into a historical narrative of the ongoing power conflicts between the 
British Parliament and Executive government from the twelfth to nineteenth 
centuries for control of public finance. The contextual administrative framework in 
which British colonies operated in the nineteenth century, considered in Chapter 5, 
demonstrates the strengths and limitations of mechanisms used by the British 
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Parliament and Colonial Office to oversee and control colonial finances. Chapter 6 
analyses the applications of these mechanisms in the first British colony in Australia, 
New South Wales, in the decades immediately prior to the settlement of the Swan 
River colony in Western Australia.  
 
The operation of public sector audit in colonial Western Australia, and the 
constitutional battle to implement effective legislative control of government 
finances, is presented as a chronological narrative in Chapters 7-9. This case study 
answers the second thesis question: how the principles of Auditor General 
independence were implemented in the nineteenth century, demonstrating that it was 
a genuine political conflict over the transfer of power. The synthesised data 
informing the narrative clearly reveal that colonists increasingly understood the 
control of Executive government expenditure to be fundamentally linked to the 
constitutional status of the colony and the role of the Auditor General. Indeed, this 
theme occurs repeatedly from the very first year of operation of the colony's 
Parliamentary body (1832) and throughout the many decades before obtaining a fully 
responsible government in 1890. In particular, the political fight for providing 
legislated independence for the Auditor General in 1880 illustrates the intertwining 
of constitutional and public sector audit issues (Chapter 8). The effectiveness of 
public sector audit legislation in providing a check on Executive expenditure and the 
necessity of it being available to Parliament is confirmed by data found in excess 




It was posited in Chapter One that addressing the two primary research questions 
would enhance our understanding by: (1) identifying major themes in both Western 
Australian public sector audit practice and in Westminster constitutional 
development; (2) synthesising a new chronological and contextual narrative on the 
topic; and (3) generating a conceptual framework describing public sector audit 
independence. Summaries of these three areas of understanding, and their 




10.3.1 Major themes 
 
This contextual historical analysis has clearly identified some new and important 
themes in both Western Australian public sector audit practice and in Westminster 
constitutional development. Those themes include the finding that obtaining Auditor 
General independence was a difficult process as it required a transfer of power from 
the Executive to the Parliament. The legislative provision entailed multiple stages of 
constitutional change in Britain (Chapter 4) and its Australian colonies (Chapters 6-
9). Further, the transition was characterised by political resistance from the Executive 
at every stage, even though the fundamental constitutional right of the legislature to 
control public expenditure was acknowledged and alleged to be upheld by all parties 
involved.  
 
Ultimately, the connection of public sector audit with legislative power is 
incontestable (as discussed in Chapter 4 and demonstrated in the Western Australian 
historical context in Chapters 7-9). The implication is clear. Having fought so hard to 
obtain an independent Auditor General, Parliaments in a Westminster-based system 
must continue to support that independence if they wish to maintain the 
constitutional right of financial control. 
 
10.3.2 The new narrative 
 
The case study presented in Chapters 7-9 synthesised a new chronological and 
contextual narrative on the origins of Auditor General independence. A synopsis of 
this narrative is provided below. 
 
The management of government finances in the first British settlements in Australia 
was compromised, principally due to deficiencies in the instructions provided by 
Britain to the local government, some poor choices of key personnel and the 
unavoidable delays in account processing and checking due to the distances between 
settlements and Britain. Serious problems in financial administration occurred as a 
consequence. Clerical errors and even overt corruption were able to remain 
undetected for considerable periods. In response, various measures were gradually 
implemented by Britain throughout the first half of the nineteenth century to improve 
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its colonial financial management system. These measures included issuing 
comprehensive official instructions to governors, treasurers, collectors of revenue 
and commissariat officers, appointing colonial auditors to provide stronger local 
checks prior to submitting accounts to Britain, and strengthening the control already 
provided by cultural concepts of personal honour and integrity by enforcing the 
provision of security bonds and the requirement to personally repay incorrectly 
expended government funds. 
 
The early administrative system implemented in the British colony in Western 
Australia demonstrated reasonably sound financial management practices throughout 
the 1830s, largely due to the presence of clear and detailed instructions and 
transparent processes of cross-checking that included a local audit. Nevertheless, 
sound management of public finances by the colonial government was increasingly 
regarded as unsatisfactory by colonists. Even though strong local auditing controls 
were in place, the absence of a system of direct Parliamentary representation was 
held to be in breach of constitutional rights established over centuries of British 
history, notably Magna Carta and the Glorious Revolution. Western Australian 
colonists politically agitated for six decades to obtain representation in the local 
legislature and for responsible government, arguing that this was the rightful and 
effective way to obtain control over Executive expenditure. 
 
These demands were only answered slowly and incrementally by the Imperial and 
local Executive government. Non-representative government was in place until 1869, 
with only a limited non-official (nominee) membership provided from 1839 until 
1869. Appointing governor-nominated men as members of the Legislative Council 
was implemented to provide some level of control over Executive proposals for 
taxation and expenditure and was strengthened by Imperial requirements for the local 
approval of annual estimates of expenditure (appropriations) and for regular 
publication of audited income and expenditure statements. However, with the 
balance of voting power in Parliament held firmly by the Executive, there was little 
genuine control. Most notably, the practice of presenting the Legislative Council 
with Excess bills seeking the retrospective approval of expenditure became a regular 
occurrence. Consecutive governors continued to express their understanding that 
expenditure without Legislative Council approval was unconstitutional and that good 
202 
financial management was an essential function of government. Yet analysis of 
annual appropriation bills in Western Australia revealed that between 1852 and 1880, 
the Legislative Council was asked each year to retrospectively approve expenditure 
amounting to between 10% and 15% of the already authorised annual appropriation. 
In short, gaining nominee representation in the Legislative Council in 1839 was not 
sufficient to prevent the Executive from over-spending the approved appropriations.  
 
The growing concerns in Western Australia over government expenditure were a 
direct influence in popular demands for a representative, elected legislature. Finally 
achieved in 1870, in the first few years of representative government it did appear the 
Legislative Council would at last be able to control Executive expenditure. The 
evidence, however, shows that that expectation was short-lived. Calls for a fully 
responsible form of government were actively blocked by local and Imperial 
authorities. Therefore, elected representatives worked throughout the 1870s to 
implement other mechanisms in the Legislative Council for obtaining the desired 
financial control, including resolutions clarifying financial rights and responsibilities, 
Select Committees, Commissions of government, increases in the numbers of elected 
representatives and alterations in administrative processes. None proved effective in 
obtaining the constitutional legislative control. Lip service continued to be given 
from the Executive agreeing with the principle that public money could not be 
expended without the approval of the legislature, and no cases of impropriety or 
corruption were identified. Yet annual government expenditure continued to exceed 
the appropriated sums, incorrect statements of revenue and expenditure continued to 
be presented (and then later adjusted), clear pictures of actual financial positions and 
debts were not possible and conflict between the government and elected 
representatives in the Legislative Council became more intense. 
 
In 1880, elected representatives combined efforts to introduce and pass the Audit Bill 
1880 (WA), including two clauses to place the Auditor General as an officer of 
Parliament, and which was intended to place a limit on Executive expenditure of 
funds not included in annual appropriations. The passage of the Bill was fought 
against by the Executive every step of the way, with a range of arguments and 
delaying tactics. The Governor refused to provide assent and recommended the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to also refuse assent, arguing that existing 
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processes and controls were sufficient. The Secretary of State affirmed that, in 
Western Australia's representative government constitution, appointing the Auditor 
General as an independent officer of Parliament would conflict with the governor's 
constitutional power to appoint and remove all public officers and was not 
permissible. However, a lack of comment about the ongoing over-expenditure above 
the approved appropriations prompted a question to be asked in the House of 
Commons in May 1881, and the Secretary of State subsequently issued clear 
statements supporting the Legislative Council's right and responsibility to control 
public expenditure.  
 
This Imperial support, combined with the damning report of a government 
Commission that conclusively found the existing financial management 
arrangements were not satisfactory, generated the implementation of the Audit Act 
1881 (WA). Presented by the Governor, this legislation did not include an 
independent Auditor General but it did provide for a Finance Committee of Advice 
as a mechanism for ensuring legislative approval of expenditure (resisted by 
government members) and much stronger regulations for administrative 
management. Thereafter, the proportion of over-expenditure to approved 
appropriations dramatically decreased. Elected representatives continued to face 
opposition in applying their constitutional right to approve expenditure, such as in 
regard to the issue of loan funds, but increased legislative control over expenditure 
post-1880 is evident. 
 
From the late 1880s it became clear that Western Australia would be granted 
responsible government. This formally occurred in October 1890 with the passage of 
the Constitution Act 1889 (WA). Implementing new audit legislation that 
significantly strengthened the independence of the Auditor General was one of the 
very first actions undertaken by the first Parliament with two Houses (the Audit Act 
1891 (WA)). It is unlikely that such urgency and focus on the part of the Executive 
would have occurred without the events of 1880 and 1881 and the subsequent 
watchful actions of the elected representatives. The independence of the Auditor 
General was incrementally strengthened and the powers extended from then on, 
although literature examining government actions since then has shown that the 
principles must be constantly defended. 
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10.3.3 The new conceptual framework 
 
The new narrative describing the implementation of Auditor General independence 
in Western Australia forms the basis of the conceptual framework about its 
constitutional origins. Gaining that independence was not a smooth process of 
legislative evolution. The Executive and the Parliament did not work together to 
ensure the best possible financial management outcomes in accordance with British 
historical precedent. Even though all parties appear to have genuinely believed they 
were working for the public good and, as noted before, there is no evidence of wilful 
misconduct or corruption, there was fundamental conflict over who held financial 
control. The constitutional principle was actively tested and Parliamentary attempts 
to strengthen legislative control were aggressively blocked despite the historical 
precedent. Each step increasing legislative financial control was achieved only after 
much effort: comprehensive financial management instructions that clearly 
established responsibilities; nominee representation; representative government; 
responsible government; an independent Auditor General. 
 
The fact that this conflict has been overlooked as an area of research to date signifies 
that it is at risk of being forgotten. There is a danger in assuming the historical 
transition to Auditor General independence happened smoothly, as any diminishment 
of Auditor General independence may not be recognised as a loss of hard-fought for 
constitutional privilege, or even acknowledged as a loss of power. The implication is 
that Parliaments must remember they overcame constant resistance to ensure their 





The principal limitation in this thesis was the necessary restriction to one jurisdiction 
in a specific time frame (colonial Western Australia), although some brief references 
were made to relevant events in other colonies in Australia and non-Australian 
jurisdictions including North America, Canada and New Zealand. Within this tight 
constraint, an adequate contextual background to the narrative of events was 
attempted by analysing the history of public sector audit in both Britain's constitution 
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and colonial administration and in the foundational years of government 
administration in the original British colony in Australia, New South Wales. While it 
is acknowledged that this thesis provides only a very small window into the much 
larger fields of public sector audit history, public administration and the 
Parliamentary and constitutional histories of Britain and Australia, the findings are 
informative and may prove to be useful for researchers in these and other areas. 
 
The search for answers to the research questions was initially limited to the history of 
public sector audit and it was only after identifying connections with other fields, 
particularly constitutional law, that the importance of the findings was fully 
identified. The linkage of these otherwise diverse fields via analysis of just one 
common factor—public sector audit—has revealed new information not found in 
other research in these fields, and extending the research into other physical and 
legislative jurisdictions would further strengthen the findings. 
 
The historical nature of this thesis generated further restrictions, in that available 
approaches were inevitably limited. Other qualitative research methods, such as 
interviews, questionnaires or direct observation, were not possible. Additional 
limitations were generated by the amount of available data. The abundant sources 
and accessibility of stable, permanent data were disadvantages in the sense that 
archival research in the available time frame could not possibly claim to have 
identified all potential data pertinent to the research. It is also self-evident that the 
data were generated not for the purposes of this thesis but for their original 
administrative and/or political aims, and that the viewpoints expressed in the data 
were not representative of the general population but of a small cohort largely 
comprised of literate, British, socially and politically elite men. These aspects of the 
data in themselves, however, did provide evidence of the era being studied—a key 
principle of the Sussex School approach of positioning the historical narrative in its 
own time.  
 
The design strategy of capturing identified data in a chronological database proved to 
be an effective method for managing the substantial collection in later analysis. The 
risks of observer bias and interpreter errors were minimised by the size of the 
database and careful transcription of data without amendment. The wide range of 
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sources provided multiplicities of available viewpoints that assisted in assuring data 
confidence and triangulation. Further, constant assessment and re-assessment of data 
validity and relevance ensured broad coverage and minimal bias.   
 
10.5 POSSIBLE AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
It is hoped that scholars will find this thesis useful in focussing future research on 
this important but generally overlooked area of interest: the constitutional 
significance of the origins of Auditor General independence to the present state of 
government accountability. The new narrative description of the development of 
audit independence in a Westminster jurisdiction provides a foundational 
understanding that may assist improvements in policy and legislative development, 
while adding to Australian and international discussion around this topic. 
 
As noted earlier, the findings here are limited to the Westminster-style democracies 
of Australia and Britain. An obvious area of future research would be to extend the 
analysis of the origins of Auditor General independence into other physical and 
legislative jurisdictions. There are more than 190 full members of INTOSAI, from 
Afghanistan and Albania to Yemen and Zimbabwe. Analysing the connection of 
public sector audit with political power in some of these areas, and comparing the 
findings with those identified here, may further clarify the constitutional place of the 
independent Auditor General. 
 
Parliaments often have a number of independent officers to assist them in their 
oversight of government accountability, in addition to the Auditor General. 
Ombudsmen, electoral commissioners and information/privacy commissioners are 
frequent examples. Analysis of the origins of these independent officers using the 
research model presented here could assist in protecting and strengthening the 
independence of their various positions.  
 
Further, the research here has examined the inter-relationships of independent public 
sector audit with political and constitutional histories. The combination of these 
otherwise separate areas of intellectual study has proven fertile in terms of generating 
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new insights; application of the research methodology demonstrated here to other 
fields of study may be similarly fruitful. 
 
Another intriguing area of interest that could only be touched upon relatively briefly 
was the apparent connection between the strengthening of Parliament's ability to take 
control of public finances and the extension of franchise privileges. The successful 
implementation of independent Auditors General in Britain and Australia appears to 
have occurred in connection with Parliaments becoming more truly representative of 
the general population. A similar qualitative and inductive history analysing why the 
public believed gaining political representation would enhance their ability to control 
government expenditure may reveal insights into shifts in voter understandings on 
other constitutional areas, for example, and perhaps a better understanding of the 
modern trend to voter disengagement.  
 
10.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The new narrative provided here gives an answer as to why the principles of 
independent public sector audit came to be recognised in the nineteenth century as a 
key accountability mechanism for democratic governance. It has been demonstrated 
that the implementation of Auditor General independence from Executive 
government in the nineteenth century was largely the result of a growing 
understanding by colonists and members of Parliament that this could be an effective 
strategy for strengthening Parliament's historical constitutional "power of the purse". 
Appointing the Colonial Auditor to verify, on behalf of the Parliament, that 
Executive government expenditure was in accordance with approved appropriations 
exercised the Parliamentary constitutional role as a guardian of public finance. 
 
It was noted in Chapter One that having an Auditor General with independence from 
the Executive government is a central proposition of modern public sector audit and 
government accountability. The findings here are the result of significant and 
comprehensive research regarding the origins of the Auditor General’s place in 
Western Australian government and its importance in relation to democratic 
accountability. This history is valuable for educators and policy-makers alike in 
terms of current public sector audit practice and government accountability. Much 
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more than a rectification of an absence in provincial historiography, this thesis 
provides a new narrative description of the development of audit independence in a 
Westminster-based jurisdiction—a foundational understanding that may inform 
improvements in policy and legislative development and which substantially adds to 
Australian and international discussion around the topic of the constitutional powers 
of Parliaments over Executive government expenditure and the necessity of 
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APPENDIX 2  EXAMPLES OF DOCUMENT TRANSCRIPTION 
 
The following figures provide examples of documents identified by archival research 
as containing potentially relevant data, and how they were transcribed into the thesis 
database. 
 
Example 1(a). Datum item: Microfilmed correspondence.  
Note. Example 1(a). Datum item: Microfilmed correspondence. 
Captured by digital scanning and saving as a PDF file. 
 
 
Example 1(b). Datum item: Microfilmed correspondence, after transcription 
and entry into database. 
16 Nov 1831 To Peter Brown Esqr, Secretary to Government 
Audit Office, 16 Nov 1831 
Sir, I beg to transmit you herewith for the 
information of His Excellency the Governor the 
contingent Account of the Colonial Hospital for the 
month of Nov 1830 to which I have attached a 
certificate agreeably to the instructions contained 
in your letter of the 28 ult. 







Cons 36, v.18, 
no. 163 
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Note. Example 2(a). Datum item: Newspaper article.  
Example of newspaper article retrieved from Trove. Identified data 
is in article is at top of left-hand column.  
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Example 3. Datum item found in three separate sources, after transcription and 
entry into database.  
 
Note. Example 3. Datum item found in three separate sources.  
Retrieved from Trove ((1847, July 10). The Perth Gazette and 
Western Australian Journal, p. 1; (1847, July 14). Inquirer, p. 2; 





Colonial Secretary’s Office, Perth, January 23, 1834. 
Notice is hereby given, that in future all Claims and 
Demands on the Colonial Government, which are not 
lodged for Examination with the Auditor on or before the 
5th of each Month, will not be ordered for Payment till the 
month following. 















Colonial Secretary’s Office, Perth, July 7, 1847 
His Excellency the Governor has been pleased to make the 
following appointments: 
Frantz Anthon. Didrich Christian Helmich, Esquire, to be 
Postmaster General, Perth, and  
Mr. Edward Lane Courthope, to be Clerk in the Office of 
the Colonial Auditor.  
By His Excellency’s command, 


















APPENDIX 3  KEY BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY ACTIONS 1100-1921 
 
Coding: In terms of Parliamentary attempts to increase its power over the Executive 
via control of public money, was the action:  
 Successful: eg Acts; improved/increased reporting to Parliament; independent 
auditing; appropriation/expenditure 
 Partially successful: eg Committee inquiries and reports recommending 
increased independence;  
 Limited: improved Treasury control of process (but did not increase power of 
Parliament); or 
 Failed: eg: failed bills; legislation that decreases Parliamentary control. 
 
Date Code Legislative title Description 
1118 Limited  Formation of the Exchequer. 
1215 Success Magna Carta Agreed to by King John. Establishes principle of no taxation 
without representation. 
1225 Success Magna Carta Parliament grants subsidy to Crown upon condition of 
Charter confirmation (Constitutional principle). 
1236 Partial  Parliament first mentioned in official legal record. 
1266 Limited 51 & 52 Hen. III, 
stat 5. 
Dictum of Kenilworth. Collectors of revenue required to 
account to treasurer in the Exchequer. 
1275 Limited 3 Edw. I, c.26 Extortion by Officers of the Crown. No sheriff or minister to 
take any reward to do their office. 
1285 Limited 13 Edw. I, c.11 Accountants Act 1285. Punishment for receivers of revenue, 
if auditors find them in arrears. 
1297 Success Magna Carta  King re-issues 1225 Charter in return for a new tax being 
granted (this version remains in statute today). 
1311 Success 5 Edw. II Ordinances of 1311. Revenue paid into Exchequer, not 
Crown household. Appoints permanent Exchequer auditors. 
1322 Failed  Ordinances of 1311 repealed, following rebellion (removes 
restrictions on Crown power).  
1340
- 41 
Success 14 Edw. III, c.3  Pardon of Crown Debts 1340. Crown permits audit of 
accounts by Parliamentary committee (in 1340 and 1341). 
1377 Success 1 Rich. II, c.5 Officers of the Exchequer 1377. Appoints two officers to 
receive / disburse war grants. Parliament's right to audit 
begins to be used regularly.  
1404 Success 6 Hen. IV, c.3 First fruits, petitions to the King, etc (cc.1-4). Appoints 
Commissioners to inquire into Exchequer accounts. 
1406 Success  House of Commons appoints auditors and demands regular 
accounts. 
1407 Success 9 Hen. IV?  Confirmation of liberties, charters, and statutes,…etc. 
Asserts principle: House of Commons issues money grants. 
1512
- 14 
Partial 4 Hen. VIII, c.18; 
6 Hen. VIII, c.24 
Surveyors of Crown lands, etc. (1512; 1514). Crown 
appoints Chief Auditors to take account of all things. 
1529 Failed 21 Hen. VIII, c.24 Release of Loans etc 1529. Parliament wipes out Crown's 
debts, 'loaned" to him 1522-28. 
1535
-36 
Limited 27 Hen. VIII, c.27 
28 Hen. VIII, c.11 
Court of Augmentations Act 1535; Tithe Act 1536. Improves 
Crown control over finances; establishes financial courts. 
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1541 Failed 33 Hen. VIII, c.39 Crown Debts Act 1541. Crown given priority for its debts 
before all other creditors. 
1543 Failed 35 Hen. VIII, c.12 Loans to the King Act 1543. Parliament wipes out Crown's 
debts (again). 
1552 Partial Failed bill House of Lords presents bill to make treasurers accountable. 
Not passed by Commons, on principle of 'prerogative'. 
1553 Success 1 Mary, sess. 2, 
c.10 
Dissolution of Certain Courts Act 1553. Crown's financial 
courts dissolved; control returned to Exchequer. 
1560 Success Letters patent Appointment of Auditors of the Imprest: establishes 
permanent system of audit. 
1610 Limited Failed bill House of Commons present bill to deny Crown subsidies 
without consent of Parliament. Rejected by House of Lords.  
1614 Limited James I House of Commons passes "unanimous vote denying the 
king's right of imposition". Refuses to grant subsidy "until 
this grievance should be redressed. James dissolved the 
Parliament" (Maitland, 1911, p. 259). 
1625 Success Charles I  Audits of appropriations first implemented (following 
accession of Charles I). 
1628 Success Petition of Right Crown assent given to prohibition of forced loans (to the 
Crown) without the consent of Parliament.  
1629 Failed Charles I House of Commons refuses to vote taxation. Parliament 
dismissed (not resumed until 1640). 
1640 Limited Short Parliament 13 Apr-5 May 1640. Parliament queries Crown request for 
funds; is dissolved.  
1641 Partial Long Parliament 
(Nov 1640—Dec 
1660). 
Triennial Act 1641: maximum three years between 
Parliaments. Parliament issues Grand Remonstrance 
repeating grievances, impeaches 12 bishops, attempts to 
impeach Queen. King enters Commons, attempts to arrest 
five MPs. Militia Act 1641: permits troops to be raised only 
under officers approved by Parliament. 
1642 Success 15 Sep 1642 
(Charles I) 
1st Civil War begins Aug (1642-46). Parliamentary 
ordinance appoints Navy Commissioners to examine and 
authorise all Navy accounts (over-ruling Crown). 
1643 Success 21 Sep 1643 
(Charles I) 
Ordinance for the due and orderly receiving and collecting 
of the King's…Revenue, and the arrears thereof. Parliament 
appoints Committee for the Revenue, to take all Crown 
revenues and use them as they decide.  
1644 Success 22 Feb 1644 
(Charles I) 
Ordinance for taking and receiving Accompts of the 
Kingdom. Parliament appoints Committee for Accounts. In 
July, passes Ordinance reinforcing Committee's powers. 
1645 Success 11 Sep 1645 
(Charles I) 
Ordinance appointing a Comptrol on the Office of Excise. 
Appoints a Comptroller of the Office of Excise, with salary, 
to keep accounts according to Parliament's instructions. 
1646 Success 14 Dec 1646 
(Charles I) 
Ordinance for justifying the Proceedings of Parliament. 
End of 1st Civil War. 
1647 Success 22 Feb 1647 
(Charles I) 
Ordinance concerning the Excise, with Additional 
Instructions for the better regulating the same. Formalises 
power of Parliament to collect excise for public use. 
" Success Dec 1647 Various ordinances for auditing, paying etc Army salaries 
(sorting out issues from 1st Civil War). 
" Success 8 Aug 1649 Act for taking Accompts belonging to Navy and Customs.  
" Success 15 Feb 1649 Act for Allowances to Sheriffs upon passing their Accompts. 
" Success 28 May 1649 Act for…Examining and stating the Accompts of the 
Officers and Soldiers now in the Parliament's service…. 
" Success 11 Oct 1649 Act for taking and receiving the Accompts of the 
Commonwealth, with Instructions concerning the same. 
1653 Success 7 Oct 1653 
(Cromwell) 
Act for Accounts and clearing of Public Debts and for 
discovering frauds or concealments of any thing due to the 
Commonwealth. Appoints seven commissioners.  
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1660 Failed Charles II 
(Restoration) 
Separation of Exchequer and Treasury. Treasury gained "the 
superintendence of financial affairs. The functions of the 
Exchequer became confined to the receipt of public money 
and to its lawful issue, to record and to audit. It merely 
controlled issue and even this task was performed 
inefficiently" (Chubb, 1952, pp. 12-13).  
" Partial Charles II House of Commons gains sole control of financial matters: 
Lords denied right to amend financial bills. 
1667 Success 19 & 20 Charles 
II, c.1 
Accounts of Public Moneys Act 1667. Parliament grants 
Crown a revenue for life (from customs and excise). 
Enforces principle that additional grants to the Crown 
should be appropriated and expenditure audited. 
1671 Success 13 Apr 1671 Parliamentary resolution: all supplies to the Crown are the 
sole gift of the House of Commons, which also has sole 
right to determine the purposes of such grants.  
1688 Success 1 Will and Mary, 
c.14 
Revenue Act 1688: An Act for preventing Doubts and 
Questions concerning the Collecting of the Public Revenue. 
" Success 1 Will and Mary, 
c.28 
Appropriation of Revenue Act 1688. Provides for portion of 
specified revenues to be appropriated and audited.  
" Success 1 Will and Mary, 
sess. 2, c.2  
Bill of Rights 
Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and 
Settling the Succession of the Crown. Limits power of 
Crown; establishes Parliamentary privilege. 
1689 Success 2 Will and Mary, 
c.1 
Crown and Parliament Recognition Act 1689. Secures 
regular appropriation. 
1690 Success 2 Will and Mary, 
sess. 2, c.11 
Public Accounts Act 1690: Act for Appointing and Enabling 
Commissioners to Examine Take and State the Public 
Accounts of the Kingdom. 
1691 Success  House of Commons conference with House of Lords to 
enforce their right to appoint auditors of accounts. 
1694 Success  Bank of England formed: a government bank. 
1695 Success 6 & 7 Will. III, 
c.9 
Public Accounts Act 1695. Names commissioners to take, 
examine and state the public accounts. 
1696 Success 8 & 9 Will. III, 
c.28 
Receipt of Exchequer Act 1696: for the better observation of 
the course anciently used in the Receipt of the Exchequer. 
Places obligation to ensure compliance on the Auditor of 
the Receipt, Clerk of the Pells and Tellers, rather than 
Treasury.  
1697 Success 9 Will. III, c.23 Civil List Act 1697. First time the annual amount assigned 
to the Crown (the Civil List) appears as statute. 
1698 Success 11 Will. III, c.8 Appoints Commissioners to sort out arrears in military pay 
and accounts. 
1701 Success 13 & 14 Will. III, 
c.1 
Debts Due to the Army, etc. Act 1701. Revives and 
continues the 1698 Act.  
1702 Success 1 Ann, c.4 Public Accounts Act 1702: for taking, examining and 
stating the public accounts of the kingdom. Limits power of 
Crown. 
1710 Success 9 Ann, c.18 Public Accounts Act 1710 
1711 Success 10 Ann, c.11 Public Accounts Act 1711 
1712 Success 13 Ann, c.3 Public Accounts Act 1712 
1716 Success 3 Geo. I, c.15 Estreats Act 1716 
1727 Limited House of Lords 
resolution 
House of Commons grants a sum to Crown for use in 
potential emergencies: Lords protest this is inconsistent 
with principle of supply only being granted for specific 
purposes.  
1730 Success 4 Geo. II, c.26 Proceedings in Courts of Justice Act 1730 (passed 1731) 
Requires English language and common characters to be 
used in all judicial proceedings. 
1732 Failed 6 Geo. II, c.6 Receipt of the Exchequer Act 1732. The Act that 
Proceedings shall be entered in English not to affect the 
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Receipt of Exchequer (not abolished until 1834). 
1732 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Recommends a survey of fees and emoluments payable in 
Courts of Justice. Implemented by Royal Commission.  
1734 Limited House of Lords 
resolution 
Protest by House of Lords against the Commons granting 
supply without specifying a purpose (without an estimate).   
1760 Partial Accession of 
George III. 
Crown surrenders management of royal domains in return 
for a fixed Civil List grant. However, also begins regular 
habit of overspending and exceeding Civil List, then 
applying to Parliament for additional funds. Parliament 
"accepted the premise that...the king's administration was 
his own affair and that it was 'not proper to require any 
account of the expenditure...unless money had been 
demanded of Parliament to pay debts'"(Chubb, 1952, p. 10). 
1780 Success 20 Geo. III, c.54 Audit of Public Accounts Act 1780. Supported in debate as a 
Constitutional right (referring to 1691 conference on right to 
appoint auditors). Appoints six commissioners to examine, 
take and state public accounts. Renewed annually (until 
1787). Issues 15 reports Nov 1780-Dec 1786.  
1782 Success 22 Geo. III, c.81 Paymaster General Act 1782. Abolishes practice of revenue 
collectors holding sums for long periods. 
" Success 22 Geo. III, c.82  Civil List and Secret Service Money Act 1782 (Burke's Civil 
Establishment Act). Increases independence of Parliament. 
Treasury given power over Civil List expenditure.  
1783 Partial 23 Geo. III, c.82 Act for establishing certain Regulations in the Receipt of the 
Exchequer. Abolishes outdated offices, personal receipt of 
fees and use of tallies in the Exchequer. Not effected until 
1826, upon death of the last Chamberlain.  
1785 Partial 25 Geo. III, c.19 Act for Appointing Commissioners to Enquire into the Fees, 
Gratuities…received in Public Offices. Issues 10 reports 
Apr 1786-Jun 1788.  
" Partial 25 Geo. III, c.52 
(also 25 Geo. III, 
c.68) 
Act for better examining and auditing the Public Accounts 
1785. Abolishes Auditors of the Imprest. Appoints five 
Commissioners for Auditing the Public Accounts (providing 
for regular audit, not irregular Parliamentary inquiries). 
Commissioners have some independence but report to 
Treasury. Issues 15 reports to Dec 1786 (see 13th, 1785). 
" Partial Finance 
Committee 
Commissioners for Examining Public Accounts: 13th 
Report. Recommends consolidating all public revenue 
accounts into one fund (implemented 1787) and introducing 
a simpler, uniform mode of account keeping. 
1786 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Public Income and Expenditure. 
Recommends establishing a general Fee Fund in Treasury, 
to collect all fees, gifts, etc. received in government offices. 
1787 Success 27 Geo. III, c.13 Customs and Excise Act 1787 (Consolidated Revenue). 
Creates one total consolidated fund. Obliges Treasury to 
annually lay accounts before Parliament.  
1791 Success Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Public Income and Expenditure 
(reports May). Compares public accounts for 1791 to those 
for 1786.  
1794 Partial 34 Geo. III, c.59 Audit of Public Accounts Act 1794. Extends powers of 
Audit Commissioners to Navy. 
1797 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Public Revenue and Expenditure. 
Issues 36 reports 1797-1803. Several reports focussing on 
resolving issues of fees (see 1786). 
1799 Partial 39 Geo. III, c.83 Auditors of Land Revenue Act 1799. Abolishes Auditors of 
Land Revenue; transfers duties to Audit Commissioners. 
1800 Partial 39 & 40 Geo. III, 
c.54 
Public Accountants Act 1800. Extends Audit Board powers 
for recovering funds from public accountants. Also charges 
interest on retained sums, to ensure rapid transfer. 
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" Partial 41 Geo. III, c.22 Expenditure in the West Indies Act 1800. Appoints five 
commissioners to examine public accounts of military "in 
the West Indies during Present War". Extended by 48 Geo. 
III, c. 91 (Accounts of Expenditure in West Indies Act 1808). 
1802 Success 42 Geo. III, c.70 Public Accounts Act 1802. Obliges Treasury to lay annual 
public accounts before Parliament.  
" Success Return: Public 
Income and 
Expenditure, 1802 
First Annual Finance Account published. Includes vote for 
Miscellaneous Civil Services: now to be provided by annual 
appropriations and estimates, not permanent charges. 
1803 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee to inquire and report on Civil List. Issues 
five reports: 1803, 1804, and another three before 1815. 
1805 Partial 45 Geo. III, c.55; 
91 
Auditing of Public Accounts Act 1805. Additional Board 
added to Audit commissioners (to manage backlog on army 
accounts from Napoleonic wars (Chester, 1981, p. 210). 
1806 Partial 46 Geo. III, c.141 Audit of Public Accounts Act 1806. Modifies Audit Board 
operations by separating comptroller of army accounts and 
auditor of public accounts. Appoints 10 commissioners for 
auditing public accounts. Not independent (reports to 
Treasury); only concerned with issue of funds.  
1807 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Committee on Regulations and Checks to Control Public 
Expenditure. Issues 13 reports 1807-1812: see 5th and 10th 
(both 1810).  
1810 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Committee on Public Expenditure: 5th Report—Audit of 
Public Accounts. Criticises account auditing system and 
provisions of 46 Geo. III, c.141. Notes Treasury control: 
Parliament is not informed of Board's findings, 
recommendations, or Treasury's reactions to these. 
Recommends a single Audit Board responsible for all 
accounts, and that Parliament should be annually informed 
of all salaries, emoluments and expenses in public offices. 
" Partial Finance 
Committee 
Committee on Public Expenditure: 10th Report. Follow-on 
from 5th Report. Notes several recommendations have been 
implemented, resulting in "considerable improvements", but 
that Latin and old numbering still being used. 
" Success 50 Geo. III, c.117 Public Salaries etc Act 1810. Accounts of public salaries to 
be annually laid before Parliament. 
1813 Success 53 Geo. III, c.86 Naval Compensations, etc Act 1813. Naval allowances to be 
annually laid before Parliament. 
" Partial 53 Geo. III, c.150 Audit of Accounts, etc. Act 1813…for removing delays in 
passing the Public Accounts; and for making New 
Arrangements for conducting the business of the Audit 
Office." Still under Treasury control. 
1814 Success 54 Geo. III, c.184 Accounts of Colonial Revenues Act 1814. Creates separate 
Colonial Audit Office to audit accounts of five colonies. 
Extended by various acts until made permanent in 1821. 
Applicable to NSW in 1822. Abolished 1832. 
1816 Success 56 Geo. III, c.46 Civil List Audit Act 1816. Civil list accounts to be audited 
(auditor appointed by Treasury). 
" Success 56 Geo. III, c.98 Consolidated Fund Act 1816. Creates one consolidated fund 
for all British and Irish public revenues. 
1817 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Committee on the Public Income and Expenditure…and 
measures for relief. Issues 16 reports 1817-1819. 
" Partial 57 Geo. III, c.84 Offices of Exchequer Act 1817. Treasury given 
administrative control of the Receipt of the Exchequer 
(implemented 1834). 
1819 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Finance. Appointed 1819. 5th Report: 
Audit Office (July). Refers to recommendations of 1810 
report; criticises lack of action implementing improved 
processes and continuing use of Latin etc. 
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1821 Partial 1 & 2 Geo. IV, 
c.121 
Commissariat Accounts Act 1821. Appoints three 
permanent Commissioners to examine colonial revenue 
accounts (under Treasury authority) (see 1814). Abolished 
1832. 
1822 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on mode of simplifying the Accounts laid 
Annually before Parliament. Notes these accounts are 
annually laid before Parliament, in accordance with 1802 
Act. Recommends new forms (implemented 1823). 
1823 Success  Introduction of annual balance sheets of income and 
expenditure (recommended by 1822 Committee). 
1826 Success   Exchequer and Treasury transition from using wooden 
tallies to written receipts. 
1828 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on State of Public Income and 
Expenditure, and on Establishing effectual control on 
charges incurred in its receipt, custody and application. 
Issues four reports in 1828.  
1829 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Commission on the Public Accounts: appointed to examine 
account keeping processes in the major departments (see 1st 
Report 1831). Focus on role of audit in securing 
conformance with appropriations. 
1830 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Commissioners of the Receipt and Expenditure of Malta, 
Gibralta, Australian Colonies and Mauritius. Issues four 
reports 1830-31. 
1831 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Commissioners of Public Accounts: 1st Report. 
Recommends Exchequer functions to be controlled by a 
new officer (implemented 1834: Comptroller-General of 
Exchequer). Recognises that effective Parliamentary control 
requires the House to examine annual accounts before 
voting the annual budget: calls for an independent 
committee (ie a PAC) to examine and report on annually 
accounts (followed-up 1846).  
1832 Success 2 Will. IV, c.1 Crown Lands Act 1832. Extends public sector audit to land 
revenues. 
" Success 2 & 3 Will. IV, 
c.26 
Colonial Audit Revenues Act 1832. Merges Colonial Audit 
Board into Commissioners for Public sector audit (see 1814; 
1821). 
" Success 2 & 3 Will. IV, 
c.40 
Admiralty Act 1832. Appropriation audit applied to Naval 
accounts and reported to Parliament. 
" Success 2 & 3 Will. IV, 
c.99 
Commissioners of Audit Act 1832. Commissioner of Public 
Accounts made responsible for auditing Irish public 
accounts. 
1834 Success 4 & 5 Will. IV, 
c.15 
Office of Receipt of Exchequer Act 1834. Implements 
recommendation of 1831 report to establish new, 
independent Office of Comptroller-General of the Receipt 
and Issue of the Exchequer (also see 1817). 
1837 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Accounts of Colonial Receipt and 
Expenditure. Reports with no recommendations. 
1844 Partial   Treasury memorandum tabled in Parliament, outlining 
functions and processes of its Commissariat department. 
1845 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Committee of Inquiry into System of Account and Audit. 6th 
Report: Preparation, Audit and Presentation to Parliament 
of Annual Accounts of the Naval and Military Departments. 
Recommends (a) extending appropriation audit to War 
Office and Ordnance; (b) Commissioners of Audit to 
examine accounts on behalf of Treasury and Parliament; 
with Treasury presenting the audit reports to Parliament. 
Implemented 1846. 
1845 Success Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Colonial Accounts. Extensive 
recommendations for improvements. Implemented in 
Treasury Instructions sent to all colonies by 1847. 
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1846 Success 9 & 10 Vic., c.92 Naval and Military Accounts Act 1846. Extends 
appropriation audit to War Office, Commissariat and 
Ordnance. 
" Success 9 & 10 Vic., c.116 Appropriation Act 1846. Amends Appropriation Act to 
permit virement only in Army and Navy services, and 
elsewhere only if absolutely necessary. 
1847 Success Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure: reviews 
classification of civil votes. Recommends that departments 
present separate estimates to Parliament (implemented 
1849). Issues two reports 1848; 1860. 
1848 Success House of 
Commons 
Resolution 
13 May 1848: "That this House cannot be the effectual 
guardian of the revenues of the State unless the whole 
amount of the taxes and the various other sources of income 
received from the public accounts be either paid in or 
accounted for to the Exchequer." 
1849 Limited Treasury Minute 
13 Apr 1849 
Audit Commissioners report (to Treasury). Recommend (a) 
repealing all conflicting / outdated legislation governing the 
Board's proceedings, and passing new Act; (b) improving 
Audit Office administrative processes (update forms; define 
accurate job duties; receive accounts monthly).  
1851 Success 14 & 15 Vic., c.42 Crown Lands Act 1851. Extends appropriation audit to 
departments of Woods and Forests, and Public Works. 
1854 Success 17 & 18 Vic., c.94 Public Revenue and Consolidated Fund Charges Act 1854. 
Requires all revenue departments to present estimates of 
expenditure costs. 
1857 Success Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Public Moneys (appointed 1856). 
Inquiry on how public money is received, issued and 
audited. Issues three reports (1856, 1857, 1857). Criticises 
the Exchequer control system (established 1834). 
Recommends extending appropriation audit to all revenue 
accounts and to civil services, and for Audit Board to report 
directly to Parliament. Implemented in 1886 Act. 
1860 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Miscellaneous Expenditure. Criticises 
current system as not all estimates are audited. Supports 
recommendations of 1857 Report. 
1861 Partial Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on Public Accounts. Criticises current 
system as not all accounts are independently audited. Issues 
five reports Apr-Jul 1861. 
" Success 24 & 25 Vic., c.93 Revenue Departments Accounts Act 1861 (assented 6 Aug). 
Extends appropriation audit to revenue departments. 
1862 Success Finance 
Committee (PAC) 
Standing Public Accounts Committee (PAC) established 
(April). Chair is always a member of Opposition. 
1863 Partial Treasury Minute 
27 Jan 1863 
Practice of virement further restricted. 
" Success Finance 
Committee (PAC) 
PAC: Advises the 1861 Committee recommendations have 
been implemented, but more steps on appropriation audits 
are needed. Issues two reports May-Jun 1863. 
1865 Success 28 & 29 Vic., c.93 Comptroller of the Exchequer, etc. Act 1865. Audit Board 
Chairman appointed as Comptroller-General of Exchequer.  
1866 Success 29 & 30 Vic., c.39 Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866. Establishes 
independent Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) to 
audit every appropriation account. 
1871 Partial Finance 
Committee (PAC) 
PAC: 6th Report (Jul). Notes no official action has been 
taken on their 1868 and 1869 recommendations that 
Treasury should inquire into extending the audit of Naval 
and Military Accounts by the CAG. Treasury agree to 
implement inquiry (in Minute 12 Aug 1871). PAC inquires 
again on progress in 1872, 1874 and 1875. See 1876. 
1873 Success Order in Council Order in Council passed 16 Jan, formally prescribing 
manner of keeping accounts (a requirement of E&AD Act 
247 
1866). (See Appendices in 1st PAC Report, Mar 1873.) 
1876 Partial Finance 
Committee (PAC) 
PAC: 3rd Report (Jun). Supports Treasury proposal 
extending CAG audit to Naval and Military accounts using 
a test audit process (Treasury Minute 20 Mar 1876). See 
1889. 
1888 Success Finance 
Committee (PAC) 
PAC: 2nd Report (Aug). Notes that if CAG, in course of 
audit, notes improper expenditure or waste, it is his duty to 
inform Parliament. 
1889 Success 52 & 53 Vic., c.31 Army and Navy Audit Act 1889. Extends CAG audit to 
naval and military accounts. 
1891 Success 54 & 55 Vic., c.24 Public Accounts and Charges Act 1891. Abolishes Office of 
Receiver-General of Inland Revenue; provides for 
appropriation and audit of Inland Revenue moneys.  
1903 Success Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on National Expenditure: Report (Jan). 
Includes evidence for Constitutional principle supporting 
Parliamentary control over finances. Recommends PAC 
should continue supporting CAG to scrutinise and report 
improper / wasteful expenditure (see 1888). Recommends 
HoC should set aside a full day each year to consider PAC 
reports (adopted in 1905, 1907, 1908 and 1910). 
1905 Success Finance 
Committee (PAC) 
PAC: 1st Report (May). Sets out Constitutional principle that 
only Parliament can alter existing system of financial 
control (not departmental Chief Accounting Officers).  
1912 Success Finance 
Committee 
First Estimates Committee established (first report July). 
Ceased with outbreak of war in 1914. 
1917 Success Finance 
Committee 
Select Committee on National Expenditure: Report. To 
examine current expenditure; make recommendations on 
public accounts. Operated Aug 1917-Dec 1920. 
1921 Success 11 & 12 Geo. V, 
c.52 
Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1921. An Act to 
amend the Exchequer and Audit Departments Acts 1866 and 
1889. Permits test audits.  
" Success Finance 
Committee 




APPENDIX 4  BRITISH COLONIES 1837 
 
This list provides additional insight into the enormity of the administrative task of 
managing the colonies. Reproduced (with original spellings) from its 1837 
publication, it identifies Britain's 39 "Colonial Possessions" at that time (only four of 
which were in Australia) (Glenelg, 1837, pp. vi-vii). It further shows the range of 
processes by which each colony had come under British control and the composition 
of the local government constitutional structures.  
 
"List of His Majesty's Colonial Possessions 1837" (Glenelg, 1837, pp. vi-vii). 
 
Colony Date of Capture, Cession or 
Settlement 
Whether having Legislative 
Assemblies or Councils 
Lower Canada Capitulation, 18 Sept. 1759 (& 
Cession by Treaty, 1763) 
Governor, Council & Assembly 
Upper Canada Capitulation, 8 Sept 1760 (& 
Cession by Treaty, 1763) 
ditto 
New Brunswick Fisheries & Settlements, established 
soon after discovery in 1497 
ditto 
Nova Scotia ditto 
Cape Breton ditto 
Prince Edward's Island ditto 
Newfoundland ditto 
Antigua Settlement, 1632 ditto 
Barbadoes ditto, 1605 ditto 
Dominica Ceded by France, 1763 ditto 
Grenada ditto, 1763 ditto 
Jamaica Capitulation, 1655 ditto 
Montserrat Settlement, 1632 ditto 
Nevis ditto, 1628 ditto 
St Kitts ditto, 1623 ditto 
St Lucia Capitulation, 22 June 1803 Governor & Council 
St Vincent Ceded by France, 1763 Governor, Council & Assembly 
Tobago ditto, 1763 ditto 
Tortola (Virgin Islands) Settlement, 1666 ditto 
Anguilla ditto, 1666 ditto 
Trinidad Capitulation, 18 Feb 1797 Governor & Council 
Bahamas Settlement, 1629 Governor, Council & Assembly 
Bermudas ditto, 1609 ditto 
British Guianaa (Demerara 
& Essequibo) 
Capitulation, 18 Sept 1803 Governor & the Honourable the 
Court of Policy 
British Guianaa (Berbice) ditto, 23 Sept. 1803 ditto 
Honduras Treaty, 1670 Superintendent & Magistrates 
Heligoland Capitulation, 4 Sept 1807 Governor 
Gibraltar ditto, 4 Aug 1704 ditto 
Malta & Gozo ditto, 5 Sept 1800 Governor & Council 
Cape of Good Hope ditto, 10 Jan 1806 ditto 
Sierra Leone Settlement, 1787 ditto 
Gambia ditto, 1631 ditto 
St Helena Settlement by East India Co. 1651; 
vested in the Crown 1833 
ditto 
Ceylon Capitulation, 17 Sept 1795 ditto 
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Mauritius ditto 3 Dec 1810 ditto 
New South Walesb Settlement, 1787 Governor & Council, & British 
Acts of Parliament 
Van Diemen's Land ditto 1803 ditto 
Western Australia ditto 1829 ditto 
Southern Australia ditto 1836 ditto 
 
Notes: 
a. The settlements of Demerary, Essequebo and Berbice were united 
into the one colony of British Guiana in 1831 (Colonial Office, 
1846, pp. 88-90). 
b. In 1837, when this list was compiled, New South Wales included 
the settlements that would later become the separate colonies of 




APPENDIX 5  COLONIAL ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS 1847 
 
The following information is a summary of the 49 new colonial accounting 
requirements implemented by the Imperial Treasury in 1847, as a result of the 19 
recommendations of the Select Committee on Colonial Accounts (1845), discussed 
in Chapter 5. The references at the end of each point refer to the original numbering 
of the Select Committee (SC) recommendation (Select Committee on Colonial 
Accounts, 1845, pp. iii-iv) and the subsequent Treasury Instruction (TI) (Treasury, 
1847, pp. 21-26). 
 
 Annual submission to Britain of annual estimates for all expected revenue (in 
gross, with no deductions) and expenditure on each service and charge, 
classified according to the same specific and detailed heads at every stage (SC 
1-5; TI 1-5, 21-25, 35-39, 42-44, 49). 
 Payment of gross revenues into the colonial chest with no deductions (SC 4; TI 
20). "This fundamental principle of all sound and satisfactory public 
accountancy, has been recommended by the Audit Board itself—has been 
approved by the Treasury, and laid down in the strongest terms by the 
Commissioners of Public Accounts" (UK, HC, April 1, 1845, vol. 78. cc. 1321-
31).  
 Fixed charges for salaries, allowances and office contingencies to be 
distinguished from all other charges (SC 6; TI 26-27, 29, 30-31, 33-34, 40). 
 Emergency expenditure, not included in the annual estimate, not to be included 
as "Unforeseen Charges" but to be made up (in the same way as the annual 
estimate) as a supplementary estimate and forwarded to Britain (SC 7; TI 6, 
28). 
 Annual estimates to also show, in a separate column under the same general 
heads, the actual receipt and expenditure of previous year. To be prepared by 
local Auditor immediately after close and examination of yearly accounts, 
showing differences (with explanation), and transmitted to the Audit Office via 
the Secretary of State and the Treasury (SC 8; TI 7).  
 Adoption of the double entry accounting system (SC 9; TI 8). 
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 A cash book, journal and ledger to be kept in all the colonies, with the various 
heads of receipt and expenditure matching those in the Estimates (SC 10; TI 9-
12). 
 Auditor empowered "at any and all reasonable times" (on application to 
Governor) to inspect the cash and other balances of the Treasurer and compare 
to the accounts (SC 11; TI 41, p. 25) (Treasury, 1847, p. 25).   
 A complete set of accounts, accompanied by the relevant estimates, to be sent 
by the Auditor to Britain within three months of the end of the year. Another 
complete set to remain in colony (SC 12-14; TI 7, 18-19, 45). 
 Queries about the colonial accounts, arising from their examination by the 
Imperial Board of Audit, to be replied to with one month of receipt (SC 15-17; 
TI 46-47).  
 Abstracts of colonial accounts, with the relevant estimates, to be annually 
presented to Parliament (SC 18; TI 45, 48). 
 The Audit Office to keep a systematic and complete record of examined 
colonial accounts so they can accurately report to Parliament (SC 19). 
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APPENDIX 6  INSTRUCTIONS TO COLONIAL AUDITOR 1826 
 
These instructions to the Colonial Auditor of New South Wales, dated 13 June 1826, 
were received by Governor Darling in February 1827 (Treasury to Auditor of 
Accounts in NSW, 13 June 1826. AO 16/44 (AJCP reel 1541, 1787-1826)). They are 
transcribed below from the handwritten original with original spelling and 
punctuation. The same despatch containing these instructions also contained separate 
instructions (of the same date) to the Agent, Treasurer and Governor of New South 
Wales detailing their individual responsibilities and the mode of accounting for 
revenue and expenditure, plus a set of ten template forms for recording and reporting 
on various aspects. Copies of several Royal Warrants for the approved annual 
expenditure for the government of New South Wales were also included in the 
package, respectively dated 10 October 1788, 10 October 1788-1790, and 1825. 
 
The Instructions to the Governor, and the covering letter, can also be found at 
Bathurst to Darling, 11 Aug 1826. HRA Series I, Vol. XII, pp. 483-493. 
 
Instructions to the Auditor of Accounts in the Colony of New South 
Wales 
 
1st. You will receive herewith a Copy of Our Instructions to the 
Treasurer of the Colony in regard to the Custody, disbursement and 
accounting for the Public Money, and you will be furnished with a 
Copy of Extracts from Our Instructions to the Governor of the 
Colony respecting the Revenue and Expenditure thereof with 
reference to which and to such further Regulations as may be from 
time to time Established. You will examine and report upon all 
Accounts, and abstracts that may be referred to you, in doing which 
you will be guided by the following general regulations subject to 
such particular directions as may be given you by the Governor. 
 
2nd. You will call upon all Colonial Officers accountable for the 
Receipt and Expenditure of Public Moneys, or Stores, to render to 
you the Accounts required by Our Instructions, or by the Colonial 
Regulations, and you will ensure that all transactions in which they 
are concerned are conducted in Conformity with those Instructions 
and Regulations. 
 
3rd. You are to require from all Persons where Accounts are 
rendered to you Copies of all Orders and Regulations, under which 
the duties of their respective Departments are carried on, and you are 
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to attend that all Public Monies, Bills, Stores, etc are duly brought to 
the Auditor of the Public. 
 
4th. When Accounts are sent to you for Examination you are to 
require the production of all necessary Explanatory documents, you 
are to examine the Computations and Castings, to compare each 
separate Abstract with the Vouchers accompanying the same and to 
certify the amount on each Abstract and Account Current passed by 
you in Words at length noting the Amount of any Surcharge. 
 
5th. In all cases of Accounts of the Collectors of Revenue being 
referred to you for examination you will call for such documents as 
you may think necefsary [sic] to substantiate the entries therein, and 
should any difficulty be made to the production of them, you will 
represent the same to the Governor for his directions thereon and 
you will Certify upon each Account the Amount of the [illegible] for 
which the Collector became responsible and of the other payment 
into the Treasury, or other Authorized Application of it. 
 
6th. You are to attend to the prices paid for all Articles, hired, 
purchased, or contracted for, and to ascertain that all Contracts, and 
Agreements have been punctually fulfilled. 
 
7th. You will be careful to ascertain that all Advances of Public 
Money are duly accounted for, and that all necessary [illegible] 
Accounts of Agents or other Persons to whom such Advances are 
made, are duly and punctually rendered, and you will report all 
omissions without delay to the Governor, you will transmit with the 
Abstract of Outstanding Advances, Copies of every Reports that 
may relate thereto and of any preceding head respecting them. 
 
8th. You will take care that the Accounts are rendered of the disposal 
of all these Stores charged for in the Colonial Accounts with the 
necessary Vouchers and Authorities and you will transmit with the 
Annual Accounts, Abstracts of such Store Accounts certified by you, 
showing the Quantity of Stores received, the Quantity duly applied 
to the Public Service and the Quantity remaining in Store. In the 
event of such Store Accounts not being duly rendered you will 
represent the same to the Governor in order to his giving the 
necessary order thereupon and in the Event of your finding it 
necessary to make a Surcharge against any Store Accountant you 
will ascertain and State in the Surcharges, the value of the Articles 
which you conceive are not duly accounted for. 
 
9th. You will see that all Assignments, Clauses of Attorneys or other 
documents provided to you under the 13th Article of Our 
Instructions to the Treasurer are legally executed, you will keep a 
Register of them and will [illegible] to the Receipts for all payments 
made under them a Certificate to the following Effect: 
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I (A.B. Auditor) do Certify that sufficient Authority has been 
shewn to me on the part of C.D. for receiving the Salary or 
Payment due to E.J. 
 
10th. In all Cases where alterations are required to Accounts you 
will see that the Affidavits are stated as the day, on which they are 
actually made, and should it seem from any unforeseen circumstance 
that the forms of alteration required by Our Instructions are not 
strictly in accordance with the facts of the Account, you will suggest 
[illegible]. 
 
11th. If in the Examination of any Account, it shall appear to you 
that the Officer has deviated from his Instructions, or that any 
Voucher is wanting, or that any Article is incorrect, or requires 
explanation, you are forthwith to give advice thereof to the 
Accountant in writing specifying the particular instance or Article 
and stating your observations or Queries thereon against which you 
are to require him to insert his answer. In the event of your not being 
furnished with such Explanations or Vouchers as you may deem 
satisfactory, and in conforming with established regulations, you 
will make such a Surcharge against the Accountant. 
 
You will at the close of the Examination of each monthly, or other 
periodical Account submitted to you, report all findings as thereon to 
the Governor and transmit Statements of them to the Persons against 
whom Surcharge is made, and to the Treasurer where instructed not 
to make any Payment to any Persons against whom Findings is 
made, until such Surcharge is satisfied or remitted. And you will 
take especial care that the Treasurer performs his duty in this respect 
and should he neglect to do so you will hold him accountable for the 
[illegible] unrecovered, and make it a Surcharge against himself. 
 
12th. The Accounts of the several Collectors of Revenue and the 
Accounts and Vouchers of the Treasurer will be rendered to you in 
Duplicate, with the exception of the Warrants and Authorities under 
the Governors [sic] Signature which will only be granted in original; 
you will cause the Duplicates each to be completed with Copies of 
these Warrants and Authorities, and of any other Document which 
from unavoidable circumstances cannot be provided in Duplicate, 
and you will verify all Copies of Documents that Be attached to 
either set of the Accounts by Your Signature. 
 
13th. You will examined [sic] the Treasurer’s Annual Statement, and 
will Certify the same in the following terms. 
I (AB. Auditor) do Certify that I have carefully examined the 
several Entries appearing both on the Debit and Credit Sides 
of the aforegoing Statement and having compared the sums 
with the original Accounts of the several Public Departments, 
as audited in my Office have found them to agree, and I do 
further Certify that proper Accounts of Particulars, 
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Authorities and Vouchers, in conformity to the Existing 
Regulations of Government have been exhibited to me in 
support of the several Articles of Charges and discharge 
therein contained. 
 
14th. You will as soon as possible after the close of the year transmit 
the original Sets of the Treasurers [sic] Annual and Monthly 
Accounts with all Vouchers in support of them, to the Auditor of 
Colonial Accounts [illegible] to the Consulting with the Accountant 
as to the mode of transmission, and acquainting him and the 
Governor by what means and on what day they are forwarded. 
 
15th. You will transmit thereunto: 
1st. One Set of the monthly Accounts of the Collectors of the 
Revenue with your Certificate of Examination. 
2nd. Copies of all Surcharges made by you including how 
they were eventually disposed of and accompanied by Copies 
of any Orders for remitting Surcharges without the 
production of the Vouchers and Explanations for want of 
which they were made. 
3rd. A Statement of all Allowances or Accounts outstanding 
and unliquidated at the End of the Year, specifying the period 
at which they were made, and noting against each the period 
at which they ought to have been or are likely to be 
liquidated. 
4th. A Complete Set of Government Gazettes for the year, 
with Copies of all Orders and Regulations in any way 
connected with the Finances of the Colony, which are not 
either contained in the Gazette or attached as Vouchers to the 
Accounts and any of the Documents requisite for the 
explaining the Accounts and the Financial State of the 
Colony. 
 
16th. You will retain in your Office for reference the complete Set of 
the Cash and Store Accounts rendered to you, and to which you will 
allow the several Accountants to have access. 
 
17th. You will show to the Treasurer the Triplicate Copies of his 
monthly and Annual Accounts with your Certificate of their 
examination, and you will at the request of any other Accountants 
and upon his presenting a Copy of his Account for that purposes 
show the same to him with your Certificates of Examination 
annexed thereto. 
 
18th. You will keep Registers of all Accounts delivered to you 
specifying the date of delivery, the period when the Examination of 
them was complete, and the manner in which they were disposed of. 
 
19th. You will report to the Governor all delays and irregularities in 
the delivery of the various Accounts to be rendered to you, under 
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these Instructions, or under the regulations of the Colonial 
Government, in order to the adoption of remedial, or preventative 
measures he may think advisable. 
 
20th. You will use every incentive to ascertain that the Colonial 
Revenue is duly and properly Collected, and brought to Account, 
and you will lose no time in reporting any default or irregularity in 
that respect to the Governor. 
 
21st. If in the course of your Examination of the Accounts it should 
appear to you, that any Person [illegible] therein is unacquainted 
with the Form of Account or the Vouchers required, you are to 
inform him as to the proper course of proceeding and make any 
requisite communication to the Governor upon the subject in order 
that all irregularities may be as few as possible, or prevented or 
remedied. 
 
22nd. You will call the particular attention of the Governor to all 
deviations from Instructions or from any other established 
Regulations of the Colony, in order should he think fit to grant any 
Authority dispensing with this observance, he may be fully aware of 
the circumstances of the Case, and that such Authority may be 
issued in the exercise of the discretionary power vested in him. 
 
23rd. You will implicitly obey all such legal Orders as you may from 
time to time receive from the Governor or Officer duly Authorized 
to Act on his behalf, but should it appear to you that such Orders are 
at variance with Our Instructions or the Regulations of the Colonial 
Government, you will respectfully represent the same. 
 
24th. You will make all such Reports and Returns to the Governor, 
or other Public Department, as he may think fit to require, and you 
will from time to time submit for his information or directions any 
observations that may seem to you, with reference to your Official 
duties. 
 
25th. In the Event of your giving over on any occasion the Charge of 
your Department to any other Person you will take Care that he is 
furnished with these Instructions, and any regulations that may be 
established for the conduct of the Department. 
 
26th. From the very irregular and senselefs [sic] manner in which 
many of the Colonial Accounts have been submitted to this Country, 
We strictly admonish you to pay the greatest attention to these 
Instructions, and adhere closely thereto. 
 
Dated 13th June 1826. 
 
Ld Liverpool, F.J. Robinson; G.C.H. Somerset 
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APPENDIX 7  MAP SOUTH-WEST WESTERN AUSTRALIA 1907 
 
 
National Library of Australia. (1907). The West Australian Midland land grant 





APPENDIX 8  PERCENTAGE OF EXCESS EXPENDITURE TO 
ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE, APPROVED  
IN APPROPRIATION ACTS, WA, PER YEAR 1835-1893 
 
The table below contains the data pertaining to the various sums of expenditure 
authorised in the many Appropriation Acts enacted by the WA Parliament 1839-1889 
(sometimes up to four separate Appropriation Acts were passed each year). The 
results for all financial years 1840-1841 to 1889 were graphed and are shown in 
Chapter 7 as Figure 7.1, including a five year moving average trend line.   
 
These sums in each Appropriation Act were examined and identified as either 
"Estimated" (that is, approved by the Legislative Council prior to the period in 
question) or as "Excess" (that is, approved after the funds had been spent). Each sum 
was entered against the relevant financial year of expenditure; not against the year in 
which the legislation was enacted. This enabled a calculation of the total amount of 
funds approved by the Legislative Council for each financial year.  
 
The percentage of excess expenditure to estimated expenditure (final column) was 
then calculated (that is: total sum approved post-expenditure for each financial year - 
"Total Excess Expenditure" - as a percentage of the amount approved pre-
expenditure - "Total Estimated Expenditure"). For example, the 1840-1841 financial 
year result of 19.8% was arrived at by calculating the percentage that £1,620 
approved post-expenditure ("Total Excess Expenditure") constituted of the total 
£8,167 approved pre-expenditure ("Total Estimated Expenditure") (made up of 






















1835 5/6  46,056 na - 0.0 
1836 na - na -  
1837 na - na -  
1838 na - na -  
1839 na - na -  
Apr 40 - 
Mar 41 
2/8, May '39 (5,121) 
4/3 Jul '40 (3,046) 
8,167 4/3, Jul '40 (Excess 
portion) 
1,620 19.8 
1841-42 4/3, Jul '40 8,000 6/9, Jul '42 940b 11.8 
1842-43 4&5/11, Jun '41 8,971 7/8, Aug '43 289b 3.2 
1843-44 6/9, Jul '42 9,858 na - 0.0 
1844-45 7/8, Aug '43 10,304 na - 0.0 
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1845-46 8/3, Jul '44 7,526 9/11, May '46 880b 11.7 
1846-47 9/1, Jun '45 6,650 10/3, Jul '47 36b 0.5 
1847-48 9/11, May '46 (7,930) 
10/3, Jul '47 (9,221) 
17,151 na - 0.0 
1848-49 10/21, Mar '48 (9,500) 
12/5, Jul '48 (1,422) 
10,922 na - 0.0 
1849-50 12/1, Jul '48 (9,000) 
12/22, May '49 (1,501)  
(Jun-Dec '49) 





12/22, May '49 (8,679) 8,679 14/16, Dec '50 1,232c 14.2 
1851 13/2, Feb '50 (9,443) 9,443 15/1, Nov '51 8,897c 94.2 
1852 14/23, May '51 (14,218)
15/8, May '52 (9,362) 
23,580 16/1, Dec '52 6,202c 26.3 
1853 15/7, May '52 (22,395) 
16/21, Apr '53 (9,630) 
16/23, May '53 (1,500) 
33,525 17/15, May '54 6,016 17.9 
1854 16/21, Apr '53 (31,091)
17/19, Jun '54 (14,326) 
45,417 18/7, Apr '55 6,110 13.5 
1855 17/19, Jun '54 (43,489) 
18/17, Apr '55 (7,984) 
51,473 20/4, Jun '56 4,406 8.6 
1856 18/17, Apr '55 (51,119), 
amended to £44,045 by 
19/1, Sep '55. 
20/3, Jun '56 (1,000) 
20/6, Oct '56 (5,058) 
50,103 21/9 Jun '57 3,152 6.3 
1857 20/3, Jun '56 49,260 22/2, Sep '58 4,445 9.0 
1858 21/9, Jun '57 51,030 23/12, Nov '59 6,192 12.1 
1859 22/2, Sep '58 56,532 24/2, Oct '60 6,745 11.9 
1860 23/12, Nov '59 56,367 25/7, Nov '61 8,467 15.0 
1861 24/2, Oct '60 59,746 25/16, Jun '62 25,375d 42.5 
1862 25/7, Nov '61 64,986 27/12, Jul '63 
(10,171) 
7,281e 11.2 
1863 25/17, Jun '62 67,803 28/8, Jul '64 7,325 10.8 
1864 27/15, Jul '63 70,140 29/10, Jul '65 6,024 8.6 
1865 28/11, Jul '64 74,038 30/7, Jul '66 7,500 10.1 
1866 29/11, Jul '65 76,059 31/12, Jul '67 14,210f 18.7 
1867 30/8, Jul '66 82,045 32/13, Aug '68 12,731 15.5 
1868 31/13, Jul '67 93,988 33/11, Jul '69 4,631 4.9 
1869 32/15, Aug '68 96,276 33/15, Jun '70 11,218 11.7 
1870 33/12, Jul '69 101,294 35/1, Aug '71 15,496 15.3 
1871 35/16, Jan '71 102,098 36/2, Aug '72 9,746 9.5 
1872 35/15, Aug '71 98,036 37/2, Jul '73 4,688 4.8 
1873 36/11, Aug '72 104,062 38/1, Jul '74 9,318 9.0 
1874 37/18, Aug '73 114,421 39/4, Dec '75 20,925 18.3 
1875 38/17, Nov '74 152,116 40/1, Aug '76 22,498 14.8 
1876 39/18, Dec '75 158,863 41/5, Aug '77 18,755 11.8 
1877 40/15, Sep '76 153,225 42/7, Jul '78 17,928 11.7 
1878 41/20, Aug '77 151,115 43/22, Oct '79 
(41,437) 
24,699g 16.3 
1879 42/29, Jul '78 154,711 45/6, Sep '81 18,477 11.9 
1880 43/27, Oct '79 (176,256)
44/14, Sep '80 (4,025) 
180,281 45/10, Sep '81 28,600 15.9 
1881 44/13, Sep '80 (168,894)
45/5, Sep '81 (14,016) 
182,910 50/8, Jul '86 5,842 3.2 
1882 45/13, Sep '81 (158,911)
46/4, Aug '82 (11,658) 
170,569 47/1, Aug '83 6,938 4.1 
1883 46/23, Sep '82 (186,204)
47/5, Aug '83 (24,322) 
210,526 48/1, Aug '84 2,059 1.0 
260 
Notes: 
Supp.: Supplementary Appropriation Act 
na: No Appropriation Act passed for this financial year. 
a. From Appropriation Acts (WA) 
(https://www.slp.wa.gov.au/legislation/statutes.nsf/default.html). 
b. Recorded in Appropriation Act as "Supplementary" expenditure 
but approved after financial year end (post-expenditure). 
c. Recorded in Appropriation Act as "Supplementary" expenditure, 
but approved in last weeks of financial year (predominantly 
post-expenditure). 
d. Includes: £898 (Transport); £5,696 (Works and Buildings); 
£10,754 (Roads and Bridges); £2,655 (Misc. Services). 
e. £10,171 less £2,889 received from surplus appropriation, 1861. 
f. Includes: £4,183 (Roads and Bridges); £2,767 (Misc. Services). 
g. £41,437 less £16,738 from "Disbursements…services provided 
for, and recoverable from Public Works Loan 1878".  
1884 47/25, Sep '83 (245,486)
48/2, Aug '84 (23,579) 
269,075 49/2, Sep '85 724 0.3 
1885 48/23, Sep '84 (247,431)
49/1, Sep '85 (25,086) 
272,517 50/1, Jul '86 14 0.0 
1886 49/25, Sep '85 (277,107)
50/16, Aug '86 (74,935) 
352,042 51/21, Aug '87 5,766 1.6 
1887 50/32, Sep '86 (360,594)
51/19, Aug '87 (49,984) 
410,578 52/4, Nov '88 3,811 0.9 
1888 52/1, Nov '88 (16,659) 
52/28, Apr '88 (326,622)
343,281 53/10, Nov '89 1,368 0.4 
1889 52/15, Dec '88 (321,314)
53/11, Nov '89 (6,146) 
327,460 54/10, Feb '91 6,465 2.0 
1890 53/21, Dec '89 (315,277) 315,277 54/11, Feb '91 28,794 9.1 
1891 54/1, Jan '91 (60,000) 
54/2, Feb '91 (286,684) 
346,684 56/2, Jan '93 16,885 4.9 
1892 55/1, Jan '92 (80,000) 
55/8, Mar '92 (394,049) 
474,449 57/21, Oct '93 36,883 7.8 
Jan-Jun 
1893 




APPENDIX 9  CORRESPONDENCE RELEVANT TO THE 
AUDIT BILL 1881 
 
Robinson to Kimberley, 13 November 1880, Governor's confidential despatches to 
Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 390 v.47. 
 
The Earl of Kimberley 
13th November 1880 
Confidential  
 
My Lord, With my Despatch No 131 of the 12th Instant I have 
forwarded to your Lordship a Memorial from the Legislative 
Council asking that I may be authorized to assent to an Audit Bill 
similar in its main provisions to the one which I have lately 
disallowed and also a copy of the Speech which I addressed to the 
Council at the close of the Session. 
 
2. In my closing Speech it will be observed that I take notice of the 
manner in which the Memorial to Your Lordship was introduced and 
express my regret that the rules laid down by Parliament for the 
purposes of forwarding against surprise should have been departed 
from. The promoters of the Memorial paid me the bad compliment 
to suppose that if they allowed me to become aware that such a 
Memorial was about to be introduced I would prevent its adoption if 
I could. Instead therefore of printing it in the notice paper is the rule 
and practice in all such cases here, they had it privately printed at the 
Office of the West Australian – the only paper which has supported 
them in the matter of the Audit Bill – privately circulated amongst 
their own supporters in the House and at one of the last sittings of 
the Session they hurried it though without affording the Government 
Members and Supporters any opportunity of considering it. To this 
sharp practice I felt it my duty to refer in my closing Speech and I 
am able to assure Your Lordship that the course which I adopted has 
been endorsed by the press and by public opinion generally. The 
accompanying article from the Herald (11.9.80) reflects very fairly 
the general feeling on the Subject. The persons immediately 
concerned were naturally displeased at my remarks and they have 
endeavoured to excuse themselves by saying in the columns of the 
West Australian that they had no wish to take any unfair advantage 
of the Government, and their only object was to save time as the 
Session was drawing to a close. I may however remark to your 
Lordship that Mr Steere (the leader of the so called Opposition) 
admitted to me in private conversation that their object was to 
prevent the Government from knowing anything about the Memorial 
beforehand and his words when I spoke to him about the 
undesirableness of either party departing from the rules of 
parliamentary procedure were "Why should we furnish the Enemy 
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with Ammunition'" and similar words were used by one of Mr 
Steere's supporters to a Government Member in the House. Although 
therefore they may now attempt to make excuses for their conduct, 
of which I believe they already feel heartily ashamed, they must 
know by now [nb a pencilled tick is beneath the words "by now" and 
above the word "administered"] that the rebuke which I administered 
to them was well merited and I hope that the notice which has been 
taken of their proceedings by myself and by the Press will prevent a 
repetition of any such practice in the future. 
 
3. I may observe in conclusion that the events of the last Session 
have in no way impaired the friendly feeling which has always 
existed between the Elected Members & myself. Mr Steere whose 
name I have already mentioned though very much in the hands of his 
party is by no means and unreasonable man himself, and as I thought 
that he might feel hurt at the rejection of the Audit Bill of which he 
had had charge from the first, I wrote to him a private note telling 
him how sorry I was that my duty obliged me to take a course which 
I feared would be displeasing to him. To this he replied in a note (4 
Sept 1880) which gave me the opportunity of setting him right on 
one or two points and of pointing out in a friendly manner the 
mistake made by the Council (No. 599) in claiming a right which 
could only be demanded as a concession. Copies of these letters are 
Enclosed (4 Sept 1880). In subsequent conversation I remarked to 
him how foolish it was of the Council to take up a position 
antagonistic to the Government on such a question as this; that I 
should have been only too glad as indicated in my opening Speech to 
join them in any legitimate legislation having for its object the better 
administration of our finances; and that if they had worked with 
instead of against the Government they might have had nearly all the 
wanted, (excepting of course the absolute control over the Auditor 
which they demanded) without any friction or delay. His answer 
was, "If we worked harmoniously with the Government our 
Constituents would think we were doing nothing for them and would 
not be satisfied." 
 
4. In this is really the key note to the politics: It is a political 
necessity with the elected Members to harass and attack the 
Government and this is what makes the present form of Government 
so exceedingly difficult to administer. 
 
I have etc 







Kimberley to Robinson, 19 February 1881, Confidential despatches received from 
Secretary of State, SROWA, Cons 391 v.259. 
 
Colonial Office, Downing Street,  
19 February 1881 
Governor Sir William Robinson HCMG, Western Australia 
Confidential 
 
Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch 
marked Confidential of the 13th of November [1880], respecting the 
manner in which the memorial from the Legislative Council relating 
to the Audit Bill which accompanied your despatch No 131 of the 
12th of November was introduced in the Council. 
 




WA, LC, April 4, 1881, pp. 126-129.  
 
MESSAGE (No. 15): Re AUDIT BILL. 
 
MR. SPEAKER announced the receipt of the following Message 
from His Excellency the Governor:  
 
"The Governor has the honor to lay before the Legislative Council a 
copy of a Despatch from the Secretary of State on the subject of the 
Audit Bill, in which His Lordship states that he approves of the 
course taken by the Governor in withholding his assent to the Bill; 
that he concurs in the views which the Governor expressed upon the 
subject of it in his Message No. 22, of the 2nd September; that His 
Lordship is therefore unable to accede to the Memorial forwarded to 
him by Your Honorable Council, wherein you requested that the 
Governor might be directed to assent to a similar Audit Bill if 
introduced next Session; but that he will be happy to consider any 
Bill founded on the recommendations of the Commission appointed 
by the Governor to consider and report on the question whether any 
improvements could be introduced in the mode of keeping and 
auditing the accounts. 
 
The Report of the Commission alluded to has already been received 
and considered by the Governor, and a Bill to give legal effect to the 
Regulations suggested by the Commission will, as stated by the 
Governor in his Message No. 22, of the 2nd September, be presented 
to you at the next Session of Council. In the meanwhile, the 
recommendations of the Commission are about to be provisionally 
enforced in the Financial Departments concerned, and the Governor 
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has no doubt that the changes proposed will be highly beneficial to 
the Service. The Report of the Finance Commission will be 
submitted to Your Honorable Council next Session, concurrently 
with the Bill which the Governor has directed to be prepared for 
your consideration. 
 




The Right Honorable Earl of Kimberley, &c., &c., &c. 
No. 131. WESTERN AUSTRALIA. 
Government House, Perth, 
12th November, 1880. 
 
My LORD,-I have the honor to submit, herewith, the following 
documents:  
1. A Bill passed by the Legislative Council on the 30th of 
August last, intituled 'An Act to regulate the receipt, custody, 
and issue of the 'Public Moneys, and to provide for the Audit 
of the Public Accounts.' 
2. Governor's Message No. 22, withholding his assent to the 
Audit Bill. 
3. Address of Legislative Council to Governor, No. 47, in 
reply to Message No. 22. 
4. Message No. 26, being Governor's rejoinder to Address 
No. 47. 
5. Memorial of the Legislative Council to the Secretary of 
State, requesting that the Governor may be directed to assent 
to a similar Audit Bill if introduced next Session. 
6. Governor's Closing Speech, 8th September, 1880. 
 
2. In my Message No. 22, reference is made to the Report of the 
Select Committee on the Audit Bill, as also to a communication 
addressed to me by the Treasurer with regard to his evidence before 
the Committee. Copies of these documents are therefore also 
forwarded for Your Lordship's consideration.  
 
3. Having stated in my Message No. 22 that, with Your Lordship's 
approval, I would myself bring in a Bill next Session to embody 
revised regulations for the Treasury and Audit Departments in legal 
form, there is in reality only one point which calls for Your 
Lordship's decision, namely, the proposal to make the Auditor 
General responsible to the Legislative Council by enacting that he 
shall not be removed from office unless upon the Address of that 
body. 
 
4. My views on this point are so fully expressed in my Message No. 
22, that I do not consider it necessary to trouble Your Lordship with 
any further remarks upon it in this Despatch. The clause embodying 
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the principle which the promoters of the Bill have been anxious to 
see introduced, was only carried in a full Committee of the House by 
the casting vote of the Chairman, the Speaker voting with the 
majority; and I have the satisfaction of knowing that the course 
which I adopted in refusing my assent to this principle has been 
supported by the leading Journals of the place (the Inquirer and 
Herald), and I believe by public opinion generally. 
 
5. The action of the Legislative Council throughout this whole case 
might lead a casual observer to suppose that I was indifferent as to 
economy, and insensible of the importance of a prompt and efficient 
audit of the Public Accounts. A reference to my Opening Speech 
will show you that I took the initiative in both these matters, and had 
the Council been satisfied to co-operate with the Government in a 
friendly spirit, instead of attempting to force the acceptance of a 
principle which the Government regarded as both unconstitutional 
and unnecessary, the whole question might have been satisfactorily 
disposed of during the last Session of Council. 
 
6. Frequent reference is made, in the papers now forwarded, to the 
alleged extravagance of former Administrations, as showing the 
necessity for placing the Auditor in a position independent of the 
Government, and of enabling him to exercise a check on expenditure 
not sanctioned by the Legislature. On this point I would beg to draw 
Your Lordship's attention to the following extracts from my Message 
No. 26: 
 
2. Your Honorable Council dissents from the Governor's 
opinion that in the direct responsibility of the Governor to the 
Secretary of State the country possesses as full and ample 
security for the proper and economical expenditure of public 
money as would be provided by the Audit Bill, and in 
support of your opinion you refer to the unauthorised 
expenditure which has been incurred during the last few 
years. In the Governor's opinion the overdrafts alluded to, 
except in so far as they were incurred in connection with 
public works of an urgent character, were to a great extent 
due to the practice referred to in his Opening Speech, of 
framing the Estimates on an insufficient scale, thus leaving it 
to the Governor to issue on his own authority Supplementary 
Warrants, which had to be legalized by subsequent 
legislation. That they were not due to extravagance on the 
part of the Government will be seen on reference to the 
Report of the Select Committee on the Over-expenditure for 
1878—which considerably exceeded the average-in which 
Report it is stated that 'due regard to economy was as a whole 
observed by the Government.'  
 
3. Undoubtedly a rigid view should be taken of what 
constitutes such an emergency as justifies the Governor in 
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spending money in advance of Legislative authority. Your 
Honorable Council have apparently somewhat misunderstood 
the Governor's meaning on this point. The Governor's 
argument is that where an Audit Act expressly states that in 
case of emergency the Governor may incur unauthorised 
expenditure, the Governor must be, as he is now, the judge of 
the emergency, and that therefore his sense of right and his 
responsibility to the Secretary of State furnish, under the 
existing Regulations, as ample security against extravagant 
or improper expenditure as would exist under the provisions 
of an Audit Act. 
 
7. I may further observe that the Estimates for 1881 have been 
passed without much alteration, which is, in itself, an admission on 
the part of the Legislative Council that the Government have been 
mindful of economy, while as regards former Administrations it is 
frankly stated in the Memorial that 'Your Lordship's Memorialists 
are perfectly ready to allow that there has been but little positive 
extravagance on the part of the successive Administrations which 
have governed this Colony during the period in question, and that 
these Administrations in their expenditure of the public funds have 
been actuated by a sincere desire to promote the public good.' 
 
8. In pursuance of the intimation made in the twelfth paragraph of 
my Message No. 22, I am now about to appoint a commission to 
compare the Regulations contained in the Audit Bill with those 
already in operation, and to report whether any, and if so what, 
improvements could be introduced in the mode of keeping and 
auditing the accounts. The report of the commission will be duly laid 
before Your Lordship, and, if approved by you, will be embodied in 
a Bill and submitted to Council at its next Session. I shall be glad if 
Your Lordship will inform me whether you would wish me to 
include in the new Bill a provision to make the Auditor General 
independent of the Government, as desired by certain members of 
the Legislative Council, or whether Your Lordship concurs in the 
views which I have expressed on this subject in my Message of the 
2nd September. 
 
I have, &c., 
WILLIAM C. F. ROBINSON. 
 
 
Governor Sir W. C. F. Robinson, K.C.M.G., &c., &c., &c. 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
No. 10. Downing Street, 
19th February, 1881. 
 
Sir,-I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch 
No. 131, of the 12th of November last, transmitting a transcript of a 
Bill passed by the Legislative Council on the 30th of August last, 
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intituled 'An Act to regulate the receipt, custody, and issue of the 
Public moneys, and to provide for the Audit of the Public Accounts.' 
 
2. Your Despatch also inclosed, with other papers relating to the 
Bill, a Memorial addressed to me by the Legislative Council, 
requesting that you may be directed to assent to a similar Audit Bill 
if introduced next Session. 
 
3. I approve of the course which you have taken in withholding your 
assent to this Bill; and I concur in the views which you expressed 
upon the subject of it in your Message to the Council of the 2nd of 
September. 
 
4. The view of the Legislative Council, that the Auditor General 
should be responsible to that Council instead of to the Governor, is 
opposed, as you observed in your Message, to the established rule 
that, in colonies not under Responsible Government, all Public 
Officers are appointed and removed by the Crown, and their tenure 
of office is not in any case dependent upon the will of the Local 
Legislature; and it would not be in accordance with constitutional 
precedents to place the Auditor General of Western Australia in a 
different position from that which was held by the same officer in 
the other Australian colonies before the introduction of Responsible 
Government. You will therefore be so good as to inform the Speaker 
that I am unable to accede to the Memorial forwarded to me by the 
Legislative Council; but that I shall be happy to consider any Bill, 
founded upon the recommendations of the Commission which I 
understand you are about to appoint, or probably have now 
appointed, to consider and to report upon the question whether any 
improvements can be introduced in the mode of keeping and 
auditing the accounts. 
 




AUDIT BILL, 1880: REPLY OF SECRETARY OF STATE TO 
MEMORIAL. 
 
MR. SPEAKER informed the House that he had received the 
following letter from His Excellency The Governor, in reply to one 
addressed by him to the Secretary of State, forwarding a memorial re 
Audit Bill: 
 
"The Honorable Sir L. S. Leake, Speaker.  
WESTERN AUSTRALIA. 
 
Government House, Perth, 
4th April, 1881. 
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SIR,-I duly forwarded to the Secretary of State your letter to His 
Lordship, enclosing a Memorial from the Legislative Council, 
requesting the Secretary of State to instruct me not to withhold my 
assent again from an Audit Bill similar in its provisions to the Bill 
which I disallowed last Session. I am desired, in reply, to inform you 
that His Lordship is unable to accede to the prayer of the Memorial, 
but that he will be happy to consider any Bill founded on the 
recommendations of the Finance Commission which, as you are 
aware, I not long since appointed to advise on the Regulations of the 
Treasury and Audit Departments. 
 
The Secretary of State's Despatch will be submitted to the 
Legislative Council in due course. 
 
I have, &c., 
WILLIAM C. F. ROBINSON." 
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APPENDIX 10 HOUSE OF COMMONS QUESTION 27 MAY 1881 
 
British House of Commons—Parliamentary Debates (UK, HC, May 27, 1881, vol. 





SIR WALTER B. BARTTELOT [member for Sussex Western] 
asked the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, Whether 
remonstrances have been lately received at the Colonial Office from 
Western Australia, as to the way in which expenditure has been 
incurred in that Colony, without previous legislative sanction; and, 
whether the subject is under the consideration of the Secretary of 
State? 
 
MR. GRANT DUFF [Sec of State for Colonies] Sir, it might be 
enough to say that the hon. and gallant Baronet's information is quite 
correct; but as he has asked me, for good reasons, to give a 
somewhat full answer to his Question, I must state a few particulars. 
The Legislative Council of Western Australia, in September of last 
year, presented an Address to the Governor in connection with a Bill 
to regulate the receipt, custody, and issue of the public moneys, and 
to provide for the audit of the public accounts, in which Address the 
Council represented that the control of the Legislature over the 
public purse has been merely nominal, and not real, as the present 
constitution of the Colony contemplates. They further stated that 
during the past 10 years some £160,000 has, in fact, been expended 
over and above the sums submitted to vote in the annual Estimates. 
The Governor pointed out, in reply, that this irregularity has been, to 
a great extent, due to the practice of framing the Estimates on an 
insufficient scale, leaving it to the Governor to issue on his own 
authority Supplementary Warrants, which had to be legalized by 
subsequent legislation; and he quoted the Report of a Select 
Committee on over-expenditure for 1878, which stated "that due 
regard to economy was, as a whole, observed by this Government." 
The Secretary of State is now considering this matter, and proposes 
to issue such instructions as may remove, as far as practicable, the 
irregularity of spending money without the previously obtained 
authority of the Legislature. Her Majesty's Government are confident 
that they will have the full co-operation of the Governor in securing 
the legitimate control of the Legislature over the Public Expenditure. 
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APPENDIX 11 CORRESPONDENCE PUBLISHED WA 30 JULY 1881 
 
(1881, July 30). Correspondence upon the Questions of Over-Expenditure and the 
Control of the Legislature over the Public Finances. The Herald, p. 1S. 
 
Governor to Secretary of State. The Right Honorable the Earl of 
Kimberley, &c., &c., Colonial Office 
 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA. 
Government House, Perth.  
22nd June, 1881. 
 
MY LORD, … 
 
2. The accompanying Minute from the Colonial Secretary gives full 
information on the subject of the overdrafts for last year, and accords 
with the paragraph in my Speech of the 21st March, to which I have 
since drawn attention. There are certain Departments, such as 
Medical, Gaol, Poor Relief, &c., which it is almost impossible to 
estimate for with accuracy; but I trust I need not assure Your 
Lordship of my desire to do so, and that, so long as I remain here, 
the Public Expenditure will be estimated and disbursed with the 
utmost care. 
 
3. I may be permitted to add that our present temporary 
embarrassment is a legacy which I inherited from the past, and that I 
have done my utmost to restore the financial equilibrium, and to 
place the accounts of the Colony on a sounder basis. In proof of this; 
permit me to invite Your Lordship's particular attention to my 
Speech to Council, of the 19th July, 1880, in which I have marked 
certain paragraphs for easy reference, and to my Despatch No. 86, of 
the 24th July, 1880, of which a copy is also enclosed. 
 
4. I now further submit the report of the Finance Commission, 
appointed by me in pursuance of the intimation contained in the 8th 
paragraph of my Despatch No. 131, of the 12th November, 
forwarding the rejected Audit Bill, together with copy of the Bill 
based on the recommendations of the Commission, which I propose 
to submit to the Legislative Council at its next Session, and which I 
trust will serve to remove all just grounds for complaint as to the 
mode of auditing and keeping the Public Accounts, and meet with 
your Lordship's approval. 
 
5. I may add that I have not waited for the passing of this law to 
introduce the new system in the Treasury and Audit Departments. 
From the accompanying Gazette notice Your Lordship will observe 
that it has been in operation for some weeks in a satisfactory manner. 
So much discontent has been expressed as to the state of the Public 
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Accounts that I have thought it advisable to lose no time in giving 
publicity to the letter from the Finance Commission, which I now 
submit, and which I feel satisfied will give general satisfaction to the 
public. 
 
I have, &c WILLIAM C. F. ROBINSON. 
 
 
Secretary of State to Governor. Sir William C. F. Robinson, 
K.C.M.G., &c., &c., &c. WESTERN AUSTRALIA. 
 
Downing Street  
June 3, 1881. 
 
SIR, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Despatch 
No. 51, of the 28th of March, transmitting a copy of the Speech with 
which you opened the Special Session of the Legislative Council on 
the 21st of March. 
 
2. I observe that in this Speech you took occasion to explain the 
Financial position of the Colony, and you showed that (excluding the 
expenditure on the Northern Railway), the total Expenditure of last 
year exceeded the Authorised Expenditure by less than four 
thousand pounds (£4,000). I have noticed this explanation with 
satisfaction, more especially since the irregular expenditure of public 
money in Western Australia, without the previous sanction of 
Legislature, has recently been the subject of a question in the House 
of Commons. 
 
3. I enclose a copy of a question asked on this subject on the 27th of 
May, and a copy of the reply which was returned to it. 
 
4. In my Despatch No. 10, of the 19th of February, on the subject of 
the Bill which had been passed by the Legislative Council "to 
regulate the receipt, custody, and issue of the Public Moneys, and to 
provide for the Audit of the Public Accounts," I explained the 
reasons which appeared to me to preclude, under the existing 
Constitution of the Colony, the appointment of an Auditor General 
holding office on the conditions specified in that Bill, and I promised 
to consider any Bill which might hereafter be framed, on the 
recommendation of your proposed Commission, for introducing an 
amended system of keeping and auditing the Public Accounts. 
 
I did not, however, refer to the representation made by the Council, 
in their Address which accompanied the Bill, that practically there is 
no restraint on unauthorised expenditure; in support of which they 
adduced figures showing the Expenditure in excess of the 
appropriations during the years 1877, 1878, and 1879. 
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5. You pointed out, in reply, that these irregularities were due in a 
great extent to the practice of framing the Estimates on an 
insufficient scale; and you observed that "the Governor's sense of 
right, and his responsibility to the Secretary of State, furnish as 
ample security against excessive or improper Expenditure as would 
exist under the provisions of an Audit Act." 
 
6. I do not doubt that you have endeavoured to prevent unauthorised 
expenditure; but it is impossible to deny that the procedure of the 
Colonial Government during past years has been open to exception 
in this respect. Under the present Constitution of Western Australia 
the members of the Legislature, two-thirds of whom are elected by 
the people, have both the right and the responsibility of controlling 
the expenditure of Public Money. It would be a dereliction of duty 
on their part to relax their vigilance in discharging this important 
function in reliance upon such supervision as the Secretary of State 
may be able to give, which, from the distance and the impossibility 
of thoroughly understanding local details, must necessarily be 
imperfect. 
 
7. I request you to consider and report to me the steps which, under 
all the circumstances, appear to you and to the Executive Council to 
be desirable for the purpose of regulating and extending the control 
of the Legislature over the Public Finance. Amongst other things, it 
seems desirable that the Estimates should make fuller provision than 
hitherto for such services as can be foreseen, and a Committee of 
Public Accounts might be appointed by the Legislative Council to 
examine the questions connected with the Expenditure of the 
Colony. The Legislative Council should also at all times be promptly 
furnished with all such information on the Financial Proposals of the 
Government and the details of the Revenue and Expenditure of the 
Colony as it may require. 
 
I have, &c., KIMBERLEY. 
 
 
Governor to Secretary of State. The Right Honorable the Earl of 
Kimberley. &c., &c., &c., Colonial Office. 
No. 126. 
WESTERN AUSTRALIA. Government House, Perth,  
July, 15th, 1881. 
 
MY LORD, Your Lordship's Despatch No. 39, of the 3rd June, 
which I received by last mail, has crossed my Despatch No. 113, of 
the 22nd June, with which I submitted to you a copy of the Audit 
Bill which I propose to introduce at the next Session of Council, as 
also a few observations on the financial position of the Colony. 
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2. I am gratified to find that your Lordship has recognized my wish 
to place the Financial affairs of the Colony on a more satisfactory 
footing, and that the Under Secretary of State, in replying to Sir 
Walter Barttelot's question in the House of Commons, expressed the 
confidence felt by Her Majesty's Government in my readiness to co-
operate in securing the legitimate control of the Legislature over the 
public expenditure. Such has been my wish from the outset, although 
for a time a different impression may have been created in certain 
quarters, in consequence of my inability to assent to the mode by 
which the Legislative Council sought to arrive at the result which we 
equally desired to attain. 
 
3. Your Lordship has justly remarked that the members of the 
Legislative Council have both the right and the responsibility of 
controlling the public expenditure. I do not think that this has ever 
been disputed by any one connected with the Administration; and for 
my own part I have certainly never denied it. It is true that Estimates 
have been exceeded, and unauthorized expenditure incurred, in 
reliance on subsequent confirmation; but I must say that I think that 
in this matter the Legislative Council has been quite as much to 
blame as the Government. The evils of exceeding the Estimates have 
necessarily become more apparent since the creation of the deficit; 
and I believe I may claim to have been the first to point out to the 
Council officially the importance of adhering strictly to the 
Appropriation Act. But the constitutional impropriety of exceeding 
the authorized expenditure was in reality just as great in more 
prosperous times as it is today, and unless the Legislative Council 
can show that it ineffectually remonstrated with the Government 
during the ten years over which those irregularities are said to have 
extended, I do not think it is in a position to lay the chief blame on 
the Executive, or to assert that because certain irregular practices 
have contributed to our financial embarrassment the constitutional 
right of the Elective Chamber to regulate the public expenditure has 
been questioned. As a matter of fact there have been faults on both 
sides-on the part of the Government in sometimes exceeding the 
Estimates without authority; on the part of the Council in falling 
itself into the irregularity of recommending expenditure, by 
Resolutions, for which no provision may have been made either in 
the Estimates or the Appropriation Acts. In short, there has been a 
general laxity of system, of which, while the money lasted, no great 
notice appears to have been taken by any one; but I confess that I 
can see but little to support the views entertained by certain members 
of Council that their constitutional rights have been ignored. 
 
4. In requesting me to consider and report the steps which, under all 
the circumstances, may appear to my Government to be desirable for 
the purpose of regulating and extending the control of the 
Legislature over the Public Finances, Your Lordship suggests, (1) 
that the Estimates should make fuller provision than hitherto for 
such services as can be foreseen; (2) that a Committee of Public 
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Accounts might be appointed by the Council to examine all 
questions connected with the Expenditure of the Colony; and (3) that 
the Council should at all times be promptly furnished with all such 
information on the financial proposals of the Government and the 
details of Revenue and Expenditure as it may require. 
 
5. The first suggestion, in so far as it rests with me to do so, will be 
carefully observed in future. As regards your second suggestion, I 
have the honour to report that the Council is annually it the habit of 
appointing a Select Committee for the examination of Over-
Expenditure, and that I am not acquainted with any Legislative 
Chamber in which questions of Expenditure are more fully examined 
and discussed than in the Council of Western Australia. I think, 
however, it would not be difficult or inexpedient to extend to this 
Colony a system which I found to work well at Singapore, where a 
Committee of Unofficial Members advise the Governor during 
recess on certain questions connected with the Expenditure, and, in 
order to carry out this arrangement, I have added to the Draft Audit 
Bill a clause which I hope will meet with your approval. 
 
6. As regards keeping the Council well supplied with information on 
financial subjects, I beg to state that I do not think the Government 
has at any time shown itself indisposed to do so, and certainly the 
members themselves have not failed to make use of their undoubted 
right and privilege to demand it. 
 
7. The Draft Audit Bill, which I have already submitted to Your 
Lordship, is the result of much careful deliberation on the part of 
myself and the members of my Government, and, having again 
carefully considered it in Executive Council since the receipt of 
Your Lordship's Despatch, I am not aware that I can improve upon it 
further than by the introduction of the additional clause to which I 
have referred. I believe that the new Bill will serve to place the 
accounts of the Colony on a thoroughly satisfactory footing, while it 
will satisfy the reasonable wish of the Council to see the Regulations 
of the Treasury and Audit Departments embodied in a legal form. 
 
I have, &c., WILLIAM C. F. ROBINSON. 
 
